AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 24355/94
by Kazimierz KALUZA
against Poland
The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting
in private on 17 January 1995, the following members being present:
Mr. H. DANELIUS, President
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
MM. G. JÖRUNDSSON
S. TRECHSEL
J.-C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
F. MARTINEZ
L. LOUCAIDES
J.-C. GEUS
M.A. NOWICKI
I. CABRAL BARRETO
J. MUCHA
D. SVÁBY
Mr. K. ROGGE, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 7 February 1994
by Kazimierz Kaluza against Poland and registered on 8 June 1994 under
file No. 24355/94;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case as submitted by the applicant may be
summarised as follows:
The applicant is a Polish citizen born in 1940. He is an
engineer, residing in Olawa.
In 1973 the applicant concluded a contract with the local state
administration for the use a plot of land in Olawa for 99 years. The
contract determined, inter alia, the rates to be paid each year. In
1990, as a result of the reform of the municipal administration, the
plot became the property of the municipality. On 16 September 1991 the
Board of the Olawa Municipal Council passed a resolution to increase
rates for use of the land owned by the municipality. On
18 September 1991 the Board informed the applicant of the increase.
The applicant and his neighbours filed a complaint about this
resolution to the Supreme Administrative Court. They argued that the
applicable law did not allow for an increase of the rates as they had
previously been determined in a civil contract between them as users
and the State as a former owner.
On 28 January 1992 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the
applicant's complaint. The Court considered that the Board's
resolution, even though taken by the municipal administration, had not
been an administrative decision and that it was a civil court which
would be competent to entertain the complaint.
Upon the applicant's request, the President of the Supreme Court
filed an extraordinary appeal to the Supreme Court on 8 July 1992. He
argued that the applicable law on land planning did not authorise the
municipalities to raise rates for the land use unilaterally. Moreover,
the resolution of the Municipal Board, although affecting the
applicant's civil rights and not an administrative decision in a strict
sense, was undeniably an act of an administrative character. Thus, the
Administrative Court should have entertained the complaint.
On 22 October 1992 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. The
Court considered that the contentious issue of the increase of the
rates for the land use fell within the competence of a civil court.
The applicant filed a civil action with the Olawa District Court
requesting declaration that the rates which he should pay were those
established by the parties in 1973. On 18 May 1993 the District Court
dismissed the action as it found that the applicant only questioned the
manner in which the rates had been raised but not their actual sum
after the raise. Thus, he had no legal interest in a determination
that the original rates were still binding between the parties.
The applicant appealed to the Wroclaw Regional Court and
requested exemption from the advance court costs. On 23 June 1993 the
Court refused to grant exemption. On 27 August 1993 the Court
dismissed the appeal.
On 31 December 1993 the President of the Supreme Court refused
to file an extraordinary appeal on the applicant's behalf.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention that
the judgments concerned are arbitrary and in breach of law and equity.
He contends that the rates for the use of land should have remained
unchanged as they had been agreed between the parties in a contract
concluded as a notarial deed. He contends that the Courts lacked
impartiality and independence. The applicant alleges that the Courts
failed to take evidence properly and wrongly assessed the evidence.
THE LAW
1. Insofar as the applicant's complaints relate to a period prior
to 1 May 1993, the Commission recalls that Poland recognised the
competence of the Commission to receive individual applications "from
any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individual
claiming to be a victim of a violation by Poland of the rights
recognised in the Convention through any act, decision or event
occurring after 30 April 1993."
It follows that this part of the application is outside the
competence ratione temporis of the Commission and therefore
incompatible with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning
of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).
2. The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention that the Courts lacked impartiality and independence. He
further complains that the judgments concerned are arbitrary and in
breach of law and equity. He contends that the rates for use of the
land should not have been unilaterally changed by one of the parties.
The Commission has examined these complaints in respect of the
period after 1 May 1993. However, under Article 19 (Art. 19) of the
Convention the only task of the Convention organs is to ensure the
observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties to the
Convention. In particular, it is not competent to deal with an
application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by
domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have
involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out
in the Convention. The Commission refers on this point to its
established case-law (see e.g. No. 458/59, Dec. 29.3.60, Yearbook 3
p. 222, 236; No. 5258/71, Dec. 8.2.73, Collection 43 pp. 71, 77; No.
7987/77, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 p. 31, 45).
It is true that the applicant also raises complaints under
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention about unfairness of the
proceedings. However, as regards the admissibility and assessment of
evidence, the Commission recalls that the admissibility of evidence is
primarily governed by the rules of domestic law, and as a general rule
it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before them. The
Commission's task is to ascertain whether the proceedings, considered
as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was submitted, were
fair (see Eur. Court.H.R., Lüdi judgment of 15 June 1992, Series A no.
238, p. 23, para.43).
In the present case the Commission has not found any elements
which could lead it to conclude that the right to a fair hearing was
not respected. There is no indication that in these proceedings the
applicant could not duly put forward his own submissions or that the
proceedings were otherwise unfairly conducted.
As regards the complaint concerning lack of impartiality and
independence of the courts, the Commission considers that the applicant
has not submitted any ascertainable facts which might raise doubts in
this respect. In particular he has not submitted any details which
could rebut the presumption of personal impartiality of the judges
involved or call into question the independence of the Courts dealing
with his case after 1 May 1993.
It follows that the remainder of the application is
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission unanimously
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the Second Chamber President of the Second Chamber
(K. ROGGE) (H. DANELIUS)
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy