FIRST SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 44384/04
by Anna Ivanovna KLUSHINA
against Russia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 12 October 2006 as a Chamber composed of:
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrL. Loucaides,
MrsF. Tulkens,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrA. Kovler,
MrD. Spielmann,
MrS.E. Jebens, judges
and Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 18 November 2004,
Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having regard to the comments submitted by the respondent Government,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Ms Anna Ivanovna Klushina, is a Russian national who was born in 1949 and lives in the village of Fastovetskaya, the Krasnodar Region. She was represented before the Court by Mr K. Ilyin, a lawyer practising in Tikhoretsk, the Krasnodar Region. The respondent Government were represented by Mr P. Laptev, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
1. Original proceedings
The applicant suffers from cerebral paralysis and has a disability of the second category.
In 2002 she sued a local welfare authority in connection with the latter’s refusal to pay her annual compensation in respect of her transport expenses.
On 16 January 2003 the Tikhoretsk Town Court of the Krasnodar Region (“the Town Court”) granted the applicant’s claim and ordered the welfare authority to pay her a compensation. The court did not specify the amount of the compensation. This judgment was not appealed against and entered into force on 27 January 2003.
On 20 March 2003 enforcement proceedings commenced.
On 6 August 2004, in reply to the applicant’s query, the bailiffs informed her that they were unable to enforce the judgment of 16 January 2003, since the debtor had insufficient funds.
On 21 August 2004 the applicant lodged a court complaint against the bailiffs for their failure to enforce the judgment in her favour.
On 7 October 2004 the Town Court confirmed the applicant’s entitlement to the compensation of her transport expenses in the amount of 2,189 Russian roubles (RUR) per year and ordered the bailiffs to enforce the judgment of 16 January 2003 within 30 days from the date on which the present judgment would become final. It does not appear that any appeal was lodged against the judgment of 7 October 2004.
On 5 April 2005, upon the applicant’s request for clarification of the judgment of 16 January 2003, the Town Court ruled that the applicant was eligible for compensation of her transport expenses in the amount of RUR 2,189 per year for the period of six years, and therefore the defendant authority was under obligation to pay her a total sum of RUR 13,134. This decision was upheld on appeal by the Krasnodar Regional Court on 19 May 2005.
On 3 December 2005 the judgment of 16 January 2003, as interpreted by decision of 5 April 2005, was paid in full.
2. Proceedings for adjustment of the judgment debt
On an unspecified date the applicant instituted proceedings against the welfare authority, seeking RUR 5,083 as compensation for inflation losses sustained by her between 16 January 2003, when the judgment in her favour had been given, and 3 December 2005, when it had been enforced.
By decision of 16 March 2006 the Town Court granted the applicant’s claims in full and awarded her the requested amount as well as RUR 100 in respect of court expenses. The decision was not appealed against and became final ten days later.
On 16 May 2006 the sum of RUR 5,183 was transferred to the applicant’s bank account.
B. Relevant domestic law
Section 9 of the Federal Law on Enforcement Proceedings of 21 July 1997 provides that a bailiff’s order on the institution of enforcement proceedings must fix a time-limit for the defendant’s voluntary compliance with a writ of execution. The time-limit may not exceed five days. The bailiff must also warn the defendant that coercive action will follow, should the defendant fail to comply with the time-limit.
Under Section 13 of the Law, the enforcement proceedings should be completed within two months of the receipt of the writ of enforcement by the bailiff.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the State’s failure to enforce in time the final judgment in her favour.
THE LAW
The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the untimely enforcement of the judgment of 16 January 2003. These provisions, in so far as relevant, read as follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
The Government argued that the judgment of 16 January 2003 had been executed within a reasonable period of time after it had been clarified by the Town Court on 5 April 2005 and therefore, in their view, the length of the enforcement proceedings had not been excessive, and there had been no violation of the applicant’s rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. In their additional memorandum they also referred to the decision of 16 March 2006 by which the applicant had been awarded compensation for the fall in value of her judgment debt as a result of its untimely enforcement. They contended that she had ceased to be a victim, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, and that the present application should thus be declared inadmissible.
The applicant disagreed with the Government and maintained her complaint.
The Court does not find it necessary to examine the entirety of the arguments advanced by the parties since the application is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.
Under Article 34 of the Convention the Court is entitled to receive applications from persons, non-governmental organisations or groups of individuals “claiming to be the victim of a violation” by a High Contracting Party of the rights contained in the Convention and its Protocols. In situations where an alleged violation has already occurred, subsequent events can give rise to a loss of the status of “victim”, provided that the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then afforded redress for, the breach of the Convention (see, among other authorities, Amuur v. France, judgment of 25 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-III, p. 846, § 36). Accordingly, in principle, where domestic proceedings include an admission of the breach by the national authorities and the payment of a sum of money amounting to redress, the dual requirement established in Amuur is satisfied and the applicant can no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of the Convention (see Rechachi and Abdelhafid v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 55554/00, 10 June 2003).
On the facts, the Court observes that the judgment of 16 January 2003 remained without enforcement until 3 December 2005. The applicant then sued the authority for compensation of damage caused by the delayed enforcement of her court award and by decision of 16 March 2006, which was not appealed against and became final ten days later, the domestic court granted her claim, acknowledging the delay and ordering the authority to pay her RUR 5,083 in damages for inflation losses and RUR 100 for court expenses. Both sums were paid to the applicant on 16 May 2006 that is less than two months after the judgment in question had entered into force. The Court also notes that the applicant did not appeal against the judgment of 16 March 2006. It thus appears that she did not object to the amount of the awarded compensation.
Having regard to the content of the judgment of 16 March 2006 and the fact that it was enforced within a relatively short period of time, the Court finds that the national authorities have acknowledged, and then afforded redress for, the alleged breach of the Convention.
It follows that the applicant can no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention (see Khaziyev v. Russia (dec.), no. 15193/03, 10 November 2005 or Yeremenko v. Russia (dec.), no. 24535/04, 23 May 2006). The application must therefore be rejected as manifestly ill-founded pursuant to Article 35 § 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Decides to discontinue the application of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention;
Declares the application inadmissible.
Søren NielsenChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy