THIRD SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 56109/13
Olga Stanislavovna KAPUSTINA
against Russia
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 7 June 2022 as a Chamber composed of:
Georges Ravarani, President,
Georgios A. Serghides,
María Elósegui,
Anja Seibert-Fohr,
Peeter Roosma,
Andreas Zünd,
Mikhail Lobov, judges,
and Milan Blaško, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 19 August 2013,
Having regard to the observations submitted in 2017 by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Ms Olga Stanislavovna Kapustina, is a Russian national who was born in 1951 and lives in Saratov.
2. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were initially represented by Mr G. Matyushkin and Mr M. Galperin, former Representatives of the Russian Federation to the European Court of Human Rights, and later by their successor in that office, Mr M. Vinogradov.
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
4. A court examined a civil case against the applicant and ordered her eviction from a flat. On 7 September 2012 a bailiff came to the flat and tried to enforce that judgment.
5. An administrative-offence report under Article 17.8 (impeding the enforcement activities of a bailiff) of the Code of Administrative Offences of the Russian Federation (“the CAO”) was compiled in respect of the applicant. On 27 September 2012 a justice of the peace sentenced her to a fine of 1,000 Russian roubles (RUB) (25 euros (EUR)). On 19 December 2012 the Volzhskiy District Court of Saratov upheld the judgment. The applicant lodged an application for review before the Saratov Regional Court. On 19 February 2013 a judge of the Regional Court examined that application under the written procedure as prescribed by the CAO and upheld the lower courts’ decisions.
COMPLAINT
6. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that she had not been afforded an opportunity to be present at the trial and appeal hearings in the CAO case.
THE LAW
7. Referring to the small amount of the fine imposed on the applicant, the Government argued that the complaint had to be dismissed for lack of any significant disadvantage or because the “criminal” limb of Article 6 of the Convention was thus inapplicable. They also argued that she had not complied with the six-month rule under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention because she had lodged her application before the Court more than six months after the appeal proceedings in the CAO case. In any event, the national authorities had taken adequate measures to notify her of the hearings.
8. The applicant submitted that the CAO case had to be seen in the context of the eviction proceedings against her. The case had caused her to suffer a significant disadvantage, in that it made it impossible for her to obtain restitution of her belongings or to seek the institution of criminal proceedings against the bailiffs.
9. The Court will first deal with the Government’s objection pertaining to the admissibility of the present complaint, specifically as regards the absence of a significant disadvantage.
10. Protocol No. 15 to the Convention entered into force on 1 August 2021. Article 5 of the Protocol reads as follows:
“In Article 35, paragraph 3, sub-paragraph b of the Convention, the words ‘and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal’ shall be deleted.”
11. Accordingly, at present Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention reads as follows:
“3. The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that:
...
(b) the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits.”
Has the applicant suffered any significant disadvantage?12. A violation of a Convention right, however real from a purely legal point of view, should attain a minimum level of severity to warrant consideration by an international court. The assessment of this minimum level is relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case. The severity of a violation should be assessed considering both the applicant’s subjective perceptions and what is objectively at stake in a particular case. In other words, the absence of any “significant disadvantage” can be based on criteria such as the financial impact of the matter in dispute or the importance of the case for the applicant. However, the applicant’s subjective perception cannot alone suffice to conclude that he or she has suffered a significant disadvantage. The subjective perception must be justified on objective grounds. A violation of the Convention may concern important questions of principle and thus cause a significant disadvantage regardless of pecuniary interest (see Margulev v. Russia, no. 15449/09, § 40, 8 October 2019; Korolev v. Russia (dec.), no. 25551/05, ECHR 2010; Rinck v. France (dec.), no. 18774/09, 19 October 2010; Fernandez v. France (dec.), no. 65421/10, 17 January 2012; and Sylka v. Poland (dec.), no. 19219/07, 3 June 2014). It may be pertinent to take account of, inter alia, the nature of the Convention right or freedom allegedly violated, the seriousness of the claimed violation and/or the potential consequences of the violation on the personal situation of the applicant. In evaluating these consequences, the Court will examine, in particular, what is at stake or the outcome of the domestic proceedings (see Giusti v. Italy, no. 13175/03, §§ 22-36, 18 October 2011).
13. The applicant was sentenced to a fine of RUB 1,000 (EUR 25 at the time it was due). It appears that at that time she was a recently retired person entitled to a pension payable by the State. However, she has not substantiated that the domestic proceedings entailed any hardship for her. Given the modest amount at stake, the Court concludes that this was not the case. Moreover, it is not clear whether she paid the fine. Non-payment or a delay in payment of the fine could entail a separate prosecution for an offence under Article 20.25 of the CAO, which is punishable by a penalty of detention or another fine (see Mikhaylova v. Russia, no. 46998/08, §§ 29 and 63, 19 November 2015). The eventuality of that new prosecution is too remote, and, in any event, the applicant was never prosecuted in that connection.
14. The applicant was convicted of an administrative offence. That conviction did not entail any consequence relating to her criminal record (compare Gulmammadov v. Azerbaijan (dec.) [Committee], no. 33234/08, 12 December 2017). The Court does not discern from the available material any further adverse consequences for the applicant, for instance as regards any litigation costs incurred by her in relation to the domestic proceedings. She has not provided sufficient details of her alleged attempts to secure the restitution of her belongings or the prosecution of the bailiffs, or of any causal link between those matters and the CAO case against her. Lastly, the Court notes that the applicant has raised no other meritorious complaints under the Convention in relation to the CAO case (compare, in the context of Article 10 or 11 of the Convention, Margulev, cited above, §§ 41‑43; Obote v. Russia, no. 58954/09, §§ 29-32, 19 November 2019; Asainov and Sibiryak v. Russia [Committee], nos. 16694/13 and 32701/13, §§ 13, 23, 32 and 54, 4 December 2018; and Aristov and Gromov v. Russia [Committee], nos. 76191/12 and 5438/13, §§ 23, 40 and 63, 9 October 2018).
15. The Court concludes that the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage as a result of the alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention.
Does respect for human rights require an examination of the complaint on the merits?16. A violation of the Convention may concern important questions of principle and thus cause a significant disadvantage without affecting any pecuniary interest. The Court considers that the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 of the Convention does not raise new legal issues, including issues of a structural nature, or questions of principle (contrast Berladir and Others v. Russia, no. 34202/06, § 34, 10 July 2012; Mikhaylova, cited above, § 49; Karelin v. Russia, no. 926/08, § 41, 20 September 2016; and Vyacheslav Korchagin v. Russia, no. 12307/16, §§ 52-54, 28 August 2018).
17. The matter of applicants not being properly summoned to court hearings has been addressed on numerous occasions in the Court’s judgments on Article 6 of the Convention, including under its criminal limb (see Stadukhin v. Russia, no. 6857/02, §§ 31-37, 18 October 2007, and Abramyan v. Russia, no. 10709/02, §§ 31-33, 9 October 2008) and in relation to minor‑offence proceedings (see Jussila v. Finland [GC], no. 73053/01, §§ 40‑49, ECHR 2006‑XIV; Flisar v. Slovenia, no. 3127/09, §§ 33-40, 29 September 2011; Marčan v. Croatia, no. 40820/12, §§ 33-48, 10 July 2014, with further references; and, as regards cases against Russia concerning the CAO, Vyacheslav Korchagin, cited above, §§ 58-81; Martynyuk v. Russia, no. 13764/15, § 29, 8 October 2019; and Kustova and Bibanin v. Russia [Committee], nos. 44309/06 and 39973/08, §§ 40-52, 28 January 2020).
18. The Court considers that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto does not require an examination of the present application on the merits.
Further considerations19. From 1 June 2010 to 1 August 2021, Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention contained a “safeguard clause” which provided that no case could be rejected by the Court on the grounds of no significant disadvantage where the case had not been “duly considered” by a domestic tribunal.
20. Pursuant to Article 8 § 3 of Protocol No. 15 to the Convention, Article 4 of the Protocol is to enter into force following the expiry of a period of six months after the date of entry into force of the Protocol. Article 4 of the Protocol does not apply to applications in respect of which the final decision within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention was taken prior to the date of entry into force of that Article 4. Pursuant to Article 8 § 4 of the Protocol, all other provisions of the Protocol – including Article 5, which is relevant in the present case – will apply from its date of entry into force, in accordance with the provisions of Article 7 of the Protocol.
21. The Court also takes note of the Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 15, and specifically paragraphs 23 and 24 of that report. It specifies that the change under Article 5 of the Protocol concerning the admissibility criterion of “significant disadvantage” is intended to give greater effect to the maxim de minimis non curat praetor; no transitional provision is foreseen for that change. In accordance with Article 8 § 4 of the Protocol, that change applies as of the entry into force of the Protocol, in order not to delay the impact of the expected enhancement of the effectiveness of the system. The Explanatory Report indicates that the change therefore applies also to applications on which the admissibility decision is pending at the date of entry into force of the Protocol.
22. Under Article 32 of the Convention, the jurisdiction of the Court extends to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto which are referred to it as provided (in the present case) in Article 34 of the Convention. In the event of dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court is to decide.
23. In the present case the alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention took place in 2012. The application was lodged with the Court in 2013. In 2017 the Government were given notice of it. The parties were invited to submit observations on the admissibility and merits of the complaint under Article 6 of the Convention.
24. The question before the Court in the present case is limited to the temporal application of a change concerning proceedings before the Court – namely, an admissibility criterion set out in Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention rather than a change affecting the substance of a right or freedom protected by the Convention – in the context where the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage relating to a complaint under Article 6 of the Convention.
25. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that in the present case it is not necessary to ascertain whether the applicant’s “case” was “duly considered” by a domestic tribunal (see, in the same vein, Bartolo v. Malta (dec.), no. 40761/19, § 22, 7 September 2021).
Conclusion26. The Court concludes that the application must be declared inadmissible under Article 35 §§ 3 (b) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, by a majority,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 28 July 2022.
Milan Blaško Georges Ravarani
Registar President