KHANDANYAN v. ARMENIA

FIFTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 19022/22
Gagik KHANDANYAN
against Armenia

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 7 October 2025 as a Chamber composed of:

 Kateřina Šimáčková, President,
 María Elósegui,
 Georgios A. Serghides,
 Gilberto Felici,
 Diana Sârcu,
 Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges,
 Anna Margaryan, ad hoc judge,
and Victor Soloveytchik, Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 25 March 2022,

Having regard to the decision to give notice to the respondent Government of the part of the complaints under Article 6 of the Convention and to declare inadmissible the remainder of the application,

Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,

Having regard to the decision of the President of the Chamber to appoint Anna Margaryan to sit as an ad hoc judge from a list submitted in advance by the Government (Article 26 § 4 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1 (a) of the Rules of Court), Mr Vahe Grigroyan, the judge elected in respect of Armenia, having withdrawn from sitting in the case (Rule 28 § 3),

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

INTRODUCTION

1.  The case concerns the alleged violation of the applicant’s right under Article 6 to an independent tribunal established by law during the proceedings against him resulting in the premature termination of his powers as a judge, as well as the impossibility for him to contest his dismissal before the ordinary courts.

THE FACTS

2.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Yerevan. He was represented by Ms S. Sahakyan, a lawyer practising in Yerevan.

3.  The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr Y. Kirakosyan, Representative of the Republic of Armenia on International Legal Matters.

4.  The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

5.  From 2016 the applicant was a judge of the Civil Court of Appeal and was entitled under the law to serve until his retirement at the age of 65 (see paragraph 12 below).

6.  On 26 July 2021, upon an application by the Agency of the State Register of Legal Entities of the Ministry of Justice (“the Agency”), the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (“the CPC”) issued conclusion no. 01/2021 in which it found that the applicant had breached the incompatibility requirements as set out in section 5(1) of the Constitutional Act on the Judicial Code (“the Judicial Code”) and section 31(1) of the Public Service Act. In particular, the CPC observed, among other things, that following the purchase of 100% shares in a limited liability company and prior to transferring his shares to fiduciary management, the applicant had been engaged in managerial functions – he had participated in the general meeting of the company as its sole shareholder and had taken decisions amending its charter as to the composition of the company’s participants, dismissing its former executive director and appointing a new one, as well as applying to the Agency for the State registration of the above amendments.

7.  On the same date the CPC transmitted its above conclusion to the Supreme Judicial Council (“the SJC”) for the latter to decide on the applicant’s compliance with the incompatibility requirements.

8.  When deciding on the applicant’s case the panel of the SJC was composed of eight members – three professional judges and five non-judicial members, including the then Acting Chair G.J. At the time of his appointment to the SJC on 21 January 2021, G.J. was 66 years old.

9.  On 4 October 2021, having examined the conclusion of the CPC, the SJC found that the applicant had breached the incompatibility requirements because the above-described actions carried out by him had amounted to holding a position in a commercial organisation within the meaning of section 31(6)(4) of the Public Service Act, thus in breach of that section and hence the incompatibility requirements (see paragraphs 13 and 22 below). As a result, the SJC terminated the applicant’s judicial powers. The decision was adopted by unanimous vote.

10.  The decision of the SJC entered into force from the moment of its pronouncement and was final. No appeal lay against this decision before the ordinary courts.

RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE

11.  The relevant provisions of the domestic law and practice, as well as international law are summarised in Suren Antonyan v. Armenia (no. 20140/23, §§ 20-76, 23 January 2025).

12.  The relevant provisions of the Armenian Constitution read as follows:

Article 164

“...

6. A judge may not hold any position not related to his or her status in other State or local self-governing bodies, any position in commercial organisations, or engage in entrepreneurial activities or perform other paid work, except for scientific, educational and creative work. The Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court and the Judicial Code may prescribe additional incompatibility requirements.

...

8. The powers of a judge shall cease upon the expiry of the term of those powers, in the case of the loss of citizenship of the Republic of Armenia or the acquisition of citizenship of another State, when a criminal conviction takes effect against him or her, when a criminal prosecution against him or her is discontinued on grounds for non‑acquittal, when a civil judgment takes effect declaring him or her to have no active legal capacity, or to be missing or dead, or in the case of his or her resignation or death.

9. Where a judge breaches the incompatibility requirements, engages in political activities, is unable to hold office for health reasons, or commits a fundamental disciplinary violation, his or her powers shall be terminated, in the case of Constitutional Court judges by a decision of the Constitutional Court, and in the case of other judges by a decision of the Supreme Judicial Council.”

Article 166 § 8

“A judge shall hold office until the age of sixty-five ...”

Article 174

“1. The Supreme Judicial Council shall be composed of ten members.

2. Five members of the Supreme Judicial Council shall be elected by the General Assembly of Judges, from among judges having at least ten years of experience as a judge. Judges from all levels of court must be included in the Supreme Judicial Council. A member elected by the General Assembly of Judges may not act as chairperson of a court or chairperson of a chamber of the Court of Cassation.

3. Five members of the Supreme Judicial Council shall be elected by the National Assembly, by at least three fifths of votes of the total number of Deputies, from among legal scholars and other distinguished lawyers holding citizenship of only the Republic of Armenia, having the right of suffrage, with high professional qualities and at least fifteen years of professional work experience. The member elected by the National Assembly may not be a judge.

4. Members of the Supreme Judicial Council shall be elected for a term of five years, without the right to be re-elected.

...

8. Detailed provisions on the composition of the Supreme Judicial Council shall be laid down in the Judicial Code.”

13.  Sections 4(1), 5(1) and 83(1) of the Judicial Code lay down similar incompatibility requirements for judges and non-judicial members of the SJC. In particular, they may not engage in political activities, hold any position in State or local self-governing bodies (and in the case of a judge, any position in State or local self-governing bodies not related to his or her status), any position in commercial organisations, or engage in entrepreneurial activities or perform other paid work, except for scientific, educational and creative work.

14.  Section 80(9) provides that the National Assembly may not elect a person as a member of the SJC who is subject to any restrictions on appointment to a judicial post under this Code.

15.  Section 86(1) lists cases where the powers of an SJC member cease, including (1) upon expiry of his or her term of office and (7) for judicial members – the termination or cessation of their term of office. It does not set any age limit for remaining in office. Section 86(2) provides that the powers of a member of the SJC shall cease according to the rules established by Chapter 20 of the Code (Termination and cessation of the powers of a judge).

16.  Section 92(3) provides that, when acting as a court, a session of the SJC shall have a quorum if at least two thirds of its members are present.

17.  Section 94(6) provides, inter alia, that the decisions of the SJC on the issue of terminating a judge’s term of office will be taken in a deliberation room and with an open ballot by at least two thirds of votes of the total number of the members of the SJC. Section 94(7) provides that, except for the case provided for in part 6 of this section, the decisions taken by the SJC as a court are signed by all members present at the session. A member of the SJC may submit a separate opinion on the reasoning or final part of a decision of the SJC as a court. If a member of the SJC has a separate opinion, it is noted with his or her signature in the decision of the SJC, and the separate opinion is attached to the decision with his or her signature.

18.  Section 97(1), headed “Eligibility criteria for judicial candidates”, provides that persons aged from 25 to 60, having the right of suffrage, may participate in the qualification test to be included in the list of judicial candidates if they satisfy a number of eligibility criteria set out in that provision.

19.  Section 112, headed “Restrictions on appointment to the post of judge”, provides that a person is ineligible if they have unspent criminal conviction, have been convicted of intentional crime or served a custodial sentence, suffer from a physical or mental condition impeding judicial duties, have failed to complete mandatory military or alternative service (where the person is male), have been declared legally incapacitated, missing, or bankrupt (where proceedings are ongoing), or are subject to ongoing criminal prosecution.

20.  Section 159 (contained in Chapter 20) provides that the rules of Chapter 19 of the Code (establishing the procedure for subjecting a judge to disciplinary measures, including the procedural guarantees afforded to the judge concerned; see Suren Antonyan, cited above, §§ 45-47) apply (mutatis mutandis) to the proceedings on termination of the powers of a judge, in so far as applicable and unless otherwise prescribed by Chapter 20. Section 159(2) provides that the powers of a judge are terminated upon the decision of the SJC, if, among other things, he or she (1) has violated the incompatibility requirements. Section 159(2.1) provides that in case of a breach of the incompatibility requirements stipulated by the Public Service Act, the judge’s powers may be terminated taking into account the conclusion of the CPC submitted to the SJC.

21.  Section 160(1) lists cases where the powers of a judge cease, in particular (1) in the event of his or her resignation; (2) having reached 65 years old; (3) entry into a force of a court judgment declaring him or her lacking in legal capacity, a missing person or dead; (4) upon entry into force of a guilty verdict or the termination of criminal prosecution against him or her owing to grounds for non-acquittal; (5) upon cessation of Armenian citizenship or acquisition of citizenship of another country; or (6) death.

22.  Section 31(1) provides that persons holding public office and public servants may not hold any position in State or local self-governing bodies not related to his or her status, any position in commercial organisations, or engage in entrepreneurial activities, or perform other paid work, except for scientific, educational and creative work. Section 31(6) provides that, under the Public Service Act, holding a position in commercial organisation means: (1) being part of the management of the commercial organisation; (2) holding any other position in a commercial organisation; (3) being a fiduciary manager of a commercial organisation; or (4) apart from cases specified in points 1-3 above, being otherwise engaged in the discharge of representational, executive or managerial functions of a commercial organisation.

23.  In its above-mentioned decision, the Constitutional Court of Armenia examined an application by one fifth of the Deputies of the National Assembly (“MPs”), lodged on 17 September 2021, who had raised a question of legal certainty as regards the lack of an express age-limit for non-judicial members of the SJC under the Constitution and the domestic law.

Firstly, the Constitutional Court noted that, under Article 173 of the Constitution, members of the SJC elected by the National Assembly could not be judges; therefore there was a clear constitutional distinction between judicial and non-judicial members of the SJC. The latter had to be legal scholars or other distinguished lawyers. The Constitutional Court affirmed that the eligibility conditions for non-judicial members of the SJC included Armenian citizenship, the right to vote, legal qualifications, high professional standards, and a minimum of fifteen years of professional legal experience. These conditions were explicitly set out in the Constitution and the Judicial Code. Section 80 of the Judicial Code also provided that such members must not be subject to any restrictions applicable to judicial appointments under section 112, including criminal convictions, legal incapacity, unresolved bankruptcy, or evasion of military service. In considering whether other requirements – such as those applicable to judicial candidates under section 97 of the Judicial Code – also applied to SJC members elected by the National Assembly, the Constitutional Court held that they did not. In particular, the age restriction of 25 to 60 years and language proficiency requirements for judicial candidates were not applicable to non-judicial members of the SJC. The Constitutional Court found that while some overlap existed between the eligibility conditions for judicial candidates and non‑judicial member-candidates of the SJC (such as citizenship and legal qualifications), the two categories remained distinct. Notably, the eligibility conditions for judicial candidates were less stringent in terms of professional experience.

Secondly, the Constitutional Court examined the question whether section 160 of the Code was applicable to the non-judicial members of the SJC. The Constitutional Court noted that section 86 of the Code governed the conditions and procedures for the cessation, termination and suspension of the powers of the SJC members. The Constitutional Court held that it was evident that the legislature delineated specific circumstances and procedures for the cessation and termination of such powers. In particular, the exhaustive list of conditions under which the powers of an SJC member might cease was articulated in section 86(1). Additionally, as the regulatory framework for the termination of powers was incorporated in section 86, then the cessation of powers of SJC members was governed by the provisions of Chapter 20 of the Code concerning the cessation of powers of a judge, to which section 86(2) referred. At the same time, section 160, contained in Chapter 20 of the Code, laid down the conditions under which a judge’s powers should cease. A comparative analysis of sections 86(1) and 160(1) revealed that five out of seven grounds for the cessation of the powers of an SJC member coincided with those for the cessation of a judge’s powers. The two additional grounds pertained to the expiry of the term of office (five years) [section 86(1)(1)] and the cessation or termination of judicial powers [section 86(1)(7)].

The Constitutional Court noted that the stipulation that the judge’s term of office should cease upon reaching the age of 65 applied exclusively to judicial members of the SJC, in accordance with section 86(1)(7) of the Code. Conversely, section 160(1) did not introduce new grounds for the cessation of a judge’s powers apart from attainment of the age of 65. Thus a reference to section 160 of the Code was justified only in respect of judicial members of the SJC. In this respect, a reference to the rules in Chapter 20 in section 86(2) did not establish new criteria for the cessation of powers of the SJC members elected by the National Assembly, the said chapter predominantly addressing procedural aspects concerning the cessation of the powers of the SJC members.

The Constitutional Court noted that the legislative requirement that the SJC act as a court did not imply the full equation of the statuses of its members elected by the General Assembly of Judges with those elected by the National Assembly. The Constitutional Court confirmed that the regulations as regards the age-limit and cessation of the term of office on that ground did not apply to both judicial and non-judicial members of the SJC alike, because judicial members continued to be bound by rules [applicable to judges] under the Constitution and the Judicial Code, notably to hold the office of judge until the age of 65. Therefore, if a judicial member of the SJC reached the age of 65, he or she could not continue to serve as a member of the SJC, not because there was such an age-limit specifically for members of the SJC, but solely because the member was appointed to the SJC on the basis of being a judge. Therefore when that basis ceased, it directly eliminated the possibility of continuing to serve as an SJC member. However, the same approach could not be extended to an SJC member elected by the National Assembly, since the framers of the Constitution had not extended the judges’ age-limit to [non-judicial] members of the SJC, thereby clearly demonstrating that the 65-year age-limit applied exclusively to judges and was intended to ensure their independence in office.

Consequently, the Constitutional Court held that reaching the age of 65 could not be considered a valid ground for terminating the mandate of a non‑judicial member of the SJC elected by the National Assembly. The provisions in question were found to be clear, foreseeable, and consistent with the Constitution. The Constitutional Court confirmed that the five-year term and the prohibition on re-election adequately safeguarded the independence of non-judicial SJC members, and that judicial and non-judicial members were subject to distinct regimes that should not be conflated.

complaint

24.  The applicant complained that the election of G.J. to the SJC rendered his participation in the examination of his case “irregular” and hence in breach of his right to a “tribunal established by law”. He also complained that the SJC lacked institutional independence and that he had been deprived of the right to appeal against his dismissal by the SJC before the ordinary courts.

THE LAW

25.  The applicant relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”

26.  It is common ground that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention applies under its civil limb. In that connection the Court refers to its findings in the case of Suren Antonyan that Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was applicable under its civil limb in the proceedings before the SJC (cited above, § 128). It sees no reason to hold otherwise in the present case.

(a)   The Government

27.  Firstly, the Government appeared to argue, by reference to the Court’s decision in the case of Gevorgyan and Others v. Armenia ((dec.), no. 66535/10, § 36, 14 January 2020), that the applicant had abused the right of individual application because he had not informed the Court about the decision of the Constitutional Court of 6 May 2022 (see paragraph 23 above). They submitted that the ruling of the Constitutional Court was directly relevant to the applicant’s complaint that the election of G.J. as non-judicial member of the SJC had been in breach of the domestic law, namely the statutory age-limit set for judges under the Judicial Code. However, the applicant had failed to inform the Court about such an important development either after lodging his application or when the Government were given notice of his application.

28.  Secondly, they contested the applicant’s claim that G.J.’s election to the SJC had been in breach of the domestic law. They relied on the decision of the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 23 above) and submitted that the “restriction” mentioned in section 80(9) of the Judicial Code referred to section 112 of the Code, which did not contain any age-limit for appointment to a judicial post (see paragraphs 14 and 19 above), whereas eligibility conditions for judicial candidates including an age-limit could not be construed as such a restriction (see paragraph 18 above). Furthermore, as found by the Constitutional Court, the fact that the SJC acted as a court did not entail the equating of the status of its judicial and non-judicial members, nor were the grounds for cessation of powers of its judicial and non-judicial members identical. In particular, section 86(1)(7) specified in unambiguous terms that, in so far as judicial members were concerned, their term of office could cease also upon the cessation or termination of their powers as a judge (see paragraph 15 above). Consequently, section 160 of the Code laid down the grounds for cessation of the powers of a judge, including the attainment of the retirement age (see paragraph 21 above). Thus, as the Constitutional Court held, attaining the statutory age-limit served as a ground for discontinuing the term of office of the judicial members of the SJC in view of the fact that they had been elected to the SJC on the basis of their tenure as a judge. However, the same approach could not be applied to non-judicial members of the SJC, as neither the Constitution nor the Judicial Code prescribed for them the statutory age-limit which was laid down for judges. Therefore, the statutory age-limit was applicable exclusively to judicial members of the SJC – judges – and was meant to guarantee their independence as judges.

29.  The Government thus concluded that the first criterion of the three‑step test formulated in the case of Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland ([GC], no. 26374/18, §§ 244-45, 1 December 2020; referred to as Ástráðsson test) had not been met, namely whether there had been a manifest breach of domestic law during the election of G.J.

(b)   The applicant

30.  The applicant appeared to argue that the retirement age for judges, that is 65, was applicable to non-judicial members of the SJC, whereas G.J. had been elected to the SJC when he had already reached the age of 66 and despite the clear wording of the Judicial Code that the National Assembly could not elect a non-judicial member who was subject to any restrictions on appointment to a judicial post (see section 80(9) cited in paragraph 14 above). The applicant argued that the retirement age for judges was to be interpreted as such a restriction. He disagreed with the ruling of the Constitutional Court, essentially arguing that, since the SJC was acting as a court, its members enjoyed equal status under the Constitution. Accordingly, applying the age‑limit only to judicial members of the SJC was discriminatory and was not justified by any objective grounds, thus creating two categories of members within the SJC.

31.  The applicant also complained that G.J. could not be considered a “distinguished lawyer”, contrary to Article 174 § 3 of the Constitution, because the Court had found that “he had been liable for human rights violations”. The applicant referred to the case of Zalyan and Others v. Armenia (nos. 36894/04 and 3521/07, 17 March 2016). He further claimed that G.J. had also breached incompatibility requirements as established by the Court in the case of Jhangiryan v. Armenia (nos. 44841/08 and 63701/09, 8 October 2020).

32.  The Court does not need to determine whether the applicant’s alleged conduct constituted an abuse of right of individual application (see the Government’s argument in paragraph 27 above), because the complaints are, in any event, inadmissible for the reasons set out below.

(a)   The general principles

33.  In its judgment in the case of Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson (cited above, § 218 et. seq.) the Grand Chamber of the Court clarified the scope of, and the meaning to be given to, the concept of a “tribunal established by law”. The Court analysed the individual components of that concept and considered how they should be interpreted so as to best reflect its purpose and, ultimately, ensure that the protection it offered was truly effective.

34.  In particular, in order to assess whether the irregularities in a given judicial appointment procedure were of such gravity as to entail a violation of the right to a tribunal established by law, and whether the balance between the competing principles had been struck by State authorities, the Court developed a threshold test made up of three criteria, taken cumulatively (ibid., § 243).

35.  In the first place, there must, in principle, be a manifest breach of the domestic law, in the sense that the breach must be objectively and genuinely identifiable. In determining this matter, the Court will cede to the national courts’ interpretation as to whether there has been a breach of the domestic law, unless the breach is “flagrant” – that is, unless the national courts’ findings can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. However, the absence of such a breach does not rule out the possibility of a violation of the right to a tribunal established by law, since a procedure that is seemingly in compliance with the domestic rules may nevertheless produce results that are incompatible with the object and purpose of that right. If this is the case, the Court must pursue its examination under the second and third limbs of the test set out below, as applicable, in order to determine whether the results of the application of the relevant domestic rules were compatible with the specific requirements of the right to a “tribunal established by law” within the meaning of the Convention (ibid., §§ 244‑245).

36.  Secondly, the breach in question must be assessed in the light of the object and purpose of the requirement of a “tribunal established by law” – namely, to ensure the ability of the judiciary to perform its duties free of undue interference and thereby to preserve the rule of law and the separation of powers. Accordingly, breaches of a purely technical nature that have no bearing on the legitimacy of the appointment process must be considered to fall below the relevant threshold. Conversely, breaches that wholly disregard the most fundamental rules in the appointment procedure (such as the appointment of a person as judge who did not fulfil the relevant eligibility criteria) or breaches that may otherwise undermine the purpose and effect of the “established by law” requirement (as interpreted by the Court) must be considered to contravene that requirement (ibid., § 246).

37.  Thirdly, the review conducted by national courts, if any, as to the legal consequences – in terms of an individual’s Convention rights – of a breach of a domestic rule regarding judicial appointments plays a significant role in determining whether such a breach amounted to a violation of the right of access to a “tribunal established by law”, and thus forms part of the test itself. An assessment by the national courts of the legal effects of such a breach must be carried out on the basis of the relevant Convention case-law and the principles derived therefrom (ibid., §§ 248 and 250).

38.  The Court has applied the above test in a number of cases pertaining to the requirement under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that a tribunal be established by law (see, among many other authorities, Advance Pharma sp. z o.o v. Poland, no. 1469/20, § 349, 3 February 2022; Dolińska‑Ficek and Ozimek v. Poland, nos. 49868/19 and 57511/19, § 353, 8 November 2021; Reczkowicz v. Poland, no. 43447/19, § 280, 22 July 2021; Xero Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. v. Poland, no. 4907/18, § 289, 7 May 2021; and Besnik Cani v. Albania, no. 37474/20, § 115, 4 October 2022).

(b)   Application of the above principles to the present case

39.  In determining whether there was a manifest breach of domestic law under the first element of the Ástráðsson test, as a result of the election of G.J. to the SJC, the Court must identify the domestic courts’ position in respect of this question (compare Besnik Cani, cited above, § 94). In this connection, the Court observes that in its decision of 6 May 2022 (see paragraph 23 above), the Constitutional Court of Armenia essentially addressed the issue of whether the retirement age as a ground for cessation of a judge’s powers was to be applied to judicial and non-judicial members of the SJC alike and would thus be a bar to the election of a non-judicial candidate to the SJC. Having thoroughly analysed the domestic law, the Constitutional Court held that, while candidates for the post of non-judicial member of the SJC were subject to “any restrictions on appointment to a judicial post”, those were set out in section 112 of the Judicial Code, which did not prescribe any age limit (ibid.; see also paragraphs 14 and 19 above). Furthermore, the position taken by the Constitutional Court that the retirement age for judges (see paragraph 23 above) does not extend to non‑judicial members of the SJC is also reasoned in detail. In this connection, the Constitutional Court stressed that the statuses of judicial and non-judicial members of the SJC were not identical, given the difference regarding their eligibility conditions and election procedure. Setting an age-limit of 65 was a safeguard to ensure the irremovability of judges until the attainment of that age. Upon attainment, their judicial tenure ended, thereby effectively putting end to their powers as a judicial member of the SJC, in accordance with section 86(1)(7) of the Code (see paragraph 15 above). In contrast, the irremovability of an SJC member was ensured by a fixed term of office of five years and the prohibition on re-election (ibid., and paragraph 12 above). The importance of such guarantees, as underlined by the Constitutional Court, served to uphold the independence of judges and the judiciary as a whole (see paragraph 23 above).

40.  The Court reiterates that its power to review compliance with domestic law is limited. It is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, since the national authorities are, in the nature of things, particularly qualified to settle the issues arising in this connection (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, § 149, 20 March 2018). This is particularly true when, as in this instance, the case turns upon questions of interpretation of domestic law (see Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal [GC], no. 73049/01, § 83, ECHR 2007-I). Unless the interpretation is arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable, the Court’s role is confined to ascertaining whether the effects of that interpretation are compatible with the Convention (ibid., §§ 83 and 86).

41.  Regard being had to the findings of the Constitutional Court in its decision of 6 May 2022 (see paragraph 23 above), it cannot be said that the interpretation of the domestic provisions by that court and, in particular, as regards its conclusions about the difference in the statuses of judicial and non‑judicial members of the SJC, given the non-identical eligibility criteria and appointment procedure applicable to them, were arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable, or produced results that are incompatible with the Convention.

42.  In the light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that the first condition of the Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson test has not been met. The complaint is therefore manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

43.  Lastly, as regards the applicant’s argument that G.J. could not be appointed to the SJC because he was not a distinguished lawyer or that he had breached the incompatibility requirements (see paragraph 31 above), having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as this complaint falls within its competence, the Court finds that it does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. It follows that this part of the application must also be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

44.  The Government reiterated their arguments summarised in Suren Antonyan (cited above, §§ 92-94).

45.  The applicant complained that the composition of the SJC did not satisfy the requirement of an independent tribunal. Since he had been unable to obtain judicial review of his dismissal, there had been a breach of his right of access to a court.

46.  The Court refers to the general principles summarised in the case of Suren Antonyan (cited above, §§ 97-99 and 122-23).

47.  In that case, having examined the domestic law, including institutional safeguards for the independence of the SJC, and in the absence of any evidence that those safeguards were merely theoretical and did not operate in practice, the Court concluded that the SJC satisfied the formal requirements of an “independent tribunal” (ibid., §§ 100-19). As regards the question of substantial representation of judges in the SJC, the Court held that the Armenian system opted for parity between judicial and non-judicial members, which the Venice Commission also considered to be “quite balanced”. The Court, for its part, did not see any issue in that respect (ibid., § 118).

48.  With regard to Mr Antonyan’s complaint that he had lacked access to a court to contest the decision of the SJC to dismiss him given that it was final and not subject to appeal, the Court held that during the disciplinary proceedings at issue the SJC had acted as a “court” for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (ibid., § 124). It reiterated its case-law to the effect that no right of appeal can be derived from Article 6 § 1, in particular as regards civil proceedings (ibid., § 125). In the present case, the Court acknowledges the fact, as it did in the case of Suren Antonyan, that both the European Commission for Democracy through Law (“Venice Commission”) and the Group of States against Corruption (“GRECO”) recommended that the Armenian authorities set up an appeal procedure against the decisions of the SJC subjecting a judge to disciplinary liability (ibid., § 126). In fact, in October 2023 – that is after the circumstances of both the present case and the case of Suren Antonyan – draft amendments to the Judicial Code introducing an appellate review procedure within the SJC were presented to the National Assembly of Armenia (ibid., §§ 52 and 127). These amendments were subsequently adopted, but have not yet entered into force, pending the enactment by the SJC of a secondary legal act (ibid.) – a delay the Court finds concerning. However, in the case of Suren Antonyan, having found that the SJC qualified as a “court” to which that applicant had access for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the Court held that the lack of further review of the SJC’s decision before the ordinary courts did not raise an issue under that Article (§§ 127-29).

49.  In the present case, the applicant did not submit any new argument or evidence capable of persuading the Court to depart from its above findings in the case of Suren Antonyan (cited above). The mere fact that the non-judicial members of the SJC panel sitting in his case were in the majority does not detract from the above conclusion because the applicant failed to submit any evidence that those members lacked independence or were not impartial. In this connection, the Court observes that the SJC panel sitting in the applicant’s case had a quorum (see paragraph 16 above) and the decision to terminate his judicial powers was unanimous (see paragraph 17 above).

50.  It therefore follows that the applicant’s complaints concerning the alleged lack of independence of the SJC and impossibility to appeal against its decisions before the ordinary courts are also manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 6 November 2025.

 Victor Soloveytchik Kateřina Šimáčková
 Registrar President