Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 83
February 2006
Katamadze v. Georgia (dec.) - 69857/01
Decision 14.2.2006 [Section II]
Article 10
Article 10-1
Freedom of expression
Conviction of a journalist for having published inaccurate information and unacceptable opinions concerning other journalists: inadmissible
The applicant, a journalist, published an editorial criticising the founder and editor and three journalists of another local newspaper. They complained that the applicant had been spreading rumours through the press and that the expressions used in the impugned article undermined their dignity and reputation. The Ajarian High Court considered that a number of phrases and expressions used flippantly by the applicant in her article undermined the reputation and dignity of the journalists and constituted interference with their private life. Some of her allegations had no basis in reality and as she had failed to adduce evidence to the contrary she had acted in breach of her statutory duty as a journalist. The applicant refused to comment on the phrases or expressions that had been regarded as unacceptable by the court, even though she bore the burden of proof under domestic law. She was further accused of acting with intent to cause harm to the journalists. As they had waived their right to have the impugned article retracted by the offending newspaper, the Court confined itself to ordering the applicant jointly to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage to the aggrieved parties in an amount of approximately EUR 2,100. An appeal by the applicant on points of law was dismissed.
Inadmissible under Article 10 – Since the complainants had objectively shown that the impugned allegations were capable of interfering with their rights, the fact that domestic law required the applicant to adduce evidence as to the veracity of her statements did not seem in itself to run counter to Article 10 of the Convention. The Court attached paramount importance to the fact that the applicant's article did not contribute to any debate of legitimate public interest or to any controversy between her and the other newspaper's journalists. The applicant had been unable to show that her impugned statements had any informational value whatsoever for society. Nor had the applicant been caught out during a spontaneous debate or lively exchange of views in which she might have been provoked into thoughtlessly using offensive language. The content of the impugned article, when analysed in the context of the case, suggested that there had been some private argument between the applicant and the journalists concerned and that the applicant had used the newspaper of which she was editor as a forum for a public attack on those fellow-journalists of whom she had conceived a dislike. Even though those journalists were, like the applicant herself, public figures in respect of whom the limits of acceptable criticism were wider than in respect of a private individual, they were not obliged to tolerate language that went beyond those limits and interfered with their rights. The impugned expressions and insinuations were offensive to the persons concerned and the applicant had adduced no evidence that she had based her judgments on facts or that she had acted in good faith in writing them. She had been unable to show that it had not been a gratuitous personal attack with pointlessly harmful comments. In short, the finding against her had been a necessary measure in a democratic society for the protection of the reputation and rights of others. The grounds stated by the domestic courts had been “relevant and sufficient” for the purposes of paragraph 2 of Article 10. Moreover, having regard to the public insult to those individuals, without any valid justification, the penalty imposed did not appear excessively harsh: manifestly ill-founded.
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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