FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 20428/09
Marina KONTIĆ-DRAŠČIĆ and Brankica KONTIĆ-DRAŠČIĆ
against Croatia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 25 September 2012 as a Chamber composed of:
Anatoly Kovler, President,
Nina Vajić,
Peer Lorenzen,
Elisabeth Steiner,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Julia Laffranque, judges,
and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 16 March 2009,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicants, Ms Marina Kontić-Draščić and Ms Brankica Kontić-Draščić, are Croatian nationals, who were born in 1987 and 1949 respectively and live in Rijeka. They were represented before the Court by Mr M. Žugić, a lawyer practising in Zagreb. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik.
A. The circumstances of the case
2. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
3. On an unspecified date J.K.D., the first applicant’s father and the second applicant’s husband, entered into an employment contract with the Hanseatic Shipping Company Ltd, registered in Cyprus, pursuant to which he was employed as a sailor on a vessel for six months starting from 19 September 1998. The contract specified that the employer’s insurance covered death in service and that the contract was governed by the laws of the Republic of Cyprus, and designated Limassol, Cyprus as the forum for dispute resolution. The vessel was insured in the United Kingdom.
4. On 7 October 1998 J.K.D. died while the vessel was in the Pacific Ocean.
5. The applicants brought a civil action in the Rijeka Commercial Court (Trgovački sud u Rijeci) on 27 May 1999 against the owner of the ship and the insurance company. They sought damages in connection with the death of their husband and father, claiming that his death had occurred as a result of a lack of adequate medical treatment. As regards the jurisdiction of the Croatian courts in the matter, they considered that where a death had occurred outside the territory of Croatia, the Croatian courts had jurisdiction because the actual damage – the suffering of the deceased’s close relatives residing in Croatia caused by the death and the resulting loss of support – nonetheless occurred in Croatia.
6. On 19 August 2004 the Rijeka Commercial Court awarded the applicants USD 151,114 and rejected the rest of their claim of USD 119,997. That judgment was upheld by the High Commercial Court (Visoki trgovački sud Republike Hrvatske) on 3 February 2006.
7. On 6 March 2006 the defendants lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court (Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske).
8. At a plenary session of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court on 26 February 2007, the Supreme Court endorsed its previous practice concerning claims for damages in connection with the death of a close relative which occurred outside Croatia. According to that approach, the Croatian courts had no jurisdiction in such matters. The explanation for this was that where a death had occurred outside Croatia the associated damage had also occurred outside Croatia. As the jurisdiction of the Croatian courts depended on the question of where damage had occurred, in cases where a death (and therefore the resulting damage) had occurred outside Croatia, the Croatian courts did not have jurisdiction, even when the claimant was a Croatian national.
9. Pursuant to that approach, on 18 July 2007 the Supreme Court declared the applicants’ civil action inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction. The relevant part of the decision reads:
“The dispute concerns non-contractual liability for damage with a foreign element. Therefore, section 53(1) of the Conflicts of Law Act (the “Act”) ... is relevant to the question of whether the Croatian courts have jurisdiction in the matter.
Under section 53(1) of the Act, in disputes concerning non-contractual liability for damage the Croatian courts have jurisdiction if it is prescribed under sections 46 and 50-52 of that Act or if the damage was caused on Croatian territory.
Jurisdiction for this dispute is not prescribed under sections 46 and 50-52 of the Act, and therefore it must be assessed whether the damage was caused on Croatian territory.
As to the question of where the damage occurred within the meaning of section 53 of the Act, the plenary session of 26 February 2007 of the Civil Division of this court took the view that the occurrence of damage comprises .... death ..., and that where the damage concerns .... the death of a person abroad, then it is to be understood that the damage the claimant is seeking in that connection occurred abroad, irrespective of the fact that certain categories of damage occurred in Croatia.
Therefore, [in accordance with] section 53(1) of the Act the Croatian courts do not have jurisdiction in this dispute.
...”
10. On 12 December 2007 the applicants lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court (Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske) against the above judgment of the Supreme Court which was dismissed on 10 September 2008.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
11. The relevant provision of the Conflicts of Law Act (Zakon o rješavanju sukoba zakona s propisima drugih zemalja u određenim odnosima, Official Gazette nos. 53/1991, 88/2001 – “the Act”) reads as follows:
Section 53
“(1) The Croatian courts have jurisdiction in cases concerning claims for damages if ... the damage was caused on Croatian territory.
...”
12. The relevant part of judgment no. Rev-2390/1994-2 of the Supreme Court of 3 September 1997 reads:
“ ... According to the reasoning of the lower courts, which this court also endorses, damage is caused, within the meaning of [section 53(1) of the Act], when [a person] has been injured, death has occurred or an object has been damaged ...
The event at issue (a road accident), concerning the person in respect of whose death the claimants brought their action, occurred in Austria, and therefore the damage was caused in Austria and not in Croatia.
It follows that the courts correctly interpreted section 53 § 1 of the Act and that they therefore ... rightly declared the civil action inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction.”
13. The relevant part of Practice Direction no. Su-IV-46/7 of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court of 26 February 2007 reads as follows:
“... the Supreme Court confirms its practice [stated in] judgment 139 Rev-2390/94 of 3 September 1997, published in the Collection of Decisions 1/98 [on 30 June 1998], which reads:
The damage was caused when the [person] was injured, death occurred or an object was damaged.
Therefore, if the event at issue, concerning the person in respect of whose death the claimants brought their action, occurred abroad, the damage also occurred there, disregarding the fact that the expenses of the burial occurred in Croatia.”
COMPLAINT
14. The applicants complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that they had had no access to court.
THE LAW
15. The applicants relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
16. The applicants complained that in their case the Supreme Court had changed its well-established practice, under which the Croatian courts had jurisdiction in cases concerning claims for damages where the death of a relative had occurred outside Croatia. This had lead to their civil action being declared inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction. As a result they had had no access to court.
17. The Government contested that view. They argued that it had been the well-established practice of the domestic courts to decline jurisdiction in cases where the death of a relative had occurred outside Croatia. This practice dated from 1997, which was before the applicants had lodged their civil action, and it had merely been reaffirmed by the practice direction of the Civil Division of the Supreme Court in 2007.
18. The Court reiterates that the right to a fair trial must be interpreted in the light of the Preamble to the Convention, which declares the rule of law to be part of the common heritage of the Contracting States (see Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 13279/05, § 57, 20 October 2011). One of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal certainty (see Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999‑VII), which, inter alia, guarantees consistency in the adjudication of legal claims and contributes to public confidence in the courts (see, mutatis mutandis, Ştefănică and Others v. Romania, no. 38155/02, § 38, 2 November 2010). The persistence of conflicting court decisions, on the other hand, can create a state of legal uncertainty likely to reduce public confidence in the judicial system, whereas such confidence is clearly one of the essential components of a State based on the rule of law (see Paduraru v. Romania, no. 63252/00, § 98, ECHR 2005‑XII (extracts), and Vinčić and Others v. Serbia, nos. 44698/06 and others, § 56, 1 December 2009).
19. The Court points out, however, that the requirements of legal certainty and the protection of the legitimate expectations of the public do not confer an acquired right to consistency of case-law (see Unédic v. France, no. 20153/04, § 74, 18 December 2008). Case-law development is not, in itself, contrary to the proper administration of justice, as a failure to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would risk hindering reform or improvement (see Atanasovski v. “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, no. 36815/03, § 38, 14 January 2010).
20. The Court notes in the present case that the Supreme Court in 1997 adopted a judgment which served as its leading case as regards the jurisdiction of the Croatian courts in respect of civil claims for damages concerning deaths that had occurred outside Croatia. Under that precedent, the jurisdiction of the Croatian courts depended on the question of where the damage had occurred. The Supreme Court held that, when the death had occurred outside Croatia, the Croatian courts had no jurisdiction in the matter. The court’s practice was confirmed by the Civil Division of the Supreme Court in its 2007 practice direction.
21. The Court further notes that the applicants brought their civil action in 1999, namely after the adoption of the above-mentioned judgment of the Supreme Court. The fact that the Supreme Court referred in their case to the practice direction issued by its Civil Division in 2007, by which the court’s previous practice had merely been confirmed, does not change the fact that the precedent under which the applicants’ case was determined had been developed and was well known before the applicants lodged their civil action.
22. In this respect, the Court also notes that the applicants were legally represented throughout the proceedings and it should be expected of a lawyer that he or she be aware of the relevant case-law of the Supreme Court.
23. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Søren NielsenAnatoly Kovler
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy