FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 39282/13
Bogusław KOC
against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 21 April 2020 as a Committee composed of:
Pere Pastor Vilanova, President,
Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
Pauliine Koskelo, judges,
and Renata Degener, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 11 June 2013,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Bogusław Koc, is a Polish national, who was born in 1949 and lives in Inowrocław.
2. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Jan Sobczak of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.Background to the case
4. In 1944 the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego) issued the Decree on agrarian reform of 6 September 1944 (dekret o reformie rolnej) (“the agrarian decree”) relating to the nationalisation of agricultural land and forests.
5. Before the Second World War the applicant’s legal predecessor owned an estate situated in Lublin – Kępa Folwark. On an unknown date in the 1940s the property was taken over by the State Treasury pursuant to the provisions of the agrarian decree. Subsequently, the estate was partitioned.Administrative proceedings
6. On 16 July 2004 the applicant asked the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development (“Minister of Agriculture”) to decide that the Kępa Folwark estate had not fallen within the scope of the agrarian decree. Subsequently, his application was transferred to the Lublin Governor as the competent authority.
7. On 14 June 2010 the Lublin Governor gave a decision and discontinued the proceedings. The governor held that pursuant to the case-law of the Constitutional Court the issue of whether or not the estate had fallen within the scope of agrarian decree should be examined by civil courts.
8. On 5 July 2010 the applicant appealed against this decision to the Minister of Agriculture.
9. On 24 October 2010 the Minister upheld the first-instance decision reiterating the reasons referred to by the governor.
10. On 24 February 2011, on the applicant’s appeal, the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court quashed the decisions of 14 June 2010 and 24 October 2010 and remitted the case to the Lublin Governor for reconsideration. The court held that since the agrarian decree had never been repealed it had remained still in force and the administrative authorities could not avoid deciding the issue in question.
11. On 20 March 2012 the Lublin Governor resumed examination of the case.
12. On 24 October 2013 the Lublin Governor asked the applicant to specify the subject matter of his application as required under section 6 of the agrarian decree. The applicant did not submit the required information and replied that his application had not been based on this particular legal provision.
13. On 20 December 2013 the Lublin Governor discontinued the proceedings since the applicant had not expressed a wish to pursue his claim. This decision was served on the applicant on 30 December 2013 and is final.Length of proceedings complaints
14. The applicant made use of various remedies seeking to accelerate the administrative proceedings.
15. On 22 and 27 October 2004 he lodged complaints under the Administrative Courts Act of 30 August 2002 (Prawo o postępowaniu przed sądami administracyjnymi) (“the 2002 Act”) alleging inactivity of the Minister of Agriculture in his case.
16. On 8 September 2011, in reply to yet another complaint by the applicant, the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court imposed a fine on the Minister of Agriculture for the amount of 1,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) for failure to proceed with the applicant’s complaint about the inactivity of 22 October 2004.
17. On 7 February 2012 the applicant again asked the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court to impose a fine on the Minister of Agriculture for failure to proceed with his complaint of 22 October 2004. His application was dismissed by the Warsaw Regional Court on 4 September 2012.
18. On 14 September 2012 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court discontinued the proceedings in respect of the applicant’s complaint of 27 October 2004, as meanwhile a decision on the merits had been delivered. This decision was upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court on 13 December 2012.Relevant domestic law and practice
19. The relevant domestic law concerning the remedies against the excessive length of administrative proceedings is set out in the Court’s judgment in the case Wcisło and Cabaj v. Poland (nos. 49725/11 and 79950/13, §§ 88-102, 8 November 2018).
20. Article 4171 § 3 of the Civil Code provides the following:
“If damage has been caused by failure to give a ruling [orzeczenie] or decision [decyzja] where there is a statutory duty to do so, reparation for [the damage] may be sought after it has been established in the relevant proceedings that the failure to give a ruling or decision was contrary to the law, unless other specific provisions provide otherwise.”
COMPLAINTS
21. The applicant complained under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention about the excessive length of the administrative proceedings in his case and the lack of an effective remedy in that respect.
22. Moreover, he alleged under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, that the length of the impugned proceedings had affected his property rights and that the property in question had not been returned to him.
THE LAWPreliminary objection
23. The Government submitted that, in their view, the applicant had failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies. In particular he should have lodged a complaint under Article 4171 § 3 of the Civil Code and also another complaint under the 2002 Act.
24. The applicant did not comment on the Government’s objection.The Court’s assessment
25. The Court does not need to rule separately on the Government’s objection, as the present application is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
26. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the unreasonable length of administrative proceedings in the present case.
27. The Court observes that the proceedings were instituted on 16 July 2004 (see paragraph 6 above). However, the period to be taken into consideration began only on 5 July 2010 when the applicant appealed against the decision of the Lublin Governor (see Wcisło and Cabaj v. Poland, nos. 49725/11 and 79950/13, § 173, 8 November 2018). The proceedings ended on 20 December 2013 (see paragraphs 8 and 13 above). The period to be taken into consideration thus lasted three years, five months and fifteen days.
28. The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities (see, among many other authorities, Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 67, ECHR 1999-II, and Kuśmierek v. Poland, no. 10675/02, § 62, 21 September 2004).
29. The Court observes that during the period in question the case was examined at two levels of administrative authorities and one level of jurisdiction. It further acknowledges that the case was of a certain complexity, in particular as it concerned events that had occurred in the 1940s. However, the proceedings were, for the most part, conducted at reasonable speed and without any significant delays. Lastly, and most importantly, the Court notes that the applicant himself had failed to submit the information required by the authorities and that had resulted in discontinuation of the proceedings (see paragraphs 12 and 13 above).
30. Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court therefore considers that the length of the administrative proceedings in the present case was not in breach of the reasonable time requirement set out in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
31. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.Article 13 of the Convention
32. The applicant also complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he had no effective domestic remedy in respect of the protracted length of proceedings in his case.
33. The Court reiterates that Article 13 guarantees an effective remedy before a national authority for an alleged breach of the requirement under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a reasonable time. However, the “effectiveness” of a “remedy” within the meaning of that provision does not depend on the certainty of a favourable outcome for the applicant (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 154 et seq., ECHR 2000-XI).
34. The Court further reiterates that the word “remedy” within the meaning of Article 13 does not mean a remedy which is bound to succeed, but simply an accessible remedy before an authority competent to examine the merits of a complaint (see, for example, Šidlová v. Slovakia, no. 50224/99, § 77, 26 September 2006; Figiel v. Poland (no. 2), no. 38206/05, § 33, 16 September 2008; and Baszczyński v. Poland (dec.), no. 77103/13, § 51, 12 December 2017).
35. Having regard to its finding above in respect of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and the fact that the applicant had available to him, and made use of, a combination of remedies for excessively lengthy administrative proceedings, the Court concludes that this part of the application is manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention
36. The applicant firstly complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that the length of the impugned proceedings had affected his property rights, the Court observes that the applicant’s complaints have already been examined and rejected under Article 6 § 1 (see paragraph 30 above). Consequently, having regard to its finding under that provision, the Court considers that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
37. Secondly, the applicant complained that his legal predecessor’s property had not been returned to him. In this respect, the Court notes that it has already held on many occasions that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention cannot be interpreted as imposing any general obligation on the Contracting States to return property which was transferred to them before they ratified the Convention (see Von Maltzan and Others v. Germany (dec.) [GC], nos. 71916/01 and 2 others, § 77, ECHR 2005‑V), and Preussische Treuhand GmbH & CO. Kg A. A. v. Poland (dec.), no. 47550/06, 7 October 2008, §§ 63-64).
38. It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 28 May 2020.
Renata DegenerPere Pastor Vilanova
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy