FOURTH SECTION
PARTIAL DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 21422/02
by Kari UOTI
against Finland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 21 September 2004 as a Chamber composed of:
MrsV. Strážnická, President,
MrM. Pellonpää,
MrL. Garlicki,
MrJ. Borrego Borrego,
MrsE. Fura-Sandström,
MsL. Mijović,
MrD. Spielmann, judges,
and Mrs F. Elens-Passos, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 28 May 2002,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Kari Uoti, is a Finnish national, who was born in 1962 and lives in Helsinki.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant and as they appear from the documents, may be summarised as follows.
On 7 September 1995 the applicant was interrogated by the police about suspected fraud offences. In autumn 1997 he was charged with several offences.
The trial before the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) of Helsinki involved 47 hearings. On 29 January 1999 the District Court convicted the applicant of three counts of dishonesty as a debtor (velallisen epärehellisyys, oredlighet som gäldenär; nos. 1.1; 6; and 8 in the indictment) and four counts of aggravated tax fraud (törkeä veropetos, grovt skattebedrägeri; nos. 19; 21; 23; and 25 in the indictment) and sentenced him to four years' imprisonment. The applicant was ordered to pay, inter alia, damages approximately 46,000,000 Finnish Marks (FIM, corresponding 7,865,000 euros; EUR).
The public prosecutor appealed against the judgment insofar as some of the charges had been dismissed and introduced alternative charges of aiding and abetting accounting offences (kirjanpitorikos, bokföringsbrott). The prosecutor and the victims did not request an oral hearing.
The applicant appealed against all counts on which he had been convicted and requested an oral hearing. He claimed, inter alia, that the statute of limitations had expired with regard to many charges against him. In particular, he requested that a Mr G., who had previously submitted a memorandum contained in some letters rogatory, be heard as a witness either in the Court of Appeal or by executive assistance abroad in case the court was not satisfied that the account of a witness S. was sufficient evidence as regards the value and content of the documents drawn up by G.
On 12 May 2000 the Court of Appeal informed the parties of the preliminary timetable and that, should it decide to hold an oral hearing in the case, the hearing would commence at the earliest in the end of October 2000.
On 30 June 2000 the Court of Appeal informed the parties provisionally that it was going to hold an oral hearing and the parties were requested to prepare for the hearing as from 13 November 2000.
On 15 September 2000, after exchange of some observations, the court confirmed that the hearing would commence on 13 November 2000 and that an oral hearing would be held covering counts nos. 2-9 (counts 2, 4, 6 and 8 (dishonesty as a debtor) concerned the applicant, the first two of which the District Court had dismissed). The Court of Appeal further invited the parties to submit their comments on the scope and manner of presentation of any oral evidence to the court by 29 September 2000. It also informed them that a decision concerning an oral hearing on the other counts in the matter would be issued later.
On 29 September 2000 the Court of Appeal issued the parties with a summons for the principal hearing fixed for 8 November 2000. The summons stated that the oral hearing would concern, in addition to counts nos. 2-9, also counts nos. 11-34 (counts 2, 4, 6, 8 (dishonesty as a debtor), 11, 13, 15, 17 (accounting offence, or alternatively, aiding and abetting an accounting offence), 19, 21, 23, 25 (aggravated tax fraud) and 27 (accounting offence, or alternatively, aiding and abetting an accounting offence) concerned the applicant; the District Court had dismissed counts nos. 2, 4, 11, 13, 15, 17 and 27).
On 3 October 2000 the applicant received another notice from the Court of Appeal, which contained a more detailed description of the scope of the hearing of 8 November 2000, and its timetable. The letter also stated that a decision concerning the need of an oral hearing concerning the other counts would be issued later. For that purpose, the parties were invited to identify their witnesses to the court by 10 October 2000.
On 6 October 2000 the Court of Appeal informed the parties that a decision about the necessity of an oral hearing concerning counts nos. 1.1-1.7 (dishonesty as a debtor; only count 1.1 had been accepted by the District Court), 10.1-10.10 (dishonesty as a debtor; the District Court had dismissed these counts), 27 (aiding and abetting to an accounting offence; the applicant had been acquitted in the District Court) and 35 (which did not concern the applicant), had not yet been issued. The parties were invited to inform the court by 17 October 2000 of the witnesses they wanted to be heard.
In the letter the Court of Appeal also stated, inter alia, that:
“The charges in question have to a large degree been dismissed by the District Court. The public prosecutor and the victims have however demanded that the charges be accepted. Insofar as the charges have been accepted, the defendants have requested an oral hearing. To change the District Court's judgment insofar as it is based on the reliability of the oral evidence requires according to the so-called old provisions of the Chapter 26 of the Code of Judicial Procedure [oikeudenkäymiskaari, rättegångsbalken] an oral hearing in the Court of Appeal. If the decision concerning a charge depends on the reliability of the oral evidence received in the District Court, an oral hearing in the Court of Appeal may be necessary despite the fact that the old provisions are being applied.“
On 11 October 2000, in reply to the letter of 6 October 2000, the applicant put forward two witnesses (including G.) and maintained that he did not request an oral hearing insofar as the charges against him had been dismissed by the District Court.
On 13 October 2000 the Court of Appeal sent the parties a summary of the witnesses as presented by the parties so far. According to the summary the public prosecutor had submitted, following the above mentioned notice of 6 October 2000, that his planned evidence concerning the dismissed charges (1.1-1.7, 10.1-10.10 and 27) against the applicant, was “as in the District Court” (“kuten käräjäoikeudessa”). The court also stated that a final decision about the scope of the oral hearing had not yet been issued. The parties were informed that they would be informed separately of a possible preparatory hearing in the matter and that should there be one, it would be held on 31 October 2000.
On 17 October 2000 the public prosecutor informed the court that she had initially anticipated that there would be no oral hearing before the Court of Appeal and that it would have been possible to convict the applicant in written proceedings even of those counts which the District Court had dismissed. She now however maintained that the Court of Appeal should hear all those witnesses that were heard, or listed by the prosecutor to be heard, in the District Court.
On 17 October 2000 the applicant objected in his letter to the Court of Appeal to the public prosecutor's request to hear all the witnesses again referring, inter alia, to the public prosecutor's prior wish not to have an oral hearing in the first place and invoking Article 6 § 3(b) of the Convention. He maintained that in the light of the Court of Appeal's prior notices the defence was prepared to present oral evidence in a more restricted scope only. He maintained that the remaining time before the scheduled hearing was insufficient for the additional preparation.
On 24 October 2000 the Court of Appeal informed the parties that it had issued a decision about the oral evidence in the matter, appending the decision for the parties' information. It noted that a decision about the remaining parts of the evidence was going to be issued in the preparatory hearing on 31 October 2000.
On 25 October 2000 the Court of Appeal sent a summary consisting of 28 pages of some witness statements given in the District Court. The parties were invited to inform the court in the preparatory hearing of 31 October 2000 whether the summary corresponded to the witness statements given in the District Court. The parties were informed that the court would send them the remainder of the summary as soon as it was finished.
On 27 October 2000 the Court of Appeal informed the parties of its decision about the oral evidence concerning counts nos. 10.1-10.10 and 27 and sent the parties the remainder of the above mentioned summary. The decision contained 30 new witnesses and the topics for their examination. The parties were instructed that a decision concerning 10 witnesses and the topics of their examinations was going to be issued in the preparatory hearing of 31 October 2000.
In sum, the Court of Appeal's above mentioned letters informed the parties that an oral hearing was going to be held also concerning counts nos. 1.1, 1.4-1.6, 10.1-10.2, 10.4-10.10 and 11-34, and informed about the planned witnesses and about the preparatory hearing.
On 30 October 2000 the applicant informed the Court of Appeal that it had not been possible for him to check in necessary detail the entire summary during the one working day and the one weekend before the preparatory hearing. He contested that given the early date of the first principal hearing (8 November 2000) and the very large number of witnesses and the vast scope of the case (the case-file comprised over 10,000 pages of documents) it was impossible to prepare for the trial in the given time. The applicant invoked Article 6 § 3(b) of the Convention and requested that the preparatory hearing be postponed.
On 31 October 2000 the preparatory hearing was held, principally to discuss the oral evidence. The applicant unsuccessfully renewed his objection concerning the possibilities to prepare his defence. The Court of Appeal held that it was not necessary to hear the witness G. proposed by the applicant, resident in Guernsey. The court noted that it would give reasons for its decision later in the judgment. G. represented a company selling off-shore companies and had produced documents following letters rogatory sent by the National Bureau of Investigation (keskusrikospoliisi, centralkriminalpolisen).
The minutes of the preparatory hearing were completed on 2 November 2000 and sent for the parties' information. Consequently, according to the applicant, the decision about the necessary evidence was issued only two weekdays before the principal hearing.
The first hearing took place on 8 November 2000. The principal hearings continued for nine days on 9 November, 13-17 November, 20 November and 22 November 2000. Altogether 27 witnesses were heard during the principal hearings (the hearing of 27 other proposed witnesses was rejected). According to the applicant the overall time taken in preparation and court appearance was often over 12 hours per day, the longest court-day having lasted 14 hours. He claims that the presiding judge ordered the parties to declare the necessary time for their closing arguments beforehand and that this time was strictly monitored at the last hearing.
On 30 March 2001 the Court of Appeal issued its judgment. In addition to the convictions imposed by the District Court, the Court of Appeal convicted the applicant on four counts of dishonesty as a debtor (nos. 1.1, 1.4, 1.5 and 1.6; 2; 4; and 10.1, 10.2, 10.4-10.10) and on five counts of aiding and abetting an accounting offence (nos. 11; 13; 15; 17; and 27). The applicant was sentenced to six years' imprisonment and ordered to immediate detention. His military rank was also repealed. The applicant was ordered to pay damages over FIM 60,000,000 (approximately EUR 10,000,000) plus interest.
As regarded the reasons for not hearing witness G. (see above the decision of 31 October 2000), it was held in the Court of Appeal's judgment (pp. 103-104), inter alia, that:
“The Court of Appeal notes that no request to hear G. as witness was made in the District Court although the documents relating to the plan to transfer moneys from the “bank group I.” had been presented in the hearings of 29 May and 10 June 1998... Also [the applicant] relied as written evidence on [some] documents drawn up by G. without requesting that G. be heard as witness...
The import of the documents drawn up by [G.] can be assessed without hearing him as a witness. The necessity of whether or not to hear him as a witness depends solely on the fact of whether his hearing could produce relevant new information. In assessing this question the Court of Appeal takes into account the fact that in the District Court G. was not proposed as a witness and the fact that the parties in the Court of Appeal have been provided with an opportunity to put forward all their opinions concerning the content and reliability of the documents.
The Court of Appeal notes that the documents in question have been requested by the public prosecutor and the National Bureau of Investigation by way of sending letters rogatory to the Guernsey authorities. The Court of Appeal does not have any reason to suspect that the documents would have been drawn up by someone else than G...
The documents clearly indicate that there has been a deliberate conspiracy to transfer the assets acquired from the sale of the “bank group I.” to companies established abroad and to invest the moneys. The transfer of assets has been conducted, as later explained in detail in chapter 6.2.2, by order of... [the applicant]. The question of whether G. himself thought that he was involved in legal investment activities only is therefore not relevant.
The documents drawn up by G. are however relevant in assessing... [the applicant's] possible guilt for the offence of dishonesty as a debtor... As becomes manifest in the reasons given for the consideration of charges the Court of Appeal has however not decided the matter entirely based on the documents in question. The court has instead assessed the value of the documents in such an overall context [kokonaisyhteydessä] in which G. cannot have anything relevant to say.
The Court of Appeal has heard the witness S., as requested by [the applicant], about the events relating to the documents. The testimony of S., which in the [the applicant's] opinion prove the content of the discussions with G., has thus been taken into account... The Court of Appeal holds that the requirements of a fair trial do not require that G. be heard as a witness, either.”
The Court of Appeal also refused to hear, inter alia, a witness A., proposed by the applicant, noting that A. had hardly any recollection of relevant events when interrogated in the pre-trial investigations.
One of the items of evidence used by the Court of Appeal (p. 178-179 in the Court of Appeal's judgment) was the pre-trial statements of a witness N., the contents of which N.'s legal counsel had renewed in the District Court. N. had been personally present in the District Court on three occasions but he was not heard as a witness before his death on 21 April 1998. N. had testified to the police, inter alia, that a S. had asked him to act as the member of the board of directors in some companies owned by the applicant and his brother, to which he had agreed and recruited two other persons for the same job.
The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen), inter alia, repeating his previous complaints and requesting L. to be heard as witness, maintaining that the Court of Appeal had given great weight to his written testimony although the public prosecutor had not identified him as a witness. On 5 December 2001 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal.
B. Relevant domestic law
According to Chapter 17, section 11 of the Code of Judicial Procedure, as in force at the relevant time, a written statement drawn up with the intention of being used in an anticipated or pending trial, could not be allowed to be used as evidence, unless specifically provided for by law or unless the court so decided for particular reasons.
According to Chapter 26, section 7 of the Code of Judicial Procedure (661/1978), as in force at the relevant time, the Court of Appeal was to hold an oral hearing when necessary.
According to Chapter 26, section 8 of the Code of Judicial Procedure (661/1978), as in force at the relevant time, the Court of Appeal could not change a lower court's conviction based on the evaluation of evidence without holding an oral hearing, unless the case concerned an offence punishable by fines only or unless an oral hearing was manifestly unnecessary, in particular taking into account the defendant's need of legal protection.
The provisions concerning the Court of Appeal's duty to hold an oral hearing were amended (165/1998), effective as from 1 May 1998. The new provisions did not apply to criminal proceedings which had commenced prior to the entry into force of the new Code on Criminal Procedure (laki oikeudenkäynnistä rikosasioissa, lag om rättegång i brottmål; 689/1997; in force as from 1 October 1998). In the present case the above mentioned old provisions were applied.
According to the new Chapter 26, Section 15 of the Code of Judicial Proceedings (165/1998) the Court of Appeal shall hold a hearing regardless of whether one has been requested, if the decision in the matter turns on the credibility of the testimony admitted in the District Court or on new testimony to be admitted in the Court of Appeal. In this event, the evidence admitted in the District Court shall be readmitted in the main hearing, unless there is an impediment in doing so.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains under Article 6 of the Convention, renewing his complaints brought before the Supreme Court, that:
1. the Court of Appeal of Helsinki did not provide him with adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence (Article 6 § 3(b) of the Convention). He maintains that the time before the preparatory hearing, during which he had to check over 10,000 pages of District Court's minutes and to prepare the examination of 27 witnesses, was inadequate for the proper preparation of his defence. Further, he complains that due to the very long consecutive hearing days there was not enough time to prepare for the next day's hearing and that it caused fatigue for the applicant and his legal counsel;
2. the refusal to hear G. deprived him also of a right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him (Article 6 § 3(d) of the Convention). He maintains that G. was of crucial importance as the documents allegedly drawn up by him were decisive in leading the Court of Appeal to conclude that there had been an intentional plan/a conspiracy to commit the offences. G. managed all those companies which were accused of transferring assets abroad illegally and could have provided crucial information as a witness. Nor had G. been heard in the pre-trial investigations which made it impossible to verify the content of the documents allegedly drawn up by him.
The applicant also complains that the refusal of 31 October 2000 to hear witness G. showed a preconceived attitude (Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention) towards the applicant concerning the alleged conspiracy and his guilt;
3. the length of the criminal proceedings against him was excessive. He maintains that the proceedings affected him as from 7 September 1995;
4. of numerous ways in which the Court of Appeal disclosed bias, favouritism to the prosecution or that it had prejudged the issues. In particular, he complains of the court's decision on 15 September 2000 to hold an oral hearing on its own motion concerning, inter alia, counts nos. 2 and 4 despite the fact that no party had at that point requested an oral hearing in those respects; that the Court of Appeal's letter of 6 October 2000, informing the parties that to change the lower court's verdicts would require an oral hearing allegedly had the de facto effect of prompting the public prosecutor to put forward witnesses to support the counts on which the applicant had not been convicted by the District Court; that the Court of Appeal failed to make a stand against allegedly biased witnesses (two tax inspectors P. and T.) and therefore itself demonstrated bias; that the fact that the Court of Appeal judges did not put any questions to the defendants showed a preconceived decision to convict him; that the insufficient time to prepare for the trial indicated bias; and that the Court of Appeal's judgment disclosed a breach of the presumption of innocence as its reasoning was largely circular, unsupported by evidence, vague and confusing;
5. witness A. was not heard in the Court of Appeal although he was allegedly in a crucial position as the tax official allegedly misled concerning the offences of tax fraud. Further, he complains that a witness L. was not heard despite his contention that L. was the person who acted on the applicant's alleged instructions to transfer the assets abroad (the applicant had not himself proposed to hear L. as a witness). According to the applicant the public prosecutor was free to put forward her evidence;
6. the trial was not adversarial because the Court of Appeal allegedly did not request the parties to present the written evidentiary material, thus depriving the applicant of a chance to defend himself against it. The Court of Appeal, on its own motion, decided to take into account a statement of a witness N. even though no party had made such a request, thus depriving the applicant of a possibility to prepare his defence also as regards N.'s previous statements; and
7. he was not informed in detail of the nature and cause of the accusation against him (Article 6 § 3(a) of the Convention), claiming that the Court of Appeal's judgment did not specify the acts of which he was convicted, in particular what kind of alleged instructions he had given to other co-defendants.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 3 (b) of the Convention that the Court of Appeal of Helsinki did not provide him with adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence. Article 6 § 3 (b) reads as follows:
“3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
...
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;”
The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case file, determine the admissibility of this complaint and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 2 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.
2. The applicant complains under Articles 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3(d) of the Convention about the Court of Appeal's refusal to hear witness G., as it allegedly deprived him of a right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him, indicated a preconceived attitude towards him and violated the presumption of innocence. Articles 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 (d) of the Convention read, insofar as relevant, as follows:
“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law...
2. Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
...
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him;”
The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case file, determine the admissibility of this complaint and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 2 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.
3. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see above) about the length of the criminal proceedings against him.
The Court notes that the applicant was interrogated by the police for the first time on 7 September 1995, from which date the applicant was “substantially affected” (see Corigliano v. Italy, judgment of 10 December 1982, Series A no. 57, § 34). It further notes that the charges were brought approximately two years later in autumn 1997, and the District Court's judgment was issued on 29 January 1999. The Court of Appeal's judgment was delivered on 30 March 2001, i.e. two years, two months and one day later. The Supreme Court issued its decision on 5 December 2001, i.e. eight months and six days later. Taking into account the complexity of the case, the fact that the case appears to have progressed constantly and that there is no appearance of any unjustified periods of inactivity, none of the above mentioned periods may be regarded as excessive in length when viewed separately. The Court has reached the same conclusion as regards the overall length of approximately six years and two months of the criminal proceedings. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
4. As regards the applicant's numerous complaints about the Court of Appeal's alleged bias, breach of the presumption of innocence or favouritism to the prosecution, the Court finds that these are unsubstantiated. Nor has he shown how the Court of Appeal's alleged failure to put questions to witnesses rendered the trial unfair or indicated bias. The applicant has not substantiated his complaint that the witnesses had been evidently biased. Insofar as the applicant complains about the reasoning contained in the Court of Appeal's judgment, the Court notes that as a rule it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before them. Its task is to ascertain whether the proceedings considered as a whole, including the way in which the evidence was taken, was fair. The examination of the case-file shows that the Court of Appeal's reasoning in its judgment, comprising 325 pages, is based on comprehensive evidence. While it is true that the reasoning contains many cross-references to other parts of the reasoning, this cannot be regarded as indicating any violation of the presumption of innocence or of any unfairness in the evaluation of evidence as a whole. Insofar as the applicant complains about the Court of Appeal's various decisions as to the necessity of an oral hearing, the Court would recall that while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair trial, it does not lay down any specific procedural rules on organising trials, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation under national law. The examination of the case-file does not disclose any appearance of bias arising from the procedural decisions in question.
It follows that these complaints are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
5. The applicant complains under Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see above) that witnesses A., and L. were not heard in the Court of Appeal whereas the public prosecutor was allegedly free to present her evidence.
The examination of the case-file indicates that the Court of Appeal took into account numerous items of evidence when examining the charges, and, consequently, that witness A. was not the sole or decisive evidence against the applicant. As regards the refusal to hear L. the Court observes that L. was not proposed to be heard in the Court of Appeal and that the applicant first requested that he be heard in his application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court first notes that the proceedings before the Supreme Court did not involve any determination of a criminal charge against the applicant. Second, the Court of Appeal proceedings were regulated by the former provisions of the Code of Judicial Procedure, which enabled the Court of Appeal to take into account all written evidence gathered in the previous proceedings. The Court also reiterates that the Finnish reservation, exempting the Courts of Appeal from their obligation to hold oral hearings, was in force at the relevant time. In these circumstances there is no indication of any arbitrariness or bias or a violation of the principle of equality of arms as regards the Court of Appeal's decision not to allow A.'s testimony and the Supreme Court's refusal to grant leave to appeal. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
6. The applicant complains under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 § (d) of the Convention (see above) that the trial was not adversarial as the parties were not requested to present the written evidentiary material and that the Court of Appeal accepted the pre-trial statements of a witness N., who was not heard in the District Court or in the Court of Appeal in person.
The Court notes that it is a fundamental aspect of the right to a fair trial that criminal proceedings should be adversarial and that there should be equality of arms between the prosecution and defence. The right to an adversarial trial means, in a criminal case, that both prosecution and defence must be given the opportunity to have knowledge of and comment on the observations filed and evidence adduced by the other party (see Rowe and Davis v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 28901/95, § 60, ECHR 2000-II). Further all the evidence must normally be produced in the presence of the accused at a public hearing with a view to adversarial argument. As a rule, a conviction should not be based on the testimony of a witness whom the accused has not had an opportunity to challenge and question. However, Article 6 § 3 (d) does not grant the accused an unlimited right to secure the appearance of witnesses in court. It is normally for the national courts to decide whether it is necessary or advisable to hear a particular witness.
The examination of the case-file does not disclose any appearance of a violation of a fair trial in these respects. As N. had died in 1998 it was not the fault of the authorities that he was no longer available as a witness and in the circumstances, the Court of Appeal's inclusion of his statement, which was available to all parties, in its assessment of the evidence has not been shown to have impinged unfairly on the exercise of the rights of the defence. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
7. The applicant complains that the Court of Appeal's judgment did not specify the acts of which he was convicted, invoking Article 6 § 3 (a) of the Convention which reads as follows:
“3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;”
The Court observes that the charges brought against the applicant were comprehensive and detailed, listing, inter alia, the offences of which he was accused, with the place and the date thereof, the relevant Articles of the Penal Code [rikoslaki, strafflagen] and the name of the victim (see Brozicek v. Italy, judgment of 19 December 1989, Series A no. 167, § 42). The examination of the case-file does not disclose any insufficiency in this respect or any appearance of a violation of the fair trial. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Decides to adjourn the examination of the applicant's complaints concerning the Court of Appeal's alleged failure to provide the applicant adequate time and facilities to prepare his defence and its refusal to hear witness G.
Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.
Françoise Elens-PassosViera Strážnická
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy