SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 73298/01
by Anna KŐSZEGI
against Hungary
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 25 March 2003 as a Chamber composed of
MrJ.-P. Costa, President,
MrA.B. Baka,
MrL. Loucaides,
MrC. Bîrsan,
MrK. Jungwiert,
MrM. Ugrekhelidze,
MrsA. Mularoni, judges,
and Mrs S. Dollé, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 7 February 2001,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Ms Anna Kőszegi, is a Hungarian national, who was born in 1934 and lives in Mosonmagyaróvár.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
On 28 November 1995 the applicant brought an action in trespass before the Mosonmagyaróvár District Court. On 26 March 1996 the District Court held a hearing and discontinued the proceedings holding that the action was time-barred. The applicant appealed. On 5 June 1996 the Győr-Moson-Sopron County Regional Court quashed this decision and remitted the case to the first-instance court.
In the resumed proceedings, the applicant challenged the presiding judge and one of the lay judges for bias. On 29 June 1996 the District Court dismissed her motion. Subsequently, the District Court appointed a judicial topography expert who submitted his opinion on 1 August 1997. On 24 July 1998 the District Court allowed the applicant’s renewed motion for bias and excluded one of the lay judges from the proceedings on the ground that she had been involved in the trespass dispute in question as an official of the Municipality. On 24 November 1998 the District Court delivered a judgment dismissing the applicant’s claim. The applicant appealed. On 10 March 1999 the Regional Court quashed the first-instance decision and again remitted the case to the first-instance court.
In the resumed proceedings, on 3 January 2000, the applicant complained to the National Judicial Council of the protraction of the proceedings. On 24 January 2000 the President of the District Court acknowledged, in a letter addressed to the applicant, that there had been a period of inactivity since 10 March 1999. Simultaneously, the President granted priority to the case. On 31 October 2000 the District Court delivered a judgment allowing the applicant’s claim. On 2 November 2000 the District Court rectified its judgment as to the registration in the land register of an easement in favour of the applicant.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention of the excessive length of the proceedings. Moreover, she complains that the proceedings were unfair since one of the lay judges had been involved in the trespass dispute in question as an official of the Municipality and was thus not impartial.
THE LAW
1.The applicant complains that the proceedings lasted an unreasonably long time. She invokes Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which, in its relevant parts, provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time... by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Court observes that the proceedings started on 28 November 1995 when the applicant brought an action before the Mosonmagyaróvár District Court. The case was terminated on 2 November 2000 when the District Court rectified its judgment of 31 October 2000. The proceedings thus lasted four years and eleven months before two levels of jurisdiction.
The Court recalls that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings is to be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case, regard being had to the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, in particular the complexity of the case, the applicant’s conduct and that of the competent authorities, which in this instance call for an overall assessment (see, among many other authorities, the Cesarini v. Italy judgment of 12 October 1992, Series A no. 245-B, p. 26, § 17).
For the Court, the applicant’s action, which concerned an easement dispute, was not particularly complex. Furthermore, the applicant’s conduct does not appear to have substantially contributed to the duration of the proceedings. As to the conduct of the competent authorities, the Court observes that, although the case had to be remitted on two occasions to the District Court and a ten-and-a-half-month period of inactivity occurred between 10 March 1999 and 24 January 2000, the District Court’s President granted priority to the applicant’s action on the latter date. The proceedings were thereafter concluded on 2 November 2000 with due diligence.
Having regard to what was at stake for the applicant and the overall length of the proceedings, the Court considers that any delays that might be imputed to the authorities do not appear substantial enough for the total length to be regarded as excessive.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
2.The applicant also complains under Article 6 of the Convention that the proceedings were unfair since one of the lay judges was biased.
The Court notes that the lay judge in question was excluded from the proceedings on 24 July 1998, subsequent to which the Regional Court quashed the District Court’s decision and remitted the case to it. The lay judge did not participate in the resumed proceedings and thus could not influence their outcome. The Court considers that there is nothing in the case-file indicating that the proceedings were otherwise unfair. It is all the more so as the outcome of the proceedings was favourable for the applicant.
It follows that this part of the application is likewise manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
S. DolléJ.-P. Costa
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy