FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 62825/10
Oksana Aleksandrovna KOSTORNOVA
against Russia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 9 September 2014 as a Committee composed of:
Khanlar Hajiyev, President,
Erik Møse,
Dmitry Dedov, judges,
and Søren Prebensen, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 22 December 2010,
Having regard to the comments submitted by the parties,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Ms Oksana Aleksandrovna Kostornova, is a Russian national, who was born in 1973 and lived in Syktyvkar prior to her arrest. She was represented before the Court by Mr E. Mezak, a lawyer practising in Syktyvkar.
2. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, the Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
A. The circumstances of the case
4. Between 15 July 2009 and 9 April 2010 the applicant was held in remand prison IZ-11/1 of Syktyvkar in the Republic of Komi. The facility was overcrowded. Thus, cell 100 measuring 14 sq. m was equipped with three sleeping places and accommodated up to six inmates; cell 101 measuring 14 sq. m was designed for three detainees but housed up to six individuals; finally, cell 102 measuring 10 sq. m presented two sleeping places and up to four persons who occupied them.
5. On 9 April 2011 the applicant was transported to correctional colony IK-3 of the Ivanovo Region to serve her sentence.
6. Some time later the applicant brought a civil claim for compensation in connection with inadequate conditions of her detention in the remand prison. By final judgment of 15 August 2011, the Supreme Court of the Republic of Komi refused the claim.
B. Procedure before the Court
7. On 4 October 2010 the applicant sent her first letter to the Court. She complained, without further detail, about a violation of Article 3 of the Convention and requested an application package.
8. On 22 December 2010 the applicant submitted her application form, where she gave a detailed description of the complaints outlined below.
COMPLAINTS
9. The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention about the conditions of her pre-trial detention.
10. With reference to several Articles of the Convention she complained about various aspects of her transport to the correctional colony and her detention there.
THE LAW
11. The applicant complained that the conditions of her pre-trial detention in the Syktyvkar remand prison violated Article 3 of the Convention which provides that:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
12. The Government submitted that this complaint had been introduced out of time: it had been raised in the application form of 22 December 2010, whereas the period of the applicant’s detention in remand prison had ended on 9 April 2010. They further submitted that the subsequent civil proceedings cannot be taken into account for the purposes of calculation of the six-month time-limit set by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention, as since the adoption of the Kalashnikov judgment (see Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095/99, ECHR 2002‑VI), the Court had consistently maintained its position that there had been no effective remedy in the Russian legal system for the complaints relating to inadequate conditions of detention.
13. The applicant submitted that 4 October 2010, the date of her first letter, should be regarded as the date of lodging of the complaint, and accordingly it was not belated.
14. The Court must therefore establish the date of introduction of the complaint.
15. The Court has consistently held that a complaint is characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied on (see Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249/03, § 54, 17 September 2009, Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom, 21 February 1990, § 29, Series A no. 172 and Guerra and Others v. Italy, 19 February 1998, § 44, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998‑I).
16. In the present case the applicant’s first letter mentioned only a claim of a violation of article 3 without, however, any further detail or description. It was not until 22 December 2010, when the applicant lodged the full text of her complaint, that the conditions of detention were described.
17. In these circumstances, the Court finds that the complaint about the conditions of the applicant’s pre-trial was introduced on 22 December 2010.
18. As to the civil proceedings, the Court reiterates that the six-month period normally runs from the final decision in the process of exhaustion of domestic remedies. Where it is clear from the outset however that no effective remedy is available to the applicant, the period runs from the date of the acts or measures complained of (see Artyomov v. Russia, no. 14146/02, § 108, 27 May 2010, with further references).
19. The Court further recalls its constant position that given the present state of Russian law, a civil action for compensation for inadequate conditions of detention has not been considered an effective remedy (see, most recently, Ananyev and Others v. Russia, nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, §§ 113-118, 10 January 2012, with further references). The Court’s case‑law on the absence of an effective remedy for complaints concerning inadequate conditions of detention being sufficiently established, the applicant had at her disposal a period of six months following her departure from the remand prison, during which she should have ascertained the conditions on the admissibility of an application to the Court and, if necessary, obtained appropriate legal advice. However, she did not submit her application within that time period.
20. The Court has examined a similar situation and reached the conclusion that the complaint about the inadequate conditions of detention should have been introduced within six months of the day following the applicant’s transfer out of the detention facility (see Norkin v. Russia (dec.), no. 21056/11, 5 February 2013). There are no arguments or factual information in the present case that would warrant a departure from the Court’s findings in that decision. The applicant should have been aware of the ineffectiveness of the judicial avenue she had made use of, before she lodged her application with the Court. The final disposal of her claims for compensation cannot be relied upon as starting a fresh time-limit for her complaints.
21. Considering the above, the Court finds that the applicant’s complaint concerning the conditions of her detention in the Syktyvkar remand prison was introduced more than six months after her transfer out of that prison. It must therefore be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 § 1.
22. The Court has examined the remainder of the applicant’s complaints. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, it finds that these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Søren PrebensenKhanlar Hajiyev
Acting Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy