FOURTH SECTION
FINAL DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 43978/98
by Stanisław KĘPA
against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 30 September 2003 as a Chamber composed of
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrsV. Strážnická,
MrM. Fischbach,
MrR. Maruste,
MrS. Pavlovschi,
MrL. Garlicki,
MrJ. Borrego Borrego, judges,
and Mr M. O’Boyle, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 18 August 1997,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the Court’s partial decision of 6 July 2000,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Stanisław Kępa, is a Polish national, who was born in 1931 and lives in Nowogard, Poland.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
1. Facts prior to 1 May 1993
In 1972 the applicant sustained injuries in a car accident caused by an employee of a certain company. The applicant sued the company in the Goleniów District Court (Sąd Rejonowy). In 1974 the court granted the applicant a monthly allowance compensating him for loss of his ability to work (renta uzupełniająca).
2. Facts after 1 May 1993
On 26 August 1993 the applicant filed an action with the Goleniów District Court. He asked the court to increase his allowance but he did not specify the value of the claim.
On 8 September 1993 the court ordered the applicant to specify, within seven days, the value of the claim. The applicant submitted the required information on 20 September 1993.
The first hearing was held on 6 April 1994 but the applicant failed to appear.
On 12 December 1994 the court held a hearing and again ordered the applicant to specify the value of his claim.
On 4 January 1995 the case was transferred to the Szczecin Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki), since, given the value of the claim, the District Court was no longer competent to deal with the subject matter.
Subsequently, the applicant withdrew the power of attorney granted to his lawyer and the Szczecin Regional Bar (Okręgowa Rada Adwokacka) appointed another counsel for him.
Between 20 February 1995 and 25 January 1996 the Szczecin Regional Court held five hearings.
On 7 February 1996 the Szczecin Regional Court gave judgment and granted the applicant’s claim.
On 3 June 1996 the applicant challenged the impartiality of all the judges sitting in the Szczecin Regional Court. He also asked for his officially appointed lawyer to be replaced.
On 8 July 1996 the applicant made a second challenge to the impartiality of the judges.
On 29 October 1996, upon the applicant’s appeal, the Poznań Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) quashed the first-instance judgment and remitted the case.
On 28 July, 28 November, 10 December 1997 and 30 December 1998 the Szczecin Regional Court held hearings.
Meanwhile, the applicant made three more challenges to the impartiality of the Szczecin Regional Court and asked that the judges be disqualified from dealing with his case.
On 20 December 1998 the applicant modified his claim.
On 21 April 1999 the Szczecin Regional Court delivered judgment. On 4 November 1999, ruling on the applicant’s appeal, the Poznań Court of Appeal upheld the first-instance judgment.
On 10 January 2000 the applicant lodged a cassation appeal. On 14 June 2000 the Court of Appeal transferred the case to the Supreme Court. On 19 December 2001 a single judge sitting in camera as the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal as being manifestly ill-founded.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
A cassation appeal was introduced to the Polish Code of Civil Procedure in 1996. Under the provisions applicable until 24 May 2000, a party to civil proceedings could lodge a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court against a final judicial decision of a second-instance court. Such an appeal had to be examined at a public hearing. This had created inevitable organisational problems, as the judges of the Supreme Court were overburdened by the number of cassation appeals which they had to deal with.
On 24 May 2000 the Code of Civil Procedure was amended. The amendment provides for a preliminary examination of cassation appeals. A single judge sitting in camera as the Supreme Court may refuse to entertain a cassation appeal if that appeal is manifestly ill-founded. Where a cassation appeal has been admitted, it is further examined by a panel of three judges at a public hearing. However, the relevant transitional rules did not explain clearly whether the new procedure should also apply to cassation appeals lodged before 24 May 2000. On 17 January 2001 the Supreme Court adopted a resolution (no. III CZP 49/00) and answered this question in affirmative. The court stressed, inter alia, that the amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure made it possible to deal with enormous backlog of trivial or manifestly ill-founded cassation appeals.
Under Section 3935 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a court which has given the contested decision is competent to decide whether all formal requirements for a cassation appeal have been complied with. If an appeal has complied with the formal requirements, the case shall be transferred to the Supreme Court.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention about the excessive length of civil proceedings in his case.
THE LAW
The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings in his case exceeded a “reasonable time”. The Court finds that this complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 §1 of the Convention, which provides, in so far as relevant:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a...hearing within a reasonable time by [a]...tribunal...”
The Court observes that the period to be considered under Article 6 § 1 began on 26 August 1993 when the applicant filed his action with the Goleniów District Court and ended on 19 December 2001. The proceedings therefore lasted 8 years, 3 months and 24 days before the courts at five instances.
The Government submitted that the case was complex as it necessitated the taking of expert evidence. The applicant was also required to undergo medical tests. As to the conduct of the relevant authorities, the Government considered that the applicant’s case had been of a pecuniary nature and, unlike in cases concerning employment, pensions and invalidity pensions, the courts had not been required to handle it with “special diligence”. They further stressed that the applicant had contributed to the length of the proceedings. In particular, he had on two occasions modified his claim and repeatedly challenged the impartiality of the Szczecin Regional Court and its judges.
As regards the period before the Supreme Court, the Government pointed out that in the last few years the average length of the proceedings before the Supreme Court had systematically decreased. They cited the relevant statistics, according to which in 2000 the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court had examined 3011 cassation appeals, whereas in 2001 this number had increased to 7109. Basing their argument on the Trickovic v. Slovenia judgment (see, Trickovic v. Slovenia, no 39914/98, § 68, 12 June 2001), the Government maintained that a temporary backlog of the court’s business did not entail the liability of the Polish authorities because they had taken the appropriate remedial action with the requisite promptness.
The applicant generally contested the Governments’ submissions. He further claimed that he had not contributed to the length of the proceedings in his case.
The Court, assessing the reasonableness of the length of the time in question, will have regard to the particular circumstances of the case and the criteria laid down in its case-law, in particular the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities (see, among other authorities, Humen v. Poland [GC], no. 26614/95, § 59, 15 October 1999).
The Court considers that the case certainly involved a degree of procedural complexity.
As regards the conduct of the applicant, the Court notes that during the first-instance proceedings the applicant twice failed to comply with the court’s order instructing him to specify the value of his claim. When, eventually, he supplied the necessary details, the case had to be referred to the Regional Court as the District Court was no longer competent to deal with the subject matter. In consequence, the applicant’s failure to satisfy the formal requirements attached to his claim resulted in the delay of 1 year and 4 months, i.e. from 8 September 1993 to 4 January 1995. In addition, on 20 December 1998, the applicant modified his claim. Moreover, he repeatedly challenged the impartiality of the judges sitting in the Szczecin Regional Court. Although a party to civil proceedings cannot be blamed for using the venues available to him under domestic law in order for him to protect his interests, he must accept that such actions necessarily prolong the proceedings concerned (see Malicka-Wąsowska v. Poland, (dec.), no. 41413/98, 5 April 2001). In these circumstances, the Court finds that the applicant’s actions contributed to prolonging the proceedings.
In regard to the conduct of national authorities, the Court firstly observes that no hearing was held between 10 December 1997 and 30 December 1998. However, during that period the court dealt with the applicant’s repeated challenges to the impartiality of the court.
There was a further period of some 1 year and 6 months during which the applicant’s cassation appeal lay dormant in the Supreme Court (from 14 June 2000 to 19 December 2001). However, the Court notes that in view of the large number of cassation appeals pending before the Supreme Court, it had to deal with an increased workload. The authorities had subsequently taken the necessary remedial action in order to deal with the backlog in the Supreme Court. In this respect, the Court recalls that a temporary backlog of court business does not involve liability on the part of the Contracting States provided that they take, with the requisite promptness, remedial action to deal with an exceptional situation of this kind (see, among other authorities, the Zimmerman and Steiner v. Switzerland judgment of 13 July 1983, Series A no. 66, p.12 § 29; Guincho v. Portugal judgment of 10 July 1984, Series A no. 81, p.17 § 40; and Trickovic v. Slovenia, cited above, § 68). In the present case it appears that the measures applied by the Polish authorities had resulted in a substantial reduction of the backlog in the Supreme Court. Thus, in the light of the material produced by the Government - which was not contested by the applicant - the average length of cassation proceedings before the Supreme Court decreased from 2 years to 10 months.
In conclusion, regard being had to all circumstances of the case and, more particularly, to the conduct of the applicant, the Court considers that the impugned proceedings do not disclose an unreasonable delay within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
It follows that the application is inadmissible as being manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and it must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.
Michael O’BoyleNicolas BRATZA
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy