FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 43696/14
Zofia KAŁUŻNA
against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 17 February 2015 as a Committee composed of:
George Nicolaou, President,
Ledi Bianku,
Krzysztof Wojtyczek, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 4 June 2014,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Ms Zofia Kałużna, is a Polish national, who was born in 1969 and lives in Łódź. She was represented before the Court by Ms M. Grabarska, a lawyer practising in Łódź.
The circumstances of the case
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
3. On 29 March 2013 the applicant’s son (K.) started serving his 3 years’ prison sentence. On 20 June 2013 he was placed in the solitary cell no. 24 on his request as he stated that he had not wanted to be part of the prison subculture anymore. The cell was not monitored.
4. On 24 June 2013 he was found dead in the cell. During the investigation an autopsy was performed and a relevant report established that K. had died of hanging. The investigation was opened in order to establish whether an offence prohibited by Article 155 of the Criminal Code (manslaughter) had been committed.
5. On 12 July 2013 a report issued by an inquiry group appointed by the Regional Director of the Prison Service stated that the applicant’s son had not been known or suspected of having suicidal tendencies. The applicant was 21 years old, he had never had any psychological problems, had been of a cheerful disposition and had been making plans for the future. This opinion was confirmed by the applicant during the investigation.
6. K. had been detained on remand on three occasions in 2011 and 2012 and he had never attempted to commit suicide in prison. He had been examined by a psychologist before he was committed to a single-occupancy cell. The psychologist had found K. fit for detention in such cell. The supervising officer also confirmed that the applicant could easily stay in that cell.
7. During the investigation an autopsy was performed and a relevant report established that K. had died of hanging. The inspection of the body carried out by a forensic expert confirmed this. The applicant left a suicide note and his will. The expert’s opinion confirmed K.’s handwriting.
8. On 30 September 2013 the Łódź-Baluty District Prosecutor discontinued the investigation, finding that no one had a case to answer. He found, by reference to testimony given by the prison officer, that at 23:30 on the material day he had found K. hanging in the cell, cut the rope, called for assistance and started to resuscitate K. Resuscitation efforts failed. The prosecution was of the view, referring to the autopsy report and to the testimony given by witnesses that there were no grounds on which to have any doubts as to the cause of his death, namely suicide by hanging 2-3 hours before he had been found by the prison officer.
9. The applicant appealed against this decision. The applicant submitted that the prisoners who had previously shared cells with K. had not been called to testify.
10. On 4 December 2013 the Łódź-Śródmieście District Court upheld the prosecutor’s decision. It was noted that the prosecutor had established the state of mind of K. and there was no need to interview his fellow inmates.
COMPLAINTS
11. The applicant complains under Article 2 of the Convention that the authorities had failed to take adequate measures to protect her son’s life and to prevent him from committing suicide in prison. She further complains that the investigation into her son’s death was ineffective due to the deficiencies described above.
THE LAW
12. The applicant complained that the authorities had failed to take adequate measures to protect her son’s life and to prevent him from committing suicide in prison. She further complains that the investigation into her son’s death was ineffective. She relied on Article 2 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.
....”
13. As to the substantive limb, it needs to be considered whether the State has complied with its positive obligations under Article 2 (see Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229/95, ECHR 2001-III and Trubnikov v. Russia, no. 49790/99, 5 July 2005). The Court has had previous occasion to emphasise that persons in custody are in a vulnerable position and that the authorities are under a duty to protect them (see Keenan, cited above, § 91; Younger v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 57420/00 and Trubnikov, cited above, § 68). The prison authorities, similarly, must discharge their duties in a manner compatible with the rights and freedoms of the individual concerned. There are general measures and precautions which will be available to diminish the opportunities for self-harm, without infringing personal autonomy. For a positive obligation to arise, it must be established that the authorities knew or ought to have known at the time, of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual and, if so, that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk (see, amongst other authorities, Keenan, cited above, §§ 89-92, ECHR 2001‑III, and A. and Others v. Turkey, no. 30015/96, §§ 44-45, 27 July 2004). In the present case, the domestic investigation confirmed that the applicant’s son had not been known or suspected of having suicidal tendencies. The authorities took sufficient measures to establish his mental condition - he had been consulted by a psychologist on 20 June 2013 and no abnormalities or problems had been revealed on this occasion. Furthermore, there does not appear to be any evidence of negligence or lack of supervision in the course of the events on the day the applicant’s son died. This part of the application is inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded.
14. As to the procedural limb of Article 2 of the Convention, it should be assessed whether the investigation was adequate and effective, namely whether it succeeded in establishing and examining all circumstances of her son’s death and addressed the applicant’s allegations. To be considered adequate the investigation into a death must be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but one of means. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability of establishing the circumstances of the case or the person responsible is liable to fall foul of this standard (see, Anguelova v. Bulgaria, no. 38361/97, § 140, ECHR 2002-IV). In the present case, there was no failure on the part of the State to provide a procedure whereby the responsibility of persons who may be held accountable could be established. The persons carrying out the investigation were independent from those implicated in the events. The investigation was prompt; it was instituted immediately after the death of the applicant’s son, an autopsy was carried out without a delay. Further, in the course of the investigations the prosecutors examined evidence from the applicant and the prisons officers. The investigation was effective as the authorities took whatever reasonable steps they could to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, forensic evidence and an autopsy which provided a complete and accurate record of injury and an objective analysis of the clinical findings, including the cause of death. It should be noted that the investigations’ conclusions were based on a thorough, impartial and non-arbitrary analysis of all relevant elements. It was convincingly shown that the authorities did not and should not have had any reason to suspect that M. would commit suicide – his psychological history and mental state were checked. In addition, the investigation was accessible to the victim’s family to the extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests. Consequently, her complaint is inadmissible as manifestly ill - founded.
15. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 12 March 2015.
Fatoş AracıGeorge Nicolaou
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy