THIRD SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 53364/07
Ioan Kornelij KOMANICKÝ
against Slovakia
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 18 June 2013 as a Chamber composed of:
Josep Casadevall, President,
Alvina Gyulumyan,
Corneliu Bîrsan,
Ján Šikuta,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Johannes Silvis,
Valeriu Griţco, judges,
and Santiago Quesada, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 26 November 2007,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Ioan Kornelij Komanický, is a Slovak national, who was born in 1943 and lives in Bardejov.
2. The Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were represented by Ms M. Pirošíková, their Agent.
A. The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
1. The applicant
4. The applicant has thus far submitted 124 applications under the Convention (see Komanický v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 9845/06, § 2, 13 December 2011 with further references).
2. The action
5. On 26 August 2000 the applicant brought an action (case no. 5C 602/00) against a private company before the Svidník District Court (Okresný súd). He argued that he had title to some forest land, which was being occupied by the defendant company, and that the latter had arbitrarily terminated a lease of that land they had previously concluded. Accordingly, the applicant sought a ruling declaring the defendant company’s termination of the lease null and void.
6. Between 15 November 2000 and 30 April 2001 the applicant requested an exemption from court fees, which was examined and dismissed at two levels of jurisdiction. The question of court fees was subsequently examined again at two levels of jurisdiction in connection with various procedural applications made by the applicant.
7. Meanwhile, the applicant was asked to provide further and more detailed particulars of the claim and to support his claim with evidence, particularly in so far as he appeared to be seeking financial compensation in respect of unpaid rent. In response, the applicant specified that his claim amounted to the equivalent of some 50 euros (EUR).
In a letter of 20 September 2001, in response to a request by the District Court of 11 September of that year, the applicant submitted an apology for his “mediocre activity in [the] dispute, including [his] having missed time‑limits because [at the given time] [he] was also dealing with other, far more serious matters”.
8. Between 11 November 2001 and 21 March 2002 three hearings were listed, but the applicant excused himself from them on various grounds.
9. A hearing took place on 23 April 2002. On the same day, the District Court dismissed the action. It found that the applicant had not been the owner of the property at the time the lease was concluded and that the defendant company had therefore been entitled to terminate the lease.
10. On 19 February 2004 the Prešov Regional Court (Krajský súd) quashed the first-instance judgment following an appeal by the applicant, and remitted the matter to the District Court for re-examination. It found that the District Court had failed to identify the property in question and to establish whether the lease had been validly concluded.
11. On 7 August 2006 the District Court discontinued the proceedings, on the grounds that the applicant had failed to comply with its request of 12 July 2005 to formulate his claim properly. However, following an appeal by the applicant, that decision was quashed by the Regional Court on 27 November 2006, and the case was remitted to the District Court for a determination on the merits.
12. Between 30 May 2007 and 27 April 2009 four further hearings were listed, but the applicant excused himself from them on various grounds.
13. The hearing scheduled for 27 April 2009 took place despite the applicant’s absence. On the same day, the District Court dismissed the action, finding, inter alia, that the property in question had not been described properly, which meant that the lease was void ab initio.
14. On 15 April 2010 the Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment following an appeal by the applicant. The merits of the case were thereby resolved by a final and binding decision.
3. Constitutional complaints
15. The applicant brought two complaints under Article 127 of the Constitution, challenging the length of the proceedings in his case. In both complaints, he contested exclusively the part of the proceedings which took place before the District Court.
16. His first complaint was lodged on 3 January 2007, but was declared inadmissible on 17 April 2007. The Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd) concluded that he had not complied with the admissibility requirement of exhaustion of ordinary remedies. In particular, he could not be regarded as having properly asserted his complaint concerning the length of proceedings before the President of the District Court prior to resorting to the Constitutional Court. In that connection, the Constitutional Court observed that, as a claimant, the applicant was involved in a considerable amount of litigation before the District Court. His vaguely formulated complaints to the President of the District Court about the length of “all of his proceedings” before that court, which did not identify any specific set of proceedings, could not therefore be regarded as being in compliance with the statutory exhaustion requirement.
17. The second complaint was lodged on 15 April 2009, but was declared inadmissible on 14 July 2009.
While the Constitutional Court noted that the applicant had still not properly asserted his complaint before the President of the District Court, it nevertheless proceeded to examine it in substance by reviewing the course of the proceedings, paying particular attention to the part before the District Court, as contested by the applicant.
The Constitutional Court observed that in the two years and three months following the bringing of the action until the applicant’s appeal was transferred to the Court of Appeal for determination, the District Court had dealt with the case in a continuous and uninterrupted manner. His appeal had been pending before the Regional Court for one year and three months, following which the case had been transferred to the District Court for a new determination. It was at this stage that the Constitutional Court established that there had been a delay of some two years on the part of the District Court. However, the case was thereafter pending again before the Court of Appeal for about six months, and no further delays attributable to the District Court could be established.
As for the applicant, he was found to have contributed to the length of the proceedings by having filed incomplete particulars of claim without supporting documentary evidence, and by having to be assisted by the District Court in correcting the shortcomings of his submissions.
In sum, in view of all the circumstances, the delays on the part of the District Court were not sufficiently serious to constitute a situation that was contrary to the applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time. Thus, his complaint was in any event manifestly ill-founded.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
18. The relevant domestic law and practice are summarised in the Court’s judgment in the case of Ištván and Ištvánová v. Slovakia (no. 30189/07, §§ 23 - 50, 12 June 2012).
COMPLAINTS
19. The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the length of the proceedings in his case had been excessive.
20. The applicant also complained under Article 13 of the Convention that he had not had an effective remedy at his disposal in respect of his complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
THE LAW
21. Following communication of the application to the respondent Government, the latter disputed that the applicant had exhausted domestic remedies as required under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention.
22. However, the Court considers it appropriate first to determine whether the application is admissible under Article 35 of the Convention, as amended by Protocol No. 14, which entered into force on 1 June 2010.
Protocol No. 14 added a new admissibility requirement to Article 35 which, in so far as relevant, provides as follows:
“3. The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that:
...
(b) the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.”
23. In that regard, the Court reiterates that it has the power to examine the admissibility of applications under the requirement of the amended Article 35 § 3 (b) of its own motion (see Adrian Mihai Ionescu v. Romania (dec.), no. 36659/04, § 30, 1 June 2010, with further references).
24. The Court further reiterates that the new provision applies from the date of its entry into force to all applications pending before the Court, except those which have already been declared admissible (see Gaftoniuc v. Romania (dec.), no. 30934/05, 22 February 2011).
25. Accordingly, in the present case the Court will examine in turn (a) whether the applicant has suffered a significant disadvantage; (b) whether respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits; and (c) whether the case was duly considered by a domestic tribunal.
1. Whether the applicant has suffered a significant disadvantage
26. The Court notes that the notion at the heart of the criterion introduced by Protocol No. 14 is whether the applicant has suffered a significant disadvantage.
27. The Court has previously held that this criterion applies where, notwithstanding a potential violation of a right from a purely legal point of view, the level of severity attained does not warrant consideration by an international court (see Adrian Mihai Ionescu, cited above; Korolev v. Russia (dec.), no. 25551/05, 1 July 2010; and Gaftoniuc, cited above). Further, the level of severity must be assessed in the light of the financial impact of the matter in dispute and the importance of the case for the applicant.
28. As regards the first element of this analysis, the Court observes that the applicant’s action concerned the validity of a notice to terminate a specific lease and his related claim for damages. In that regard, the Court observes that the financial value of the applicant’s claim as specified by him amounted to some EUR 50, which as such is clearly not indicative of a significant disadvantage in terms of the Court’s case-law (see, for example, Adrian Mihai Ionescu, cited above; Rinck v. France (dec.), no. 18774/09, 19 October 2011; Ştefănescu v. Romania (dec.), no. 11774/04, 12 April 2011; Burov v. Moldova (dec.), no. 38875/08, 14 June 2011; Šumbera v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 48228/08, 21 February 2012; and Hudecová and Others v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 53807/09, 18 December 2012). In addition, while it may not be crucial for its overall assessment, the Court finds it of supplementary relevance that the lease in question was eventually found by the domestic courts to be void for uncertainty.
29. As to the importance of the case for the applicant, the Court has found no evidence to suggest that, among the extraordinary amount of litigation involving the applicant both at domestic and European level (see paragraph 4 above), the present case has played any particular role. It finds that the degree of participation on the part of the applicant in the present proceedings (see paragraphs 7, 8 and 12 above) indicates the contrary.
30. In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that the applicant cannot be said to have suffered any significant disadvantage.
2. Whether respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits
31. The Court observes that the problem of exhaustion of domestic remedies regarding a complaint to the president of a court concerned as being a requirement for the admissibility of a constitutional complaint, and regarding another remedy under the State Liability Act as being a requirement for the admissibility of an individual application under Article 34 of the Convention, as well as the role of these remedies under Article 13, including the systemic nature of this problem, has been identified and examined by the Court (see Ištván and Ištvánová, cited above).
32. The Court further observes that the Constitutional Court’s practice of requiring complainants to lodge a complaint with the president of a court prior to being allowed to bring a constitutional complaint was the reason why the applicant’s first constitutional complaint was rejected (see paragraph 16 above).
33. However, the Court also observes that the applicant’s second constitutional complaint was examined in substance and as such it was found to be manifestly ill-founded, irrespective of the fact that he had not asserted his claim before the President of the District Court prior to lodging his constitutional complaint (see paragraph 17 above).
34. Furthermore, the Court considers that on the specific facts of the present case, the element of the “respect for human rights” of the new admissibility requirement has to be assessed in correlation with the considerations underlying its assessment of the elements of “significant disadvantage” (see above) and of “due consideration by a domestic tribunal” (see below) and vice versa.
35. In sum, the Court concludes that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols does not require an examination of the present application on the merits.
3. Whether the case was duly considered by a domestic tribunal
36. The Court observes that Article 35 § 3 (b) does not allow an application to be rejected if the case has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.
37. As noted above, the applicant’s second constitutional complaint was examined in substance and as such it was found to be in any event manifestly ill-founded.
38. In addition, the Court observes that in formulating his second constitutional complaint, the applicant limited its scope to the part of the proceedings which took place before the District Court (see paragraph 15 above), and by so doing he had prevented the Constitutional Court from examining their overall length, including the part which took place before the Court of Appeal (see Obluk v. Slovakia, no. 69484/01, § 62, 20 June 2006).
39. As to the part of the proceedings contested by the applicant in the Constitutional Court, the Court notes that it has been reviewed in quite some detail (see paragraph 17 above) and considers, in view of all the circumstances, that the Constitutional Court’s conclusions cannot be dismissed as being manifestly arbitrary, irregular or otherwise wrong.
40. The Court concludes therefore that the applicant’s case was duly considered by a domestic tribunal within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention.
4. Conclusion
41. The three conditions of the inadmissibility criterion having been satisfied, the Court finds that the application must be declared inadmissible under Article 35 §§ 3 (b) and 4 of the Convention.
42. The conclusion in the precedent paragraph is without prejudice to the possible inadmissibility of the application on other grounds, including an abuse of the right of individual application within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention (in that respect see, inter alia, paragraph 4 above).
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Santiago QuesadaJosep Casadevall
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy