FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 42439/06
by Weronika KOFIN
against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 13 November 2008 as a Chamber composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
Lech Garlicki,
Giovanni Bonello,
Ljiljana Mijović,
David Thór Björgvinsson,
Ledi Bianku,
Mihai Poalelungi, judges,
and Lawrence Early, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 11 October 2006,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Ms Weronika Kofin, was a Polish national who was born in 1932 and lived in Kraków. The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
A. Civil proceedings for the division of inheritance
On an unspecified date in 1982 the applicant lodged a claim for the division of her late father’s estate with the Kraków District Court (Sąd Rejonowy).
The applicant has failed to specify the exact course of the proceedings between 1982 and 2001. From the documents produced by her it emerges that the proceedings were stayed on 14 January 1997.
On 3 December 2001 the Kraków District Court gave a decision and divided the inheritance.
On an unspecified date the other parties to the proceedings lodged appeals.
On 5 December 2002 the Kraków Regional Court dismissed the appeals.
B. Claim for damages under the 2004 Act
On 8 March 2005 the applicant lodged a claim for damages. She relied on section 16 of the Law of 17 June 2004 on complaints about a breach of the right to a trial within a reasonable time (Ustawa o skardze na naruszenie prawa strony do rozpoznania sprawy w postępowaniu sądowym bez nieuzasadnionej zwłoki) (“the 2004 Act”), which entered into force on 17 September 2004, read in conjunction with Article 417 of the Civil Code.
The applicant sought 12,000 Polish zlotys (PLN) (approximately 3,160 euros (EUR)) in compensation “for losses caused by unreasonably lengthy proceedings, which ruined her health and financial situation”. She also requested to be exempted from court fees.
On 2 June 2005 the Kraków District Court granted the applicant an exemption from two thirds of the applicable court fees.
On an unspecified date the defendant, the State Treasury represented by the President of the Kraków Regional Court (Prezes Sądu Okręgowego), replied to the applicant’s claim, requesting the court to dismiss the claim as ill-founded.
On 8 September 2005 the Kraków District Court gave judgment and dismissed the applicant’s claim on the ground that she had failed to prove that, as a consequence of the alleged breach of the reasonable-time requirement, she had incurred any pecuniary losses. The court did not refer to her claim for non-pecuniary damage.
On 29 September 2005 the applicant lodged her appeal against the first‑instance judgment and requested the court to grant her a full exemption from court fees.
On 13 October 2005, in compliance with an order by the court, the applicant specified that the value of the claim subject to the appeal was PLN 12,000 and submitted a declaration on her financial and personal situation.
On 19 October 2005 the Kraków District Court refused to grant her the requested exemption.
The applicant appealed.
On 30 November 2005 the Kraków Regional Court amended the District Court’s decision and granted the applicant a full exemption from the court fees in the appellate proceedings.
On 6 April 2006 the Kraków Regional Court gave judgment and dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the first-instance judgment.
Given the value of the claim, a cassation appeal was not available.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the inheritance proceedings had exceeded a reasonable time.
2. She further complained under Article 6 § 3 (b) of the Convention that she had not had adequate time and facilities for the preparation of her defence in the inheritance proceedings.
3. She also invoked Article 6 § 3 (c) in conjunction with Article 13 of the Convention, submitting that the courts had refused to exempt her from court fees and thus had limited her access to the appellate court.
THE LAW
By letter dated 17 January 2008 the Government’s observations were sent to the applicant, who was requested to submit any observations in reply together with any claims for just satisfaction by 28 February 2008.
The applicant failed to respond to that letter.
By letter dated 22 April 2008, sent by registered post, the applicant was notified that the period allowed for submission of her observations had expired and that no extension of the deadline had been requested. The applicant’s attention was drawn to Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention, which provides that the Court may strike a case out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that the applicant does not intend to pursue the application. The applicant received that letter on 12 May 2008.
By letter dated 13 May 2008 the applicant informed the Registry that she had not received the Government’s observations.
By letter of 29 May 2008, sent by registered post, the Government’s observations were again sent to the applicant, who was requested to submit any observations in reply together with any claims for just satisfaction by 25 June 2008.
On 19 June 2008 the correspondence of 29 May 2008 was returned to the Registry with a note by the postal service indicating that the applicant had died.
On 25 June 2008 another letter was sent by registered post to the applicant’s address. By this letter the Registry wished to find out whether the applicant’s legal successors wanted to maintain the application.
On 7 July 2008 the letter of 25 June 2008 was returned with a note to the effect that the applicant had died.
On 16 July 2008 a letter was sent to the Government informing them of the applicant’s death.
The Court notes that the applicant has died and that no request has been submitted by her heirs to pursue the examination of the case. In these circumstances the Court concludes that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 37 § 1 in fine, the Court finds no special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols which require the examination of the application to be continued.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Decides to strike the application out of its list of cases.
Lawrence EarlyNicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy