FIFTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 27509/07
by Petr Mikhaylovich KORZHIKOV
against Ukraine
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 13 September 2011 as a Committee composed of:
Boštjan M. Zupančič, President,
Ganna Yudkivska,
Angelika Nußberger, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 21 June 2007,
Having regard to the comments submitted by the respondent Government,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Petr Mikhaylovich Korzhikov, is a Ukrainian national who was born in 1947 and lives in Chernigiv. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Valeria Lutkovska, of the Ministry of Justice.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
On 21 December 2001 the applicant lodged a claim with the Desnyanskyy District Court of Chernigiv (“the District Court”) against his former employer, by which he sought reinstatement in his position and compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.
On 5 March 2002 the above court returned the claim unexamined for the applicant’s failure to attend two hearings. On 8 July 2002 the Chernigiv Regional Court of Appeal upheld that decision. On 3 September 2003 the Supreme Court quashed the above decisions as the applicant had been absent for valid reasons (sickness), and remitted the case for fresh examination.
On 6 July 2004 the District Court rejected the applicant’s claim as unsubstantiated.
On 18 January 2005, following the applicant’s appeal lodged on 3 August 2004, the Chernigiv Regional Court of Appeal upheld the above judgment.
On 15 February 2005 the applicant appealed in cassation. On 5 May 2007 the Supreme Court forwarded the appeal in cassation to the Poltava Regional Court of Appeal, which on 25 May 2007, acting as a court of cassation, rejected it as unsubstantiated. A copy of the final ruling was served on the applicant on 19 August 2007.
According to the Government, in the course of the proceedings nine hearings were adjourned at the applicant’s requests or due to his or his representative’s failure to appear. Between 20 November 2003 and 24 March 2004 the proceedings were suspended due to the applicant’s sickness. This delayed the proceedings by approximately eight months. Furthermore, the applicant lodged various procedural petitions (requested the courts to admit additional documents to the case file and challenged the judge). One hearing was adjourned due to the respondent’s representative’s and the third party’s failure to appear.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the unreasonable length of the proceedings. He also complained under Articles 6 § 1, 13, 14 and 17 of the Convention about and on account of the unfavourable outcome of the proceedings.
THE LAW
1. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant complained about the unreasonable length of the proceedings in his case. The above provision provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Government disagreed that there had been a violation of the above provision stating that the applicant, who had fully enjoyed his procedural rights, had contributed to the overall duration of the proceedings. They also explained that the period of the examination of the case by the Supreme Court had been caused by its backlog. However, in February 2007 that problem had been solved by introduction of the legislative measures.
The Court notes that the proceedings began on 21 December 2001 and ended on 19 August 2007, when the applicant received a copy of the final ruling (see, for instance, Gitskaylo v. Ukraine, no. 17026/05, § 34, 14 February 2008). They lasted, therefore, for five years seven months and twenty nine days before three judicial instances.
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, for instance, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). It recalls that special diligence is required in employment disputes (Ruotolo v. Italy, judgment of 27 February 1992, Series A no. 230-D, p. 39, § 17).
Turning to the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that the case was not complex. It further considers that the proceedings were of undeniable importance for the applicant as they concerned his reinstatement claim and called for an expeditious decision.
The Court notes that, even though certain delays could be attributed to the domestic courts (one remittal of the case for fresh examination and the period during which the case was pending before the Supreme Court), the applicant also contributed to the overall duration of the proceedings. In particular, nine hearings were adjourned due to the applicant’s or his representative’s absence or at the applicant’s requests. For about four months the proceedings were suspended due to the applicant’s sickness. Besides, in the course of the proceedings he lodged various procedural petitions. The Court also notes that the applicant appealed against the lower courts’ decisions almost in the end of the procedural time-limits (see, for instance, Azim Denizcilik Ticaret Ve Sanayi Limited Sirketi v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 1018/04, 22 June 2010). In this connection, it recalls that although a party to civil proceedings cannot be blamed for using the avenues available to him under domestic law in order to protect his interests, he must accept that such actions necessarily prolong the proceedings concerned (see Malicka-Wasowska v. Poland (dec.), no. 41413/98, 5 April 2001).
In sum, the Court considers that although certain delays could be attributed to the domestic authorities, they were not such as to warrant the conclusion that there has been a violation, especially given the overall duration of the proceedings and the fact that the applicant also caused certain delays. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
2. The Court has examined the applicant’s remaining complaints. Having regard to all the material in its possession, it finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. It follows that this part of the application must also be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Stephen PhillipsBoštjan M. Zupančič
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy