AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 24962/94
by Nicolaos KOLTSIDAS and 1158 others
against Greece
and
Application No. 25370/94
by Kiriakos FOUNTIS and 39 others
against Greece
and
Application No. 26303/95
by Panagiotis ANDROUTSOS and 109 others
against Greece
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on
1 July 1996, the following members being present:
MM. S. TRECHSEL, President
H. DANELIUS
C.L. ROZAKIS
E. BUSUTTIL
G. JÖRUNDSSON
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
J.-C. SOYER
Mrs. G.H. THUNE
MM. F. MARTINEZ
L. LOUCAIDES
G.B. REFFI
M.A. NOWICKI
B. CONFORTI
D. SVÁBY
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
P. LORENZEN
K. HERNDL
E. BIELIUNAS
Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 10 April 1994 by
Nicolaos KOLTSIDAS and 1158 others against Greece and registered on
22 August 1994 under file No. 24962/94;
Having regard to the application introduced on 19 May 1994 by
Kiriakos FOUNTIS and 39 others against Greece and registered on
5 October 1994 under file No. 25370/94;
Having regard to the application introduced on 29 December 1994
by Panagiotis ANDROUTSOS and 109 others against Greece and registered
on 25 January 1995 under file No. 26303/95;
Having regard to :
- the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission;
- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
4 July 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by the
applicants of the second application on 16 September 1995 and by
the applicants of the first and third applications on
29 September 1995;
- the parties' oral submissions at the hearing on 1 July 1996;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The first application has been introduced by 1159 Greek
citizens. In the proceedings before the Commission they are
represented by Professor P. Dagtoglou of the University of Athens, who
is also practising as an attorney in Athens and London.
The second application has been introduced by 40 Greek citizens.
In the proceedings before the Commission they are represented by
Mr. Ch. Alvanos, a lawyer practising in Thessaloniki.
The third application has been introduced by 110 Greek citizens.
In the proceedings before the Commission they are represented by
Professor P. Dagtoglou.
All the applicants were holders of licences to operate bus
services in Athens, Piraeus and the suburbs (hereafter the metropolitan
area), which licences were revoked by a law introduced in 1993.
The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the
parties, may be summarised as follows:
A. Particular circumstances of the case
Until 1977 the public transport services by buses in the
metropolitan area were provided by private entrepreneurs under the
control of a public body, the Organisation for the Control of Transport
by Buses (Organismos Elenhou ton di Aftokiniton Singinonion, hereafter
OEAS). In 1977 law 588 was enacted making the Undertaking for City
Transport (Epihirisi Astikon Singinonion, hereafter EAS), a company
wholly owned by the State, exclusively responsible for the provision
of bus services. The EAS was placed under the control of a public body,
the Organisation for City Transport (Organismos Astikon Singinonion,
hereafter OAS). The OEAS was dissolved.
In 1992 the Government decided to devise a new scheme for the
provision of public transport services by buses in the metropolitan
area. This scheme would be based on licences to operate new privately
owned environmentally friendly buses, which would be granted to certain
categories of physical persons.
On 12 August 1992 law 2078 was promulgated by which the EAS was
dissolved. Outstanding debts were assumed by the State and its property
was transferred to the OAS, which remained the control body for public
transport in the metropolitan area. The law further provided that the
transport by buses would be provided until 31 December 2006 by
Transport Undertakings (Singinoniakes Epihirisis, hereafter SEP) which
were going to be set up by ministerial decision as private law bodies.
Eight such SEP were established by decision No. 29077/1068/13.8.92 of
the Minister of Transport and Communications, which specified that they
should operate either as private law companies or as cooperatives and
fixed their by-laws. Each physical person who had been granted a
licence to operate a bus had to become a member-shareholder of a SEP.
In accordance with the provisions of law 2078/92, the following
categories of physical persons, mentioned in order of priority, became
entitled to a licence to operate a bus on their own or jointly with
others: former drivers of the EAS and former employees of the EAS who
held a professional driver's licence (under Article 3 para. 1 (a) of
law 2078/92), owners of buses in the provinces who agreed to surrender
their existing licences (under Article 3 para. 1 (b) of law 2078/92),
taxi-owners who agreed to surrender their existing licences (under
Article 3 para. 1 (c) of law 2078/92), heads of families with a certain
number of children who held a professional driver's licence (under
Article 3 para. 1 (d) of law 2078/92) and other physical persons who
held a professional driver's licence (under Article 3 para. 1 (e) of
law 2078/92). For each half licence granted a fee of 500,000 drachmas
had to be paid to the SEP. Certain categories of potential licence
holders had to pay an extra fee to the State, which was fixed at
500,000 drachmas per half licence for the former employees of the EAS
and at 1,500,000 drachmas per half licence for the heads of families
with a certain number of children and the other physical persons.
Special reductions were fixed for the heads of families with more than
five children. In accordance with law 2078/92, the licences could not
be transferred inter vivos before the new buses were acquired.
The right to retain one's licence was made dependant on the
acquisition or leasing of a new environmentally-friendly bus within
three years. Under Article 14 para. 2 of law 2078/92, the State assumed
the obligation to facilitate the acquisition of the new buses by
providing guarantees for the loans which the licence holders would
contract to this effect.
The use of the new buses would be attributed to the SEP. Pending
the acquisition or leasing of the new buses, the law provided that the
OAS would put at the disposal of the licence holders the buses it had
acquired from the EAS. The licence holders would pay in return a fee
to a special fund set up by each SEP for the renewal of the buses. In
accordance with the ministerial decision No. 29077/1068/13.8.92, the
licence holders were under the obligation to attribute the use of the
OAS buses to the SEP of which they were members-shareholders.
Law 2078/92 also provided that the OAS could lease to the SEP
assets it had acquired from the EAS.
The income of the SEP consisted of the proceeds from the sale of
tickets and subsidies by the State. The law provided that 10% of the
proceeds of each SEP would go to the buses renewal fund and 3% to the
OAS. The balance would be divided among its members after deducting the
cost of operation of the SEP. Ministerial decision 29077/1068/13.8.92
provided that this would happen four times a year in February, May,
August and November. In accordance with the law 2078/92, the licence
holders had to bear the costs of operating the bus, including
maintenance, servicing, spare parts, petrol, insurance and the salaries
of and social insurance contributions for the drivers.
The applicants took advantage of the possibility to acquire bus
licences under law 2078/92 and paid the fees provided. A number of them
ordered new buses contracting to this effect large loans, which were
in part guaranteed by the State. In accordance with the relevant
agreements, the ownership of the buses would not be transferred to the
applicants until the full repayment of the loans. The applicants also
concluded agreements with insurance companies and undertook expensive
renovations of the old buses given to them by the OAS. They rented
garages and administration offices, hired bus and administrative
personnel and purchased bus and office equipment.
Article 40 of law 2168/93, which was subsequently adopted, gave
the Minister of National Economy the possibility of granting subsidies
to the licence-holders. Such subsidies were indeed granted.
On 22 December 1993, after a change in government, law 2175 was
promulgated abolishing the OAS, dissolving the various SEP, which went
into compulsory liquidation, and revoking the licences granted under
law 2078/92. A new public enterprise, the Organisation of Public
Transport in Athens (Organismos Astikon Singinonion Athinon, hereafter
OASA), was established which was entrusted with the provision of the
public transport services in the metropolitan area. The OASA acquired
all the assets of the OAS and succeeded it in all its rights and
obligations. It also succeeded the SEP and its shareholders in all the
rights and obligations deriving from loan contracts, contracts for the
acquisition of buses and insurance contracts. The State continued to
guarantee the loans transferred to the OASA.
Law 2175/93 provided for the return of any fees paid to the State
with a view to acquiring a bus licence. No interest would be paid
thereon. Any sums of money paid for the acquisition of buses would also
be returned to the former licence holders with interest from the date
of payment.
Under Article 4 para. 3(a) of law 2175/93 the OASA would employ
all the persons who were employed by the EAS when it was dissolved.
Under Article 4 para. 3(b) of law 2175/93 members of the SEP who had
acquired licences to operate buses under Article 3 para. 1(b)(c)(d) and
(e) of law 2078/92 were also given the right to be employed as drivers
by the OASA.
Law 2175/93 further provided for the adoption of a number of
ministerial decisions which would establish the procedure for the
compulsory liquidation of the SEP and for the setting off of the claims
of the State against the claims of the former licence holders. Similar
decisions would provide for the restitution to the former licence
holders of the rights they had to surrender in order to acquire the
licences under law 2078/92. Finally, a ministerial decision would
provide for the procedure for the handing over of the assets which the
OAS had put at the disposal of the SEP and their members.
On 23 December 1993 the Minister of Transport and Communications,
acting alone or together with the Minister in charge of the Civil
Service (Ipurgos Proedrias), adopted three decisions under law 2175/93.
Under decision No. 22800 the former members of the SEP who had acquired
a licence to operate a bus under law 2078/92 upon surrendering a
licence to operate a bus in a province or a taxi could apply for the
re-acquisition of the licences they had had to surrender. However, the
restoration of the licences was made conditional on the making of a
declaration waiving the right to pursue any claims the former members
of the SEP had against the OAS or the OASA other than the claims
allowed under law 2175/92. Decision No. 22804 set a similar condition
for the re-instatement of former members of the SEP in civil service
or public sector positions from which they had to resign in order to
obtain a licence to operate a bus under law 2078/92. Decision No. 22802
laid out the procedure for the handing over of the assets which the OAS
had put at the disposal of the SEP and their members. On
24 December 1993 the Minister of Transport and Communications adopted
decision No. 22806 concerning the compulsory liquidation of the SEP.
On 17 February 1994 some applicants lodged before the Council of
State an action for the annulment of decision No. 22802/23.12.93 of the
Minister of Transport and Communications on the ground that it had been
issued on the basis of a law which violated, inter alia, Articles 17
and 106 of the Constitution and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
European Convention on Human Rights.
Three more actions were lodged before the Council of State for
the annulment of decision No. 22806/24.12.93. These actions are still
pending.
Some applicants also instituted proceedings against the Greek
State before the First Instance Administrative Court (Diikitiko
Protodikio) of Athens claiming that their enterprises had been taken
under Article 106 para. 3 of the Constitution and requesting the court
to fix their compensation under Article 106 para. 4 thereof.
On 28 April 1994 the First Instance Administrative Court of
Athens rejected one of the above-mentioned actions, which had been
lodged on 6 April 1994, for lack of competence. It considered that the
actions should have been introduced before the civil courts against the
OASA.
Following this decision, some of the actions were re-introduced
before the civil courts and more specifically before the Court of
Appeal (Efetio) of Athens.
On 17 June 1994 some applicants introduced actions before the
First Instance Administrative Court of Athens claiming damages against
the State under Articles 105 and 106 of the law introducing the Civil
Code on the ground that the provisions of law 2175 violated, inter
alia, Articles 17 and 106 of the Constitution and Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1. These actions are still pending.
On 28 July 1995 the Minister of Transport and Communications
proposed to the former members of the SEP that they withdraw all court
actions in exchange for a speedy settlement of the claims allowed under
law 2175/93.
On 7 August 1995 the Fourth Division of the Council of State
considered, inter alia, the following in respect of the action for the
annulment of decision No. 22802/23.12.93 of the Minister of Transport
and Communications. It was the Fourth Division's opinion that law
2175/93 did not violate any property rights under Article 17 of the
Constitution, in that it did not affect any rights in rem. Law 2078/92
by setting up the SEP had created private enterprises within the
meaning of Article 106 para. 3 of the Constitution, because the SEP had
been set up as legal persons incorporated under private law and their
members had contributed private funds and taken business risks.
However, the dissolution of the SEP and the setting up of another body
to which the privilege of rendering a public service had been conferred
did not amount to a taking over of a private enterprise within the
meaning of Article 106 paras. 3 and 4 of the Constitution. It simply
reflected a change of attitude on the part of the legislator as to the
most appropriate way in which this public service should be rendered
and it did not involve the transfer of an organised business as such
from one legal person to another. The economic interests associated
with the licences granted under law 2078/92 amounted to "possessions"
within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and the dissolution
of the SEP amounted to a deprivation of property to be examined under
the second sentence of Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1. However,
the compensation for which law 2175/93 made provision was adequate,
insofar as it covered most of the actual losses incurred. Although the
law did not provide for compensation in respect of loss of earnings,
this could not constitute a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1,
given the short period of time for which the SEP had existed. Finally,
the Fourth Division considered that the seriousness of the above-
mentioned issues merited further examination and decided under
Article 14 para. 2 (b) of the presidential decree 18/89 to refer the
action for annulment to the Plenary.
At the time of the introduction of the application all the buses
had already been removed from the applicants with the help of the
police. It appears that the applicants have not yet received the
compensation provided for under law 2175 and that the liquidation of
the SEP has not yet been completed.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
1. The Greek Constitution provides the following:
Article 17 para. 2
"No one shall be deprived of his property except for the
public benefit which must be duly proven, when and as
specified by the law and always following full compensation
corresponding to the value of the expropriated property."
Article 106 paras. 3 and 4
".... the law may regulate the acquisition by purchase of
or the compulsory participation by the State or another
public body in an enterprise which has a monopoly or which
is of vital importance for the exploitation of a source of
national wealth or the purpose of which is to offer
services to the community as a whole.
The amount of money to be paid for the purchase or the
compulsory participation of the State or another public
body will be determined by a court; it will represent the
full value of the enterprise, when it is purchased, or the
full value of the participation therein."
2. Article 105 of the law introducing the Civil Code provides for
the award of compensation to persons who sustain losses as a result of
something done or omitted by an organ of the State in the exercise of
the powers vested in it, except where the legal rule which has been
breached serves to protect the general interest.
Article 106 of the same law provides for the award of
compensation in cases where the losses are similarly caused by an organ
of a municipality or of a legal person of public law.
In decision No. 2174/1991 the Administrative Court of Appeal
(Diikitiko Efetio) of Athens held that a person could under
Article 105 of the law introducing the Civil Code sue the State for
damages caused by an unlawful act of the legislature, i.e. the
adoption of a law which was not in conformity with a legal rule with
superior force (for example, the Constitution or European Community
law), provided that the law adopted by the legislature affected rights
of that person which were directly protected by the legal rule with
superior force.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicants complain under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that
they have been deprived of their possessions for reasons of political
expediency without receiving adequate compensation in a manner which
disregarded the Greek Constitution.
2. The applicants further complain under Articles 6 para. 1 and 13
of the Convention of their inability to institute proceedings under
national law with a view to obtaining compensation.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
Application No. 23372/94 was introduced on 10 April 1994 and
registered on 22 August 1994.
Application No. 25370/94 was introduced on 19 May 1994 and
registered on 5 October 1994.
Application No. 26303/95 was introduced on 29 December 1994 and
registered on 25 January 1995.
On 3 April 1995 the Commission decided to communicate the
applications to the respondent Government for observations on the
admissibility and merits.
On 4 July 1995 the Government submitted their observations after
an extension of the time-limit fixed for this purpose.
The observations in reply of the applicants of the second
application were submitted on 16 September 1995.
The observations in reply of the applicants of the first and
third applications were submitted on 29 September 1995.
On 15 January 1996 the Commission, having regard to the
connection between the three cases and the similar nature of the issues
raised, considered it appropriate to order the joinder of the three
applications under Rule 35 of its Rules of Procedure. It also decided
to invite the parties to submit oral observations on the admissibility
and merits of the applications at a hearing.
The hearing took place on 1 July 1996.
At the hearing the parties were represented as follows:
The Government:
Mr. Vassilios Kontolaimos, Acting Agent, Senior Adviser, Legal Advisory
Council of the State
Mrs. Vassilia Pelekou, Legal Assistant, Legal Advisory Council of the
State
Mr. Ioannis Tsoufis, Adviser
Mr. Andreas Kitsos, Adviser
The Applicants:
Applications Nos. 24962/94 and 26303/95
Professor Prodromos D. Dagtoglou, Representative, lawyer
Mr. Anastasios Kefalas, Adviser, legal adviser and member of the board
of EAS
Mr. Andreas Vardoulakis, Adviser, former Chairman of EAS
Two of the applicants, Messrs. Kalogeris and Labiris, were also present
Application No. 25370/94
Mr. Christos Alvanos, Representative, lawyer
THE LAW
1. The applicants complain under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1)
that they have been deprived of their possessions for reasons of
political expediency without receiving adequate compensation in a
manner which disregarded the Greek Constitution.
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) reads as follows:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his
possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair
the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary
to control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions
or penalties."
The Government submit that the applicants had various
possibilities under national law for obtaining redress in respect of
their complaints, which they did not use in full. Article 106 para. 4
of the Constitution provides that, when the State takes over an
enterprise, it must pay full compensation, the amount of which must be
fixed by the courts. Some of the applicants instituted proceedings
under that constitutional provision which are still pending.
Articles 105 and 106 of the law introducing the Civil Code
provide for an action for compensation in respect of unlawful acts by
any State organ including the legislature. Article 914 of the Civil
Code provides for an action for compensation in respect of unlawful
acts in general. Some of the applicants have instituted proceedings
invoking these provisions. These proceedings are still pending.
Moreover, the courts have the power to review the correct
application of the provisions of law 2175/93 concerning the
reimbursement of money paid for the acquisition of the licences or
buses and the restitution of rights lost upon the acquisition of the
licences.
Finally, the courts have the power to review the
constitutionality of the provisions of law 2175/93. The Government
attach particular importance in this connection to the actions
currently pending before the Council of State by which the annulment
of decision No. 22806/93 of the Minister of Transport and
Communications is sought on the ground that law 2175/93 is
unconstitutional. They submit that, if the Council of State declares
law 2175/93 unconstitutional, the applicants' actions for damages are
bound to be successful. Even if, however, the Council of State were to
find that law 2175/93 is constitutional, the applicants would still
have the possibility of obtaining compensation by the domestic courts.
The applicants argue that they have no effective remedies under
domestic law. The rights of the applicants vis-à-vis the State are
defined by law 2175/93. However, this law cannot be challenged as
unconstitutional. The domestic courts have, on the one hand, always
considered that the protection of property under Article 17 of the
Constitution is limited to rights in rem. On the other hand, they have
also always refrained from applying Article 106 para. 4 of the
Constitution. Moreover, the Government have argued before the domestic
courts that, in the absence of implementing legislation, Article 106
of the Constitution cannot be applied in a particular case.
The applicants also claim that the inordinate length of the
proceedings before the Greek courts renders their protection
ineffective. In any event, they argue that it is unlikely that the
actions pending before the courts will ever reach their final stage.
In cases involving large sums of money against the State, special laws
have been repeatedly issued statute-barring claims before their period
of limitation had run, discontinuing pending proceedings and excluding
further actions against the State. Alternatively, the applicants submit
that, even if the courts were to grant them compensation, they would
not be able to enforce the judgment against the State, which enjoys
immunity from execution under Greek law.
The applicants further refer to the letter of the Minister of
Transport and Communications of 28 July 1995 whereby the settlement of
their claims under law 2175/93 was made dependent on the waiver of
their right to appeal to the courts. They also refer to the ministerial
decisions Nos. 22800 and 22804 of 23 December 1993 where a similar
condition was attached to the recovery of rights some of the applicants
had had to surrender in order to obtain licences under law 2078/92.
The applicants in application No. 25370/94 further submit that
the courts cannot award compensation in respect of a law which violates
the Constitution in the absence of a criminal conviction of the
Minister who was responsible for the law. These applicants stress that
they never attempted to institute proceedings before the domestic
courts.
The Commission recalls that, under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the
Convention, it "may only deal with the matter after all domestic
remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised
rules of international law".
It further recalls that, in accordance with its case-law, in
expropriation cases an action for reparation is an effective remedy,
unless it manifestly affords no prospects of success (No. 14276/89,
Dec. 20.5.92, unpublished). Moreover, if there exists mere doubt as to
the chances of success of a domestic remedy, it must be tried
(No. 9559/81, Dec. 9.5.83, D.R. 33 p. 158).
The Commission notes that some of the applicants have lodged
actions for reparation of damages, which are currently pending before
the domestic courts. It also notes that some of the applicants have
lodged actions before the civil courts claiming that their enterprises
had been taken under Article 106 para. 3 of the Constitution and
requesting the court to fix their compensation under Article 106
para. 4 thereof. Since, in accordance with its case-law, these actions
would in principle constitute effective remedies, the Commission must
examine whether, as the applicants maintain, these actions are devoid
of prospects of success.
The Commission considers that the applicants of application
No. 25370/94 have not substantiated their allegation that the courts
could not award them compensation in the absence of a criminal
conviction of the Minister who was responsible for the adoption of the
law at issue.
It further notes that, despite their arguments that a
constitutional challenge of law 2175/93 was bound to fail because of
the restrictive interpretation attached by the Greek courts to the
concept of property rights under the Constitution and the traditional
reluctance of the Greek courts to apply Article 106 para. 4 of the
Constitution concerning the taking over of private enterprises, some
of the applicants have attempted to challenge the constitutionality of
that law by bringing actions for the annulment of decision No. 22802/93
of the Minister of Transport and Communications on the procedure for
the handing over of the assets which the OAS had put at the disposal
of the SEP and their members. These actions has been referred by the
Fourth Division of the Council of State to the Plenary on the ground
that serious issues as to the compatibility of law 2175/93 with the
Greek Constitution and the Convention arise.
In these circumstances, the Commission considers that, whatever
the attitude of the domestic courts in previous cases of
nationalisation may have been, it cannot be affirmed at this stage that
the particular constitutional challenge is bound to fail. Moreover,
although the annulment of the above-mentioned ministerial decision is
unlikely to remedy directly the situation complained of, the Commission
cannot ignore the repercussions which a possible finding by the Council
of State that law 2175/93 is unconstitutional is bound to have for the
applicants' actions for damages which are pending before the First
Instance Administrative Court of Athens and their actions under
Article 106 para. 4 of the Constitution which are pending before the
Athens Court of Appeal.
The Commission considers that, pending a final determination by
the Council of State of the compatibility of law 2175/93 with the
Constitution and the Convention, it cannot be held that the applicants'
actions for damages and their actions under Article 106 para. 4 of the
Constitution are devoid of any prospects of success. As a result, these
are remedies which the applicants are required to exhaust. This also
holds true for the applicants who have so far refrained from
instituting proceedings for compensation.
The Commission has further examined the applicants' remaining
submissions concerning the length of the proceedings, the possibility
of an ad hoc legislative interference with the determination of the
dispute by the courts, the immunity of the State from execution and the
pressure allegedly applied on them to waive their claims. However, it
finds nothing in these submissions which could have released, in the
particular circumstances of the case, the applicants from their
obligation under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention to exhaust the
particular remedies.
It follows that this part of the applications must be rejected,
pursuant to Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.
3. The applicants complain under Articles 6 para. 1 and 13
(Art. 6-1, 13) of the Convention of their inability to institute
proceedings under national law with a view to obtaining compensation.
Insofar as relevant, the provisions invoked by the applicants
read as follows:
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations .....,
everyone is entitled to a ...... hearing ...... by a .....
tribunal established by law. ...."
Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a
national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been
committed by persons acting in an official capacity."
The Government submit that no property rights were involved; it
follows that no civil rights were involved either. In any event, the
applicants had the possibility of having their rights determined by the
courts.
The applicants submit that a dispute about the nationalisation
of private assets is a dispute involving the determination of civil
rights and obligations. However, for the reasons already stated, they
cannot obtain redress from the national courts.
The Commission, recalling its above observations regarding the
exhaustion of domestic remedies in respect of the applicants' complaint
under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), considers that it cannot be
concluded at the present stage that an action for reparation of damages
or an action under Article 104 para. 6 of the Constitution are devoid
of any prospects of success, thus depriving the applicants of access
to any effective court remedy for the determination of their property
rights within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). It
follows that the applicants' complaints under Articles 6 para. 1 and
13 (Art. 6-1, 13) of the Convention are premature and must be rejected
as being manifestly ill-founded under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2)
of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission unanimously
DECLARES THE APPLICATIONS INADMISSIBLE.
H.C. KRÜGER S. TRECHSEL
Secretary President
to the Commission of the Commission
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy