FOURTH SECTION
FINAL DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 52525/99
by Jozef KOREC
against Slovakia
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 16 September 2003 as a Chamber composed of
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrsV. Strážnická,
MrM. Fischbach,
MrJ. Casadevall,
MrR. Maruste,
MrL. Garlicki,
MrsE. Fura-Sandström, judges,
and Mr M. O’Boyle, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 1 June 1999,
Having regard to the partial decision of 18 June 2002,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Jozef Korec, is a Slovakian national, who was born in 1915 and lives in Uhrovec. The respondent Government were represented by Mr P. Vršanský, their Agent.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 17 December 1993 the applicant filed an action for damages with the Topoľčany District Court. He claimed 4,345 Slovakian korunas (SKK) from his neighbour on the ground that snow which had fallen from the roof of the latter’s house had damaged his fence in 1991. The amount claimed was based on an expert’s opinion of 23 September 1993 elaborated at the applicant’s request. In his action the applicant stated that, upon the municipal office’s order of 7 January 1992, the neighbour had fixed the fence in a provisional manner. In the applicant’s view, the repair had not been carried out properly. He therefore considered himself entitled to compensation.
On 24 January 1994 the Topoľčany District Court heard two witnesses.
On 25 February 1994 the applicant challenged the judge. The Nitra branch office of the Bratislava Regional Court dismissed the request on 31 March 1994.
On 1 July 1994 the judge examined the damaged fence in the presence of the parties. Hearings before the District Court were held on 22 August 1994 and on 8 September 1994.
On 19 September 1994 the Topoľčany District Court dismissed the action with reference to witness statements according to which the defendant had repaired the applicant’s fence. The applicant appealed on 16 November 1994.
On 25 May 1995 the Nitra branch office of the Bratislava Regional Court adjourned the case as the applicant had challenged the presiding judge. On 20 July 1995 the Supreme Court found that the judge concerned was not biased.
On 28 September 1995 the Nitra branch office of the Bratislava Regional Court quashed the first instance judgment and instructed the District Court to appoint an expert with a view to determining the damage.
On 11 December 1995 the District Court adjourned the case pending the submission of an expert opinion.
On 12 December 1995 the applicant challenged the District Court judge. On 13 May 1996 the Nitra branch office of the Bratislava Regional Court found that the applicant’s request was unsubstantiated.
On 26 June 1996 the District Court appointed an expert and instructed him to assess the damage. On 3 October 1996 the expert informed the District Court that the applicant had not allowed him to inspect the property in question. On 14 October 1996 the District Court informed the applicant that he was obliged to co-operate with the expert.
On 1 January 1997 the case was taken over by a different judge following the transfer of the judge who had originally dealt with it to a different court.
On 12 April 1997 the expert informed the District Court that the applicant had prevented him from entering his property. He was therefore not in a position to elaborate an opinion.
On 13 June 1997 the District Court asked the police to assist the expert. This request was revoked after the applicant had informed the court, on 19 June 1997, that he did not wish to be disturbed by third persons entering his property.
On 25 July 1997 the expert appointed by the District Court concluded in his opinion that the damage which the applicant had suffered amounted to SKK 5,900. The opinion was based on the material included in another expert opinion which had been elaborated at the applicant’s request in 1993.
On 16 September 1997 the District Court delivered a decision on the expert’s fees. The applicant appealed and contended that the appointment of the expert had been superfluous and that the opinion submitted by the expert appointed by the court was erroneous.
On 23 October 1997 the District Court delivered a judgment in which it ordered the defendant to pay compensation as claimed by the applicant, namely SKK 4,345. The compensation granted to the applicant was lower than the assessment made by the expert appointed by the court, as the District Court was bound by the applicant’s claim.
On 3 December 1997 the applicant appealed. He claimed, with reference to the length of the proceedings, SKK 200,000 in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. The applicant also claimed the reimbursement of the fees of the expert whom he had asked to assess the damage in 1993.
On 17 December 1997 the defendant submitted his observations on the applicant’s appeal.
On 7 October 1998 the Nitra Regional Court rejected the applicant’s appeal against the judgment of 23 October 1997. It noted that under the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure a plaintiff lacked standing to appeal against a first instance judgement by which his or her claim was allowed in full. In the same decision the Nitra Regional Court upheld the District Court’s decision on expert’s fees of 16 September 1997.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the length of the proceedings concerning his claim for damages had been excessive.
THE LAW
The applicant complained about the length of the proceedings. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention the relevant part of which provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Government first contended that the applicant had not respected the six months’ time-limit laid down in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In their view, the Nitra Regional Court’s decision of 7 October 1998 cannot be considered as final within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 as the applicant lacked standing to appeal against the Topoľčany District Court’s judgment of 23 October 1997. The Government further contended that the length of the proceedings was not contrary to the reasonable time requirement set out in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The applicant argued that the judgment of the Topoľčany District Court explicitly stated that an appeal was available against it. He maintained that the length of the proceedings was excessive and that it was due to the conduct of the authorities dealing with the case. In particular, the applicant was of the view that taking of further evidence had been superfluous as an expert had determined the damage already in 1993.
The Court does not consider it necessary to examine whether or not the appellate proceedings should be taken into consideration when assessing the length of the proceedings since, even assuming that such was the case, the application is inadmissible for the following reasons.
The Court recalls that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case and having regard to the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, in particular the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities, and the importance of what was at stake for the applicant in the litigation (see, for instance, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII; and Humen v. Poland [GC], no. 26614/95, § 60, 15 October 1999, unreported).
The proceedings complained of were brought on 17 December 1993 and they ended by the delivery of the Nitra Regional Court’s decision of 7 October 1998. Accordingly, the period under consideration lasted 4 years, 9 months and 21 days. During this time the case was twice examined by courts at two levels of jurisdiction.
In the Court’s view the case was not particularly complex notwithstanding that a certain amount of evidence including an expert opinion was to be obtained.
As regards the applicant’s argument that the courts’ decision to obtain an expert opinion was superfluous as they could have relied on the opinion which an expert had elaborated on his request in 1993, the Court recalls that it is not in a position to substitute its view for that of the domestic courts in similar matters. In any event, the domestic courts’ decision to rely on an opinion of an independent expert appointed by them does not appear unreasonable in the particular circumstances of the case. It cannot, therefore, be regarded as having been at the origin of undue delays of the proceedings.
As regards the conduct of the authorities, the Court has further noted that the appellate court took more than ten months to decide on the applicant’s appeal. However, it cannot attach decisive importance to this fact given the relatively smooth conduct of the proceedings at their earlier stage and the overall length of the period under consideration.
The documents available indicate that the applicant contributed to a considerable extent to the length of the proceedings in that, in particular, he challenged the judges dealing with the case on three occasions and that he was not willing to allow the expert appointed by the court to enter his property.
In view of the above considerations, the length of the proceedings cannot be said to have exceeded the reasonable time requirement embodied in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.
Michael O’BoyleNicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy