THIRD SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 25141/16
K.L.
against Sweden
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 17 October 2017 as a Chamber composed of:
Branko Lubarda, President,
Helena Jäderblom,
Helen Keller,
Pere Pastor Vilanova,
Alena Poláčková,
Georgios A. Serghides,
Jolien Schukking, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar
Having regard to the above application lodged on 3 May 2016,
Having regard to the decision to grant priority to the above application under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
Having regard to the decision to grant the applicant anonymity under Rule 47 § 4 and confidentiality under Rule 33,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant is a Lebanese national who was born in 1980. He is currently in Sweden. He is represented before the Court by Mr T. Fridh, a lawyer practising in Gothenburg.
2. The Swedish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms H. Lindquist, of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
A. The circumstances of the case
3. On 29 December 2007 the applicant and his wife arrived in Sweden. They applied for asylum, and before the Migration Agency (Migrationsverket) the applicant essentially stated the following. He and his wife are Christians from South Lebanon. His brother, a member of the South Lebanese Army, had disappeared in 2000 and the applicant had contacted Hezbollah to inquire about his whereabouts. After the war in 2006, Hezbollah had accused the applicant of being a spy for Israel and had harassed him due to his religious beliefs. In September 2007 two members of Hezbollah had come to his and his wife’s house and physically assaulted his wife. He had tried to scare the intruders by firing into the air. Subsequently, he and his wife had hidden in a Christian neighbourhood in Beirut. Since, allegedly, the Lebanese authorities were unable to protect them, they had decided to leave the country. If returned to Lebanon, he would risk being killed.
4. On 4 March 2009 the Migration Agency rejected the applicant’s and his wife’s requests for asylum. It noted that, according to the UNHCR, the general situation in Lebanon after the armed conflict during the summer of 2006 and cessation of hostilities was such that Lebanese citizens who had fled because of the armed conflict were no longer automatically in need of international protection. It held therefore that the general situation in Lebanon did not in itself constitute a sufficient basis for granting asylum. Turning to the applicant’s individual claims, the Agency found that there was no evidence that he had been accused of being a spy, that he was wanted by Hezbollah or that the alleged threats and assaults were connected to Hezbollah. Furthermore, there was no evidence that the Lebanese authorities would be unable or unwilling to protect him. Moreover, it noted that nothing indicated that the applicant had controversial political or other affiliations which would make him of interest to any particular group in Lebanon. Consequently, the Agency concluded that, since the applicant had not substantiated his alleged grounds for asylum, and no other reasons for asylum had been established, his request should be rejected and his deportation to Lebanon ordered.
5. The applicant appealed to the Migration Court (Migrationsdomstolen) against the Migration Agency’s decision. He maintained his claims and added that one of the reasons why Hezbollah thought he was a spy was that he had volunteered as a paramedic, which had allowed him to move freely in the area of the armed conflict. If returned to Lebanon, he would risk being imprisoned or killed by Hezbollah because they considered him to be a spy who had defied Hezbollah and fired at them in his home. He could not report the incident to the police since Hezbollah exerted power over the authorities in Lebanon.
6. On 21 December 2009 the Migration Court upheld the Migration Agency’s decision. It found that the applicant could have been of some interest to Hezbollah due to his inquiries about his brother, his work as a paramedic and the threats and assaults to which the applicant and his wife had been subjected. However, the court found that the abuse the applicant and his wife feared from Hezbollah constituted criminal acts which fell within the responsibility of the Lebanese authorities. Since the applicant and his wife had not contacted the Lebanese authorities, they could not be deemed to have exhausted the protection available in Lebanon or made it probable that those authorities were unwilling or unable to protect them. Furthermore, the court held that, as the applicant had not been politically active, and his brother’s engagement with the South Lebanese Army dated back many years, there were no reasons to believe that the applicant would be of any particular interest to Hezbollah.
7. On 15 March 2010 the Migration Court of Appeal (Migrationsöverdomstolen) refused the applicant leave to appeal.
8. In July 2010 the applicant submitted to the Migration Agency a document alleged to be a Lebanese judgment by default dated 29 May 2008. According to the judgment, the applicant had been convicted, inter alia, of premeditated murder and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment, including hard labour.
9. The Migration Agency considered the submission of the document to entail a request for a stay of the enforcement of the deportation order and a re-examination of its previous decision due to impediments to the enforcement. In its decision of 24 November 2010 the Agency noted that the applicant had not previously claimed that the Lebanese authorities had issued a warrant for his arrest and that he had not provided any information on how he had obtained the document in question. It therefore had the authenticity of the judgment examined. The examination, which revealed, inter alia, that the document was a copy created using toner technology and that the stamps and signatures on it had been produced by photocopiers or printers, led to the conclusion that there were strong indications that it was not authentic. The Agency accordingly decided that there was no ground for a re-examination of its decision of 4 March 2009. The applicant appealed to the Migration Court which, on 17 December 2010, upheld the Agency’s conclusions.
10. On 15 March 2014, the deportation order became time‑barred and shortly thereafter the applicant and his wife again applied for asylum.
11. Before the Migration Agency, the applicant maintained his previous submissions but made some changes and additions. In particular, he claimed that he had shot and killed one of the men who had forced their way into his home in 2007 and that that man was the son of a high-ranking Hezbollah politician. Furthermore, due to his alleged conviction in absentia in 2008, Hezbollah had sought him at his parents’ and their neighbours’ homes, which showed that he was wanted by Hezbollah. He submitted an arrest warrant dated 5 July 2010.
12. On 6 November 2014 the Migration Agency rejected the applicant’s and his wife’s new requests for asylum. As concerns the arrest warrant, which allegedly was based on the above-mentioned conviction, it was found to be of a very simple and easily falsified nature. Furthermore, it was undated, seemed to be a copy and was not accompanied by an explanation as to how the applicant had obtained it. In view of this, the Agency concluded that the documents submitted had very low value as evidence and were not sufficient to substantiate the applicant’s asylum claims. The Agency then turned to the oral information submitted by the applicant. It found that, after having been refused asylum in 2010, he had changed his story significantly concerning the alleged incident at his home without providing any reasonable explanation. Moreover, he had failed to give a reasonable explanation as to why he had not mentioned the fatal shooting of the intruder, the conviction and the arrest warrant in the original asylum proceedings. The Agency thus found reason to question whether the alleged incident had occurred at all. It also noted that the applicant and his wife, despite numerous questions, had only submitted very parsimonious and vague answers concerning alleged visits and inquiries by Hezbollah to their parents and other family members. In addition, the Agency noted that the incident had allegedly occurred in 2007 and that there was no evidence indicating that Hezbollah would have any particular or current interest in the applicant. Furthermore, the Agency confirmed its previous findings regarding the general situation in Lebanon. Lastly, in regard to the applicant’s and his wife’s private life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention, it found that, for the majority of the time, they had resided in Sweden illegally and had much stronger links to Lebanon than to Sweden. Thus, they could not be granted leave to remain due to their residence in or connections to Sweden. The Agency concluded that no grounds for residence permits had been established and therefore ordered the applicant’s and his wife’s deportation to Lebanon.
13. The applicant appealed to the Migration Court. He maintained his claims and submitted, inter alia, documents from a lawyer and a security official at the Rafic Hariri International Airport which stated that he had been convicted and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment and was wanted by the Lebanese authorities.
14. On 21 April 2015, after having held an oral hearing, the Migration Court upheld the Migration Agency’s decision. It agreed with the reasoning of the Agency concerning the probative value of the written evidence submitted and noted that the new documents were of a simple nature and did not substantiate his need for protection. Furthermore, the court found that the applicant’s and his wife’s accounts of the alleged incident in their home in 2007 were incoherent and contradictory. Consequently, it concluded that they had not demonstrated that Hezbollah had any interest in them, that they were exposed to risks against which they could not be protected by the Lebanese authorities or that they had been persecuted due to their Christian faith or for any other reason. Lastly, it shared the Agency’s reasoning concerning the lack of sufficient links to Sweden for granting them leave to remain.
15. On 10 June 2015 the Migration Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal.
B. Relevant domestic law
16. The basic provisions applicable in the present case, concerning the right of aliens to enter and to remain in Sweden, are laid down in the Aliens Act (utlänningslagen, 2005:716).
17. An alien who is considered to be a refugee or otherwise in need of protection is, with certain exceptions, entitled to a residence permit in Sweden (Chapter 5, section 1, of the Act). The term “refugee” refers to an alien who is outside the country of his or her nationality owing to a well‑founded fear of being persecuted on grounds of race, nationality, religious or political beliefs, or on grounds of gender, sexual orientation or other membership of a particular social group, and who is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country (Chapter 4, section 1). This applies irrespective of whether the persecution is at the hands of the authorities of the country or if those authorities cannot be expected to offer protection against persecution by private individuals. By “an alien otherwise in need of protection” is meant, inter alia, a person who has left the country of his or her nationality because of a well-founded fear of being sentenced to death or receiving corporal punishment, or of being subjected to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Chapter 4, section 2).
18. Moreover, if a residence permit cannot be granted on the above grounds, such a permit may be issued to an alien if, after an overall assessment of his or her situation, there are such particularly distressing circumstances (synnerligen ömmande omständigheter) as to allow him or her to remain in Sweden (Chapter 5, section 6).
19. Under certain conditions, an alien may be granted a residence permit even if a deportation or expulsion order has acquired legal force. This is the case where new circumstances have emerged which indicate that there are reasonable grounds for believing, inter alia, that enforcement would put the alien in danger of being subjected to capital or corporal punishment, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or where there are medical or other special reasons why the order should not be enforced (Chapter 12, section 18). If a residence permit cannot be granted under these criteria, the Migration Agency may instead decide to re-examine the matter. Such re-examination is to be carried out where it may be assumed, on the basis of new circumstances relied on by the alien, that there are lasting impediments to enforcement of the nature referred to in Chapter 12, sections 1 and 2, and that these circumstances could not have been raised previously or the alien shows that he or she has a valid excuse for not having done so. Should the applicable conditions not have been met, the Agency will decide not to grant re-examination (Chapter 12, section 19).
C. Relevant information about Lebanon
20. In March 2017 the US Department of State released the Lebanon Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2016. It stated:
“Lebanon is a parliamentary republic based on the 1943 National Pact, which apportions governmental authority among a Maronite Christian president, a Shia speaker of the Chamber of Deputies (parliament), and a Sunni prime minister...
Civilian authorities maintained control over the armed forces and other security forces, although Palestinian security and militia forces, the designated terrorist group Hizballah, and other extremist elements operated outside the direction or control of government officials...
The most significant human rights abuses during the year were torture and abuse by security forces, harsh prison and detention center conditions, and limitations on freedom of movement for Palestinian and Syrian refugees...
Other human rights abuses included lengthy pretrial detention; a judiciary subject to political pressure and long delays in trials; violation of citizens’ privacy rights...
Despite the presence of Lebanese and UN security forces, Hizballah retained significant influence over parts of the country, and the government made no tangible progress toward disbanding and disarming armed militia groups, including Hizballah...
Authorities failed to observe many provisions of the law, and government security forces, as well as extralegal armed groups such as Hizballah, continued the practice of extrajudicial arrest and detention, including incommunicado detention. Additionally, the law permits military intelligence personnel to make arrests without warrants in cases involving military personnel or involving civilians suspected of espionage, treason, or weapons possession.”
21. The International Religious Freedom Report for 2015 of the US Department of State, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, contained, inter alia, the following in respect of Lebanon:
“The constitution states there shall be absolute freedom of conscience and guarantees the free exercise of religious rites for all religious groups provided the public order is not disturbed. The constitution states there shall be a “just and equitable balance” in the apportionment of cabinet and high level civil service positions among the major religious groups, a situation reaffirmed by the Taef Agreement, which ended the country’s civil war and mandated equal representation between Christians and Muslims in the parliament. Some minority Christian groups complained they were not granted proportionate representation in the cabinet, high level civil service positions, or the parliament. ...
... Religious leaders of Muslim and Christian communities reported places of worship continued to operate in relative peace and security, and that relationships among individual members of different religious groups generally remained amicable.
...
Statistics Lebanon estimates 35.5 percent of the population is Christian. ...”
22. In a report of 30 November 2015 on his mission to Lebanon, the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief of the UN Human Rights Council (OHCHR) set out, inter alia, the following conclusions:
“In Lebanon, people are free to confess and practise their religions and beliefs in the way they see fit. Conversion in different directions is possible and indeed a reality – in stark contrast to the situation in most other Middle-Eastern countries. People can also bear public testimony to their faith and engage in missionary or dawa activities. Religious diversity is a visible and audible reality, as churches and mosques often stand in close vicinity and the ringing of bells at times intermingles with the Muslim call to prayer. Some Lebanese openly declare themselves as agnostics or atheists, and express critical views on religion in general, which is mostly appreciated as something quite natural in an open society.
The country’s pluralistic heritage is a counterpoint to the aggressive agendas of sectarian homogenization that haunt some neighbouring countries. Over the centuries, a culture of interreligious coexistence has emerged that today helps to build resilience against extremist interpretations of religious traditions. Many families comprise persons of different religious orientations. Many people live, learn and work together across confessional lines, a situation that quite naturally fosters the discovery of common interests, values and convictions.”
COMPLAINTS
23. The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that, if he were to be expelled to Lebanon, he would face a real risk of being killed by Hezbollah, mainly because he had killed one of their men – for which he had allegedly been convicted – and because he is a Christian. Furthermore, the applicant complained that his deportation would violate his right to private life under Article 8 of the Convention, as he and his wife, after many years of residence, were well-integrated in Swedish society.
THE LAW
A. The Government’s objection under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention
24. The Government contended that the applicant had failed to comply with the six-month rule in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They argued that the final decision in the domestic proceedings had been taken on 10 June 2015 when the Migration Court of Appeal had refused leave to appeal, thus eleven months before the applicant initiated the present proceedings. Even considering the Court’s previous rulings on similar objections by the Government, they maintained that the six-month rule was closely linked to the rule on exhaustion of domestic remedies and that a person facing deportation would be able to complain against a potential violation within six months from the moment when the deportation order became final and enforceable.
25. The applicant contested this argument, stating that the risk of his being deported was a continuing situation.
26. The Court considers, regardless of whether the applicant has respected the six-month rule, that it need not resolve this issue as the application is, in any event, inadmissible for the following reasons.
B. The applicant’s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention
27. The applicant complained of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
1. The Government’s submissions
28. The Government maintained that the security situation in Lebanon, including that of Christians, was not in itself sufficient to conclude that the forced removal of the applicant would breach Article 3 of the Convention.
29. As to the applicant’s personal risk, the Government pointed out that the Migration Agency and the migration courts are specialised bodies with particular expertise in the field of asylum law and practice and that they had examined the case thoroughly. The Agency had held interviews with the applicant in connection with both the first and the second asylum applications. Furthermore, an oral hearing lasting more than two hours had been held before the Migration Court. The interviews and the oral hearing had taken place in the presence of an interpreter and the applicant’s public counsel. The applicant had thus been given several opportunities to explain the relevant facts and circumstances in support of his claim.
30. In regard to the incident in 2007, when the applicant and his wife allegedly had been assaulted in their home, the Government submitted that this would have to be considered a criminal act perpetrated by non-State actors and agreed with the national authorities that the applicant had not exhausted the possibilities to obtain protection from the Lebanese authorities. They further argued that there was reason to question whether the incident had actually occurred and, more importantly, whether an intruder had been seriously wounded or even killed. In this context, the Government submitted that the applicant had made vague and incoherent statements about the moment when he had learned that the intruder had died and about the rifle he had used. During the initial asylum proceedings, neither the applicant nor his wife had mentioned that any of the intruders had been seriously wounded. It was not until the first expulsion order had become time‑barred and a new application for asylum had been submitted that the applicant had stated that he had shot one of the intruders. In the Government’s view, if the incident had occurred, it must have been obvious to the applicant from the outset that one of the intruders had actually been hit during the shooting since, according to the applicant’s later statements, he had fallen unconscious to the ground. Moreover, the documents submitted by the applicant had been considered by the national authorities to be of a very simple and easily falsified nature. The examination of the Lebanese judgment had led to the conclusion that there were strong reasons to believe that it was not authentic. Thus, the written evidence had very low probative value. The Government therefore agreed with the national authorities that the applicant’s statements about the alleged incident of 2007 could not be considered credible.
31. Additionally, the Government stated that the applicant and his wife had never been politically active and that the applicant’s brother’s engagement in the South Lebanese Army had occurred a long time ago.
32. In view of the above, the Government contended that the applicant had not demonstrated that Hezbollah posed a real and personal threat to him and his wife nor that they were at risk of treatment in breach of Article 3 due to their religious beliefs or for any other reason. Since the claims failed to attain the basic level of substantiation, the application should accordingly be declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded.
2. The applicant’s submissions
33. The applicant maintained that, if returned to Lebanon, he would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention and claimed that he had presented a detailed, coherent and credible claim.
34. In regard to the Government’s statement that the national authorities had made a thorough examination of his case, the applicant asserted that the Swedish asylum procedure – no matter how good the authorities were at assessing the information submitted – did not guarantee that the decision made would not be in breach of Article 3.
35. As to the general situation in Lebanon, the applicant stated that there were grave breaches of human rights in the country and that Hezbollah acted beyond the influence of the government. It would therefore be unreasonable to expect effective protection by the Lebanese authorities against Hezbollah, especially since he was wanted by those authorities for his actions.
36. The applicant further asserted that there might have been errors in the interpretation of his initial oral statements concerning details in his story. He claimed that he had described the attack in 2007 in great detail, and clarified that the rifle he had used was his own and that the consequences of the shooting had been unclear to him until he had become aware of the judgment issued against him. He contended that the initial errors could not be given such importance as to invalidate his claims.
37. Moreover, the core circumstances of his claims were strongly supported by the written evidence submitted. In this regard, the applicant submitted that the Migration Agency’s examination of the authenticity of the Lebanese judgment – allegedly undertaken by the Agency’s own personnel without reference to country information or the assistance of independent experts or Lebanese authorities – did not meet the standards that could be expected in a case concerning possible treatment in breach of Article 3. The applicant submitted that the Court, considering the seriousness of the risk he would face if returned to Lebanon, should be satisfied with the material presented.
3. The Court’s assessment
(a) General principles
38. It is settled case-law that Contracting States have the right, as a matter of well-established international law and subject to their treaty obligations, including the Convention, to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens. However, the expulsion of an alien may give rise to an issue under Article 3, and hence engage the responsibility of the expelling State under the Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person in question, if deported, would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the receiving country. In those circumstances, Article 3 implies the obligation not to deport the person in question to that country (see, inter alia, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 27765/09, §§ 113-114, ECHR 2012; and J.K. and Others v. Sweden [GC], no. 59166/12, § 79, ECHR 2016).
39. The assessment of whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the applicant faces such a real risk inevitably requires that the Court assess the conditions in the receiving country against the standards of Article 3 of the Convention. These standards imply that the ill‑treatment allegedly facing the applicant upon return must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no. 29217/12, § 94, ECHR 2014 (extracts); and J.K. and Others v. Sweden, cited above, § 79). Owing to the absolute character of the right guaranteed, Article 3 of the Convention may also apply where the danger emanates from persons or groups of persons who are not public officials. However, it must be shown that the risk is real and that the authorities of the receiving State are not able to obviate the risk by providing appropriate protection (Hirsi Jamaa and Others, cited above, § 120).
40. The assessment of the existence of a real risk must necessarily be a rigorous one (see Saadi v. Italy [GC], no. 37201/06, § 128, ECHR 2008). It is in principle for the applicant to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are substantial grounds for believing that, if the measure complained of were to be implemented, he or she would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3. Where such evidence is adduced, it is for the Government to dispel any doubts about it. In this respect, the Court acknowledges that, owing to the special situation in which asylum seekers often find themselves, it is frequently necessary to give them the benefit of the doubt when it comes to assessing the credibility of their statements and the documents submitted in support thereof. However, when information is presented which gives strong reasons to question the veracity of an asylum seeker’s submissions, the individual must provide a satisfactory explanation for the alleged discrepancies (see F.G. v. Sweden [GC], no. 43611/11, §§ 113 and 120, ECHR 2016; and J.K. and Others v. Sweden, cited above, §§ 91 and 93).
(b) Application of the general principles to the present case
41. The Court notes, first, that the applicant’s request for asylum was carefully examined by the domestic authorities in three sets of proceedings. The applicant was interviewed by the Migration Agency and the Migration Court held an oral hearing in the third set of proceedings. Throughout these proceedings there was an interpreter present and the applicant was represented by public counsel. There are no indications that the national proceedings lacked effective guarantees to protect the applicant against arbitrary refoulement or were otherwise flawed.
42. In regard to the general situation in Lebanon, the Court finds, in agreement with the Swedish authorities, that the country information does not indicate a situation of such nature that it would imply a real risk of ill‑treatment simply by virtue of an individual being returned there. Neither does the country information disclose any significant level of ill‑treatment due to religious beliefs. On the contrary, the Lebanese constitution guarantees religious freedom and equitable political and civil representation for major religious groups, including Christians.
43. Turning to the applicant’s fear of ill-treatment by Hezbollah – regardless of whether the Lebanese authorities are generally able to provide protection against that organisation – the Court has serious misgivings about the veracity of the applicant’s statements concerning his need of protection. First, the Court notes that the judgment allegedly issued by a Lebanese court – which is the main written evidence submitted by the applicant in support of his claim of threats from Hezbollah – has been examined by the Swedish authorities, which found strong indications that it had been falsified. Nothing indicates that that examination was arbitrary or based on insufficient expertise. Furthermore, the submitted written evidence, as a whole, was found to be of a very simple nature and of very low probative value. The Court also notes that the judgment was submitted to the Migration Agency only in July 2010, after the original asylum proceedings had ended, although it was dated May 2008. No reasonable explanation as to why this document was submitted so late has been forthcoming from the applicant.
44. Second, in regard to the oral submissions in the case, as the domestic authorities have found, the applicant has changed and gradually escalated his story several times in essential parts. To explain these alterations, the applicant has stated that there may have been interpreter errors in the first set of proceedings and that he did not know about the consequences of his shooting until he learned of the Lebanese judgment against him. However, there is nothing indicating interpreter errors in the proceedings before the domestic authorities. Also, the applicant had several opportunities to correct any errors during the first set of proceedings, both before the Migration Agency and in his appeal to the Migration Court. Furthermore, the applicant’s statements about the shooting incident in September 2007 cannot be considered credible. Initially, he claimed that he had scared off two Hezbollah members from his home by shooting in the air and, several years later, he stated that he had killed one of the intruders who also happened to be the son of a high-ranking Hezbollah politician. In the Court’s view, if the incident occurred at all, the applicant must already have been aware of the alleged consequences of the shooting at the time when he applied for asylum. Accordingly, the domestic authorities, in finding the applicant lacking in credibility, have drawn appropriate and well-reasoned conclusions. In this connection the Court observes that, as a general principle, the domestic authorities are best placed to assess the credibility of witnesses since it is they who have had the opportunity to see, hear and assess the demeanour of the individuals concerned (see R.C. v. Sweden, no. 41827/07, § 52, 9 March 2010).
45. The Court also takes into account that the alleged problems with Hezbollah date back ten years and that neither the applicant nor his wife, then or since, have been politically active.
46. In the light of the above, the Court considers that the applicant has failed to show that his return to Lebanon would expose him to a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention on account of the alleged threats from Hezbollah, his being Christian or any other ground.
47. It follows that the applicant’s complaint under Article 3 of the Convention is manifestly ill‑founded and must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
C. The applicant’s complaint under Article 8 of the Convention
48. In his reply to the observations submitted by the Government, the applicant formally lodged a complaint under Article 8 of the Convention, arguing that his removal to Lebanon would violate his right to private life in Sweden. Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
49. The applicant stated in the application form that he and his wife had established a considerable private life in Sweden: they had lived there since December 2007, had learned the Swedish language and integrated in Swedish society, and participated in the activities of the local church.
50. In the case of A.S. v. Switzerland, no. 39350/13, § 44, ECHR 2015, the Court stated the following:
“The Court recalls that where a Contracting State tolerates the presence of an alien in its territory, thereby allowing him or her to await a decision on an application for a residence permit, an appeal against such a decision or a fresh application for a residence permit, such a Contracting State enables the alien to take part in the host country’s society, to form relationships and to create a family there. However, this does not automatically entail that the authorities of the Contracting State concerned are, as a result, under an obligation pursuant to Article 8 of the Convention to allow him or her to settle in their country. ...The same applies to cases of asylum seekers whose presence on the territory of a Contracting State is tolerated by the national authorities on their own motion or accepted in compliance with their international obligations.”
51. The Court is satisfied that the decision to expel the applicant was in accordance with Swedish law and pursued a legitimate aim, notably the economic well-being of the country, including the effective implementation of immigration control. Accordingly, leaving aside the question of whether the deportation of the applicant would lead to a de facto interference with his private or family life, the Court will examine whether the deportation order was necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.
52. In this respect, the Court notes that the applicant and his wife are to be deported together to their home country, where they were born and lived until they were adults and came to Sweden. Accordingly, while they have resided in Sweden for almost ten years, albeit illegally for most of that time, their ties to Sweden are not as strong as to their home country.
53. Having regard to the above, the Court finds that the Swedish authorities’ decision to order the applicant’s deportation was not disproportionate to the aim pursued. Accordingly, the enforcement of that order would not involve a breach of Article 8 of the Convention.
54. It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill‑founded and must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 9 November 2017.
Stephen PhillipsBranko Lubarda
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy