THIRD SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 32371/03
by Mehmet KARAYAZGAN
against Turkey
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 8 February 2007 as a Chamber composed of:
MrB.M. Zupančič, President,
MrR. Türmen,
MrC. Bîrsan,
MrsE. Fura-Sandström,
MrE. Myjer,
MrsI. Ziemele,
MrsI. Berro-Lefèvre, judges,
and Mr S. Quesada, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 25 August 2003,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Mehmet Karayazgan, is a Turkish national who was born in 1955 and lives in Şanlıurfa. He was represented before the Court by Mr Mustafa Eraslan, a lawyer practising in Istanbul.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant inherited a plot of land from his father in Birecik. This land was in the possession of the applicant’s father for about 50 years. However, neither his father nor the applicant had the title deed to it.
In 1996 the authorities started the construction of the Karakamış Dam. As the applicant feared that his land could be submerged in the waters of the dam, on 30 September 1997 he initiated proceedings before the Birecik Magistrate’s Court, and requested that this plot be registered in his name. He based his case on his father’s uninterrupted possession for more than 30 years.
During the proceedings, the Magistrate’s Court held 48 hearings. It conducted two on-site inspections, namely on 10 November 1997 and 12 July 1999, with the participation of engineers. The Court further requested the Gaziantep University Engineering Faculty to analyse the soil to determine whether or not the land in dispute was sandy. It also obtained 12 reports from experts. As a result, the court decided that the land was made up of sandy soil. Recalling that private possession of sandy land was banned under Turkish legislation, the court held that it was not possible to issue a title deed in the name of the applicant based on uninterrupted possession. Accordingly, on 27 February 2002 the court dismissed the case. The applicant appealed. On 30 January 2003 the Court of Cassation upheld the decision of the first-instance court, finding its reasoning to have been in line with domestic law. This decision was served on the applicant on 28 February 2003.
COMPLAINTS
Under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the domestic courts had failed in the evaluation of the evidence. The applicant also stated that the decision of the first-instance court was not reasoned. Finally, the applicant alleged that the length of the proceedings breached this provision.
Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant alleged that he has been deprived of his land, which had been used by his family for many years.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the national courts failed in the evaluation of the facts and the interpretation of domestic law.
Noting that the applicant’s complaint concerns the Birecik Magistrate’s Court’s evaluation of facts and evidence, the Court finds that the present case does not disclose any elements of arbitrariness and that the applicant had a full opportunity to put forward his arguments before the domestic courts. The Court observes that the decision of the Birecik Magistrate’s Court was delivered on the basis of expert reports, on-site inspections and was in line with domestic law. Accordingly, no appearance of a violation of the Convention has been shown.
It follows that this complaint should be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
2. The applicant further maintained under Article 6 § 1 that the judgment of the Birecik Magistrate’s Court was unreasoned.
The Court observes that, contrary to the allegation of the applicant, in its judgment dated 27 February 2002, the Birecik Magistrate’s Court gave a lengthy explanation as to why the land in dispute should be regarded as being made up of “sandy soil” and why the title deeds to such type of land cannot be acquired by uninterrupted possession. As a result, the applicant’s allegation is unsubstantiated.
In view of the foregoing, this complaint should also be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
3. The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings in the present case constitutes a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The Court observes that the proceedings in dispute started on 30 September 1997 and ended on 30 January 2003. They therefore lasted approximately five years and four months. During this period two judicial decisions were delivered by the national courts. Furthermore, in the course of the proceedings, the first-instance court held 48 hearings, conducted two on-site inspections and obtained several expert reports.
The Court notes that the civil proceedings in question involved both factual and legal complexities as they concerned a dispute over the type of land. To solve the dispute, the domestic courts had to conduct two on-site inspections and request several expert opinions. Furthermore, it should be underlined that the applicant does not substantiate his allegations and fails to show any substantial periods of inactivity attributable to the judicial authorities.
Having regard to the above, the Court considers that, in the circumstances of the present case, the length of the proceedings cannot be considered to have been unreasonably long.
It follows that this complaint should be similarly rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
4. The applicant complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that he was deprived of his possessions as a result of the domestic courts’ wrong interpretation of the facts.
The Court observes that the applicant’s complaint is in fact closely linked to the complaint brought under Article 6. Nevertheless, it should be recalled that, according to the established case-law of the Court, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 aims at securing the peaceful enjoyment of existing possessions, and does not guarantee any right to acquire property. In the instant case, it is undisputed that neither the applicant nor his father has ever acquired the title deed to the land. The applicant’s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 concerned an alleged deprivation of land which had been used by his family for many years without such entitlement. Furthermore, there is nothing in the file to suggest that the national courts acted in an arbitrary or unreasonable way when reaching their decisions. The Court notes that, under Turkish law, private occupation of sandy land is prohibited. Thus, under the relevant law as applied and interpreted by the domestic authorities, the applicant neither had a right nor a claim amounting to a legitimate expectation in the sense of the Court’s case-law to obtain the restitution of the property in question. He therefore had no “possession” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
It follows that the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3, and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Santiago QuesadaBoštjan M. Zupančič
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy