FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 51547/22
Lukáš KOCÚN against Slovakia
and 2 other applications
(see list appended)
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 11 September 2025 as a Committee composed of:
Davor Derenčinović, President,
Artūrs Kučs,
Anna Adamska-Gallant, judges,
and Liv Tigerstedt, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications against the Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the applicants listed in the appended table (“the applicants”), represented by Mr M. Mandzák, a lawyer practising in Bratislava, on the various dates indicated therein;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The applications concern the alleged retention of the applicants’ personal data in a database allegedly held by the tax authorities, listing individuals systematically seeking to obstruct tax proceedings and tax collection by posing as statutory representatives of various corporate entities. The term used in Slovak for such individuals “biele kone” literally translates as “white horses” and it is sometimes also translated as “front men”.
2. The case has its origin in the publication on G., a privately operated web page associated with a news portal, of what was purported to be an extract from such a database, featuring among others the applicants.
3. The applicants subsequently brought an administrative-law action in the Supreme Court against the Finance Directorate of the Slovak Republic and the Criminal Investigation Service of the Financial Administration of Slovakia, alleging that the defendants had interfered with their right to privacy and data protection by maintaining the contested list and, alternatively, by keeping their data in any similar database (“the State databases”).
4. Following the resolution of a number of preliminary and procedural issues before the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union (“the CJEU” – see the CJEU’s judgment of 27 September 2017 in Puškár, C-73/16, EU:C:2017:725), the Supreme Court dismissed the applicants’ action on 18 November 2020. The Supreme Court held that the applicants had failed to discharge the burden of proof and to establish any interference with their rights by the authorities. It noted that the applicants had not explained why they believed that the list published by G. originated from State authorities, without any proof and without adducing any evidence related to G. It noted that employees of the tax authorities, called as witnesses, had admitted to the use of similar databases in general, but had denied that the list published by G. would represent such a database. The Supreme Court finally questioned the relevance of the applicants’ request to secure further evidence consisting of an extensive disclosure of various State-held databases, noting inter alia that it could lead to the unveiling of sensitive information concerning other individuals. It was not the role of the Supreme Court in adversarial proceedings to investigate all allegations made by the applicants.
5. Constitutional complaints lodged by the applicants were rejected on 14 July 2022 (III. US 432/21).
6. The applicants complained under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention that:
- their inclusion in “any” database of the tax authorities identifying them as “front men” was arbitrary, in particular having regard to the lack of safeguards in relation to the processing of their personal data;
- the authorities had failed to investigate the interference with their private life and had arbitrarily denied the existence of the State databases; and
- it had been impossible to discharge the excessive burden of proof placed on them, since the Supreme Court had arbitrarily refused to take further evidence and in consequence it had arbitrarily dismissed their action.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
7. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single decision.
8. The central point of the applicants’ complaints is the allegation that State authorities retain their personal data and thereby arbitrarily interfere with their right to protection of their private life. In addition, they argued that the State failed in the discharge of its positive obligation to protect their enjoyment of the said right. Lastly, they argued that the proceedings initiated at the domestic level in that regard fell short of the requirement of fairness. By way of negative delineation, there has been no complaint in relation to any private party, leak of confidential information, or any specific tax proceedings.
9. As to the allegation that State authorities retain the applicants’ personal data, they sought to establish that by reference to the list published by G. However, the Supreme Court found that it had not been shown that the authorities were the author of the list and accordingly that there had been any interference with the applicants’ rights by the State (see paragraph 4 above). The Court finds no ground on which to depart from this conclusion and thus holds that the applicants have failed to show that there has been an interference by the State with their private life in relation to the list. In this respect, the Court notes that the applicants do not seem to have instituted any proceedings against G. in relation to it having published the said list.
10. Concerning the existence of State databases in general, the Supreme Court held that, in their administrative-law actions, the applicants had failed to prove that their personal data had been retained by the authorities at all. What they had in fact pursued in the wake of allegations published by a third party was to have the Supreme Court investigate the matter on their behalf, and potentially to gain access to State databases which they would otherwise have had no knowledge of or access to (see paragraph 4 above). The Court notes that the Supreme Court concluded that the taking of further evidence concerning the internal procedures of the defendant authorities and State databases would go beyond the scope of the applicants’ claims and gave reasons that do not appear manifestly arbitrary, irregular or otherwise wrong.
11. In sum, to the extent that the complaint has been substantiated, and respecting its subsidiary role, the Court finds that the applicants have failed to show that there has been any interference by a public authority with their right to respect for private life under Article 8 of the Convention.
12. In addition to what has been already noted above, as regards any positive obligations that might have been involved (see, for example, Joanna Szulc v. Poland, no. 43932/08, §§ 84‑87, 13 November 2012), no allegation has ever been substantiated at the domestic level or before the Court that the applicants requested access to information held by the public authorities through normal channels provided by domestic law, needed for the pursuit of their right to respect for private life, and were prevented from accessing it (see, for instance, Law no. 122/2013 Coll. on the protection of personal data, replaced by Law no. 18/2018 Coll., or Law no. 211/2000 Coll. on free access to information). Any decisions relating to such requests would be subject to judicial review.
13. In so far as the applicants argued that the final decisions of the domestic courts had arbitrarily disrespected earlier opinions in their favour delivered by the Constitutional Court and the CJEU, the Court notes that the earlier decisions concerned no more than procedural issues, such as admissibility criteria for administrative-law actions, and were delivered with regard to a factual basis established within a limited scope. Those decisions cannot therefore in any way be considered binding in relation to the merits of the present case (see, mutatis mutandis, the CJEU’s judgment in Puškár, cited above, § 90). In their decisions on the merits, the domestic courts stated the reasons for their departure from the previous findings and found that no unlawful interference had been proved.
14. The complaint under Article 6 of the Convention concerning the alleged unfairness of the proceedings thus essentially relates to no more than the extent of the evidence admitted and the weight given to it, which are not matters for the Court to review (see López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 1874/13 and 8567/13, § 149, 17 October 2019).
15. Therefore, in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
16. Accordingly, the applications are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Decides to join the applications;
Declares the applications inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 2 October 2025.
Liv Tigerstedt Davor Derenčinović
Deputy Registrar President
Appendix
List of cases:
No.
Application no.
Case name
Lodged on
Applicant
Year of birth
Place of residence
1.
51547/22
Kocún v. Slovakia
28/10/2022
Lukáš KOCÚN
1981
Poprad
2.
51551/22
Tesla v. Slovakia
28/10/2022
Tony TESLA
1975
Bratislava
3.
52072/22
Behúň v. Slovakia
31/10/2022
Peter BEHÚŇ
1978
Poprad