SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 60759/00
by Ilona KAPITÁNY
against Hungary
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 17 February 2004 as a Chamber composed of
MrJ.-P. Costa, President,
MrA.B. Baka,
MrL. Loucaides,
MrC. Bîrsan,
MrK. Jungwiert,
MrM. Ugrekhelidze,
MrsA. Mularoni, judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 14 May 2000 and registered on 11 September 2000,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Ms Ilona Kapitány, is a Hungarian[Note1] national, who was born in 1949 and lives in Pécs, Hungary. She is represented before the Court by her father, Mr I. Kapitány. The respondent Government are represented by Mr L. Höltzl, Deputy State-Secretary, Ministry of Justice.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
A. Administrative proceedings and litigation with a view to obliging the applicant’s neighbours to arrange for the drainage of rainwater on their land
At the applicant’s request, in 1991 the Pécs City Council ordered her neighbours to arrange for the drainage of rainwater on their land. On 25 February 1992 the Office of the Representative of the Republic (Köztársasági Megbízott Hivatala) quashed this decision and remitted the case to the first administrative instance. The applicant’s related court action was finally dismissed on 19 November 1992.
On 28 December 1993 the City Council discontinued the resumed administrative proceedings. On 20 May 1994 the Office of the Representative of the Republic quashed this decision and again remitted the case to the first administrative instance.
On 11 August 1994 the City Council discontinued the resumed proceedings. On 12 October 1994 the Office of the Representative of the Republic quashed this decision and again remitted the case to the first administrative instance.
Subsequently, the Komló Town Mayor’s Office was appointed to deal with the case as a first administrative instance in the resumed proceedings. On 3 April 1995 it ordered the neighbours to carry out the necessary works by 1 September 1995. On 28 June 1995 the County Administrative Office essentially upheld this decision.
On 31 July 1995 the neighbours brought an action seeking judicial review of the above administrative decisions. On 28 August 1995 the applicant challenged the competent Szekszárd District Court for bias. On 3 October 1995 she intervened in the proceedings on the side of the defendant Administrative Office.
On 15 January 1996 the Supreme Court appointed the Nyíregyháza District Court to hear the case.
On 26 June 1996 the District Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ action holding that the defendant Office’s procedure had been in compliance with the law.
On appeal, on 10 December 1996 the Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg County Regional Court upheld this decision. The plaintiffs filed a petition for a review by the Supreme Court.
On 17 March 1997 the applicant requested the enforcement of the Regional Court’s decision. In reply to the applicant’s enquiry, on 8 July 1997 the President of the Baranya County Regional Court confirmed that the pending review proceedings were not an obstacle to the execution of the decision of 10 December 1996.
On 6 January 1999 the Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition for review.
On 28 January 1999 the Komló Town Mayor’s Office ordered the execution of its decision of 3 April 1995. A time-limit was set for 15 June 1999.
On 15 June 1999 the neighbours notified the Mayor’s Office that the works had been completed.
B. Administrative proceedings in pursuit of the applicant’s complaint about the technical solution adopted for the works
On 22 June 1999 the applicant informed the Csongrád County Administrative Office that she was not satisfied with the technical solution adopted for the drainage works. On 3 July 1999 the Komló Town Mayor’s Office appointed an expert. On 24 August 1999 the Mayor’s Office, relying on the expert opinion, ordered the neighbours to alter the construction. After several postponements, the Mayor’s Office decided that they would have until 30 April 2001 to complete the necessary works.
An inspection of the works was carried out on 18 May 2001. On 23 May 2001 a fine was imposed on the neighbours for non-compliance with the administrative orders. On appeal, on 17 August 2001 the County Administrative Office increased the amount of the fine. A further fine was imposed on the neighbours on 29 November 2001.
On 23 May 2002 another inspection took place. It was found that a major part of the works had been completed.
The applicant’s criminal complaints against various officials involved in the case were to no avail.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains that the administrative litigation lasted an unreasonably long time. She also submits that the domestic authorities’ proceedings were not fair. Lastly, she complains that her accusations against the officials involved were not properly examined. She invokes Articles 6, 13, 14 and 17 of the Convention.
THE LAW
1.The applicant complains that the administrative litigation lasted an unreasonably long time and was not fair, in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in its relevant part, provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time ... .”
The Government submit that the applicant did not exhaust the domestic remedies available to her in that she did not bring an official liability action under section 349 of the Civil Code. In any event, in the Government’s view, the proceedings ended, at the latest, on 15 June 1999 with the completion of the drainage works, i.e. more than six months before the application was lodged. Furthermore, they assert that the case was rather complex, and that two administrative and three court instances dealt with it without any particular periods of inactivity having being shown.
The applicant contests these views.
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention provides:
“The Court may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.
The Court observes that on 6 January 1999 the Supreme Court upheld the Regional Court’s decision and that the execution of the principal administrative decision was ordered on 28 January 1999. The prescribed works were completed by 15 June 1999. In these circumstances, the Court is satisfied that the final decision in the case was given by the Supreme Court on 6 January 1999. However, the application was introduced only on 14 May 2000, i.e. more than six months later.
It follows that this part of the application has been introduced outside the six-month time-limit prescribed by Article 35 § 1 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
2.The applicant also complains that the administrative proceedings in pursuit of her technical complaints lasted an unreasonably long time and were not fair.
The Court observes that the proceedings, which started on 22 June 1999 and ended on 23 May 2002, took place exclusively before administrative authorities, without the intervention of any tribunal. They did not concern either the applicant’s civil rights or obligations, or the determination of any criminal charge against her. In these circumstances, Article 6 of the Convention does not apply to those proceedings.
It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
3.Lastly, the applicant complains that her accusations against the officials involved in the proceedings were not properly examined.
The Court observes that the Convention does not guarantee as such any right in the circumstances of this case to press criminal charges against third persons.
It follows that this part of the application is likewise incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
S. DolléJ.-P. Costa
RegistrarPresident
[Note1]To be checked.
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