Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 141
May 2011
Konstas v. Greece - 53466/07
Judgment 24.5.2011 [Section I]
Article 6
Article 6-2
Presumption of innocence
Statements made by ministers before Parliament concerning a prominent figure who had been convicted at first instance and had appealed: violation
Facts – The applicant was a professor at Panteion University in Athens, and its President from 1990 to 1995. In 1996 he was appointed acting Minister for the Press and then from 1997 to 1999 Minister Plenipotentiary representing Greece at the Council of Europe. In 1998 criminal proceedings were brought against a number of members of the University’s teaching staff who had been its President or Vice-President in the period 1992 to 1998. In 2007 the Athens Assize Court sentenced the applicant, together with nine others, to 14 years’ imprisonment for misappropriation of public funds, fraud against the State and misrepresentation. The applicant immediately appealed and the execution of his sentence was stayed. Five days later, during a debate in Parliament, the Deputy Minister of Finance referred to the proceedings in question and, addressing the Socialist Party MPs, castigated the “Panteion crooks”, asking “Didn’t you appoint them acting Ministers for the Press, Ministers Plenipotentiary at the Council of Europe, when the Panteion scandals were coming to light?”, and added in particular “You even steal from each other”. In July 2007, also during a debate in Parliament, the Prime Minister referred to the present case as an “unprecedented scandal of deliberate and planned embezzlement of EUR 8,000,000 for the benefit of those involved, to the detriment of Panteion University”. In February 2008 the Minister of Justice stated in Parliament, addressing the opposition MPs: “Remember the Panteion scandal. The Greek courts boldly and resolutely convicted all those you were always protecting.”
The criminal case is still pending before the Athens Court of Appeal.
Law – Article 6 § 2
(a) Admissibility – The remedy under Article 57 of the Civil Code, which provided for the possibility of compensation in the event of an infringement of personality rights, could not have provided full redress for the breach of the right to be presumed innocent, which was a procedural safeguard among the features of a fair trial.
(b) Merits – The offending remarks had been uttered after the applicant’s conviction at first instance and while his appeal was pending. If the presumption of innocence ceased to be applied on appeal simply because the first-instance proceedings had led to the defendant’s conviction, that would run counter to the role of the appeal proceedings, in which the appeal court had to examine the decision referred to it in both fact and law. The presumption of innocence principle would thus be rendered inapplicable in proceedings where an appellant sought a fresh determination of his case and the quashing of his conviction at first instance. Article 6 § 2 did not, however, prevent the competent authorities from referring to a conviction at first instance where the proceedings were continuing on appeal, but any such reference had to be made with the appropriate reserve required by respect for the presumption of innocence. In view of the applicant’s involvement in this case, with its wide media coverage in Greece, and given his status and the posts he had held in the past, the ministers’ remarks related to him to a degree that was sufficient to render him identifiable.
(i) Prime Minister’s remarks: In using the words “unprecedented scandal”, the Prime Minister had made only a general reference to the subject matter of the case and that could not be regarded as an attempt to prejudge the Court of Appeal’s verdict.
Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).
(ii) Remarks of the Deputy Finance Minister and Minister of Justice: As regards the unequivocal and casual words of the Deputy Minister of Finance (“crooks” and “you even steal from each other”), they were, by contrast, likely to make the public believe that the applicant was unquestionably guilty and seemed to prejudge the judgment of the Court of Appeal. As to the Minister of Justice’s remarks, according to which the Greek courts had “boldly and resolutely” convicted those involved in the case, they were liable to give the impression that this Minister was satisfied with the applicant’s conviction at first instance and was encouraging the Court of Appeal to uphold that judgment. Regard being had, in particular, to the particular function of the Minister of Justice, representing the political authority with responsibility for the proper functioning of the courts, the words he had used seemed to prejudge the Court of Appeal’s judgment. Contrary to the argument of the Greek Government, the passage of time between the making of those remarks and the future judgment of the Court of Appeal was not a crucial factor in determining whether or not there had been a breach of the right to be presumed innocent. To accept that argument would lead to an unreasonable conclusion, namely that the longer the criminal proceedings, the more any disregard of the presumption of innocence at an earlier stage of the same proceedings could be minimised. In conclusion, the remarks of the Deputy Minister of Finance and the Minister of Justice had gone far beyond a mere reference to the applicant’s conviction at first instance. The Court paid particular attention to the fact that the remarks had been made by high-ranking politicians and even, in the case of the Minister of Justice, by a person of authority who was supposed, on account of his position, to show particular restraint when commenting on judicial decisions.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
The Court also found a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.
Article 41: EUR 12,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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