FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 48339/99
by Matti KANGASLUOMA
against Finland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 21 May 2002 as a Chamber composed of
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrM. Pellonpää,
MrA. Pastor Ridruejo,
MrJ. Makarczyk,
MrsV. Strážnická,
MrR. Maruste,
MrS. Pavlovschi, judges,
and Mr M. O’Boyle, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 20 October 1998,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Matti Kangasluoma, is a Finnish national, who was born in 1949 and lives in Lapua, Finland. The respondent Government were represented by Mr Holger Rotkirch, Agent, Director General for Legal Affairs, and Mr Arto Kosonen, Agent, both from the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant was a managing director in company X. On 8 May 1990 X went into liquidation before the District Court (kihlakunnanoikeus, häradsrätt) of Isokyrö. The creditor withdrew the application later and the liquidation proceedings were terminated on 28 May 1990, only to be restarted on 15 August 1990.
In the autumn of 1990 the police started interrogating the applicant relating to the business actions and accounts of X. In 1991 the Central Criminal Police (keskusrikospoliisi, centralkriminalpolisen) conducted several searches of the applicant’s and X’s premises in Seinäjoki, Isokyrö and Nurmo. The police reports, resulting from the investigations, were dated 30 May 1991, 26 April 1993 and 7 July 1993. In respect of the third report the police carried out a further investigation which was terminated on 25 July 1994. The applicant was not taken into police custody during the criminal investigations or the subsequent criminal proceedings against him.
On 15 June 1994 the applicant was charged with eleven counts of offences, including, inter alia, aggravated tax fraud. The District Court held oral hearings on 7 September 1994, 8 December 1994, 22 February 1995, 20 April 1995 and 31 August 1995. The hearing was each time adjourned on the Prosecutor’s request. On 31 August 1995, the District Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to two years’ imprisonment. Also two other persons were accused and convicted of one offence each.
All the accused appealed to the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätt) of Vaasa which, by a decision of 25 January 1996, referred the case back to the District Court for reconsideration, on the grounds that the District Court’s judgment had been inadequately reasoned.
The case was reconsidered by the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätt) of Kyrönmaa, which had replaced the District Court of Isokyrö. On 14 November 1996, the District Court convicted the applicant on ten counts of offences and sentenced him to one year and ten months’ imprisonment.
In addition to the applicant, the prosecutor and the Tax Administration of Western Finland (Länsi-Suomen verovirasto, Västra Finlands skatteverk), which was a party to the proceedings, appealed to the Court of Appeal. On 2 February 1998 the Court of Appeal granted the applicant a partly cost-free trial as from 1 June 1996 onwards.
On 11 February 1998 the Court of Appeal acquitted the applicant of one of the charges and rejected the rest of the applicant’s appeal, upholding the prison sentence. The applicant was also obliged to pay the State of Finland a total of 3,460,000 Finnish Marks (equivalent to approximately 582,000 euros) with interest in compensation for unpaid taxes.
On 24 April 1998, the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) refused the applicant leave to appeal.
The applicant twice requested the reopening of the proceedings before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s requests on 25 August and 24 November 1998, respectively.
On 21 September 1998, the applicant complained to the Chancellor of Justice about the delay in the proceedings, amongst other things. It is not known to the Court what was the outcome of the complaint.
B. Relevant domestic law
According to Chapter 16, Section 4, subsection 2, of the Code of Judicial Procedure (oikeudenkäymiskaari, rättegångsbalken), as in force at the relevant time, a District Court was allowed to adjourn a hearing of a criminal case upon request by a party to the proceedings. Any party who considered that the case had unjustifiably been delayed by an adjournment, had the right to lodge a complaint with a Court of Appeal within 30 days from the date of the adjournment. The law was amended as from 1 October 1997, prohibiting adjournment as a general rule.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, about the length of the criminal proceedings against him.
2. Moreover, the applicant complains that he did not have a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal. He invokes Article 6 of the Convention. The applicant refers in this respect to the following aspects:
a) he was not allowed to present all the evidence he wanted in the domestic courts;
b) the evidence presented by him was not evaluated in his favour;
c) the evidence against him had been obtained through coercive means;
d) he should not have been convicted; and
e) the amount of the money he had to pay is unjust.
3. The applicant complains, without invoking any Articles of the Convention, that the liquidation proceedings of X were started without the issuing of a summons.
4. Finally, the applicant claims that he did not have adequate time for the preparation of his defence before the District Court as guaranteed by Article 6 § 3(b) of the Convention.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the length of criminal proceedings against him exceeded a reasonable time. Article 6 § 1 reads, insofar as relevant, as follows:
“In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The applicant’s complaint relates to the length of proceedings, which began in December 1990 when the applicant was interrogated by the police and when the criminal investigations against him was commenced. The proceedings ended on 24 April 1998 with the Supreme Court’s decision not to grant the applicant leave to appeal. The applicant submits that the proceedings to be taken into account therefore lasted seven years and four months.
According to the applicant, the length of the proceedings is in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Especially the time taken by the police and the Prosecutor exceeded reasonable time as the charges against the applicant were brought in 1994, even though most part of the investigations had been terminated by the police already in the spring of 1991.
The Government, according to whom the proceedings at issue began on 15 June 1994 when the applicant was formally charged, reject the allegation. According to the Government, the applicant failed to exhaust the domestic remedies available to him under Finnish law, more particularly under Chapter 16, Section 4(2) of the Code of Judicial Procedure as in force at the relevant time. Alternatively the Government argue that the application is manifestly ill-founded. The proceedings to be taken into account lasted only three years ten months and nine days, which is not excessive in an extensive and complex case of economic offences. There were three accused and five complainants in the proceedings. The charges against the applicant consisted of eleven indictments concerning accounting offences, aggravated tax fraud, aggravated fraud, dishonesty by a debtor, aggravated fraud by a debtor and embezzlement. The Court of Appeal files include 3,065 pages of documentary evidence. It is thus obvious that the proceedings were time-consuming.
The Court considers, in the light of the criteria established in its case-law on the question of “reasonable time” (the complexity of the case, the applicant’s conduct and that of the competent authorities), and having regard to all the information in its possession, that an examination of the merits of this complaint is required.
As the question of existence of effective remedies is closely connected with the merits of the case, the Court decides to join that question to the merits.
The applicant also submits that he did not have an effective remedy in respect of the excessive length of the proceedings within the meaning of Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
The applicant argued that he did not have an effective remedy in respect of the length of the criminal investigations pending against him (since 1990 until 1994) as he could not even think of the possibility of being charged with an offence before the court. Later, during the criminal proceedings against him, he repeatedly reminded the domestic courts about the length of the proceedings and requested that the proceedings be expedited. Moreover, the case was once referred back to the District Court because the first District Court decision was so inadequately reasoned that it could not be approved even by the Court of Appeal. This caused a long unnecessary delay in the proceedings.
The Government argued that the applicant had an effective remedy before a national authority. As regards the delay of the police investigations he could have lodged a complaint with the superior police authorities and, in respect of the delay in the consideration of the charges, to a superior prosecutor but he failed to do so. In accordance with the law applicable until 1 October 1998, i.e. during the District Court proceedings at issue, the applicant could have appealed to the Court of Appeal against the District Court’s decisions to adjourn a hearing. The applicant, however, failed to use this opportunity as well. As the applicant has not even claimed that the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court proceedings exceeded a “reasonable time”, the applicant has been provided with an effective remedy before a national authority. The Government also recalls that the applicant could, and did, complain about the length of the proceedings to the Chancellor of Justice.
The Court considers that this complaint is closely connected with the complaint made under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the excessive length of proceedings. It raises serious issues of fact and law under the Convention, the determination of which requires an examination of the merits. The Court concludes therefore that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.
2. The applicant also complains, under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, that he did not have a fair trial by an independent and impartial tribunal as
a) he was not allowed to present all the evidence he wanted before the domestic courts;
b) the evidence presented by him was not evaluated in his favour;
c) the evidence against him had been obtained through coercive means;
d) he should not have been convicted; and
e) the amount of the money he had to pay is unjust.
In this respect the Court first recalls that its task is not to examine whether or not the applicant was guilty or innocent of the offences of which he was convicted. The taking of evidence is governed primarily by the rules of domestic law and it is in principle for the national courts to assess the evidence before them, in particular since they have the benefit of hearing witnesses and assessing their credibility. The Court’s task is to ascertain whether the proceedings in their entirety, including the way the evidence was taken, were fair.
The Court considers that the fact that the domestic courts decided against the applicant and found the evidence submitted by the prosecutor more credible than that submitted by the applicant does not mean that the applicant did not receive a fair hearing. Moreover, the Court of Appeal referred the case back to the District Court to be re-examined as it was not satisfied with the District Court’s original reasoning. As regards the complaint that the evidence against the applicant had been obtained through coercive measures, the Court finds no evidence to support this allegation. In view of this, there is no indication of a violation of Article 6 § 1 on the grounds relied on by the applicant.
It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
3. The applicant further complains, without invoking any Articles of the Convention, that the liquidation proceedings of X were started without the issuing of a summons.
In the absence of any relevant court documents or other evidence, the Court recalls in this respect that the relevant proceedings were apparently terminated in 1990. As the present application was 7 May 1999, i.e. more than six months later, this part of the application was submitted too late.
It follows that this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
4. Finally, the applicant claims that he did not have adequate time for the preparation of his defence before the District Court as guaranteed by Article 6 § 3(b) of the Convention. The relevant provision reads as follows:
“3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;...”
In this respect the Court recalls that the applicant’s case was pending before the District Court on two occasions, the first period lasting from the day on which the applicant was first charged with offences on 15 June 1994 until the District Court’s first decision issued on 31 August 1995 after five oral hearings in which the applicant was present. The second part of the District Court proceedings lasted from the end of January 1996 until 14 November 1996 when the District Court’s second judgment was issued. Taking into account that the case was thus pending before the District Court for almost two years, during which time the applicant was provided with amble opportunities to submit his defence to the court, the Court finds the applicant’s complaint manifestly ill-founded.
It follows that this part of the application must also be rejected within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares admissible, without prejudging the merits, the applicant’s complaints concerning the length of the criminal proceedings against him and the alleged lack of an effective remedy;
Declares inadmissible the remainder of the application.
Michael O’BoyleNicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy