AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 16832/90
by Oleg KOZLOV
against Finland
The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private
on 28 May 1991, the following members being present:
MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President
J.A. FROWEIN
S. TRECHSEL
E. BUSUTTIL
A. WEITZEL
J.-C. SOYER
H.G. SCHERMERS
H. DANELIUS
Mrs. G. H. THUNE
Sir Basil HALL
MM. F. MARTINEZ RUIZ
C.L. ROZAKIS
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. L. LOUCAIDES
J.-C. GEUS
A.V. ALMEIDA RIBEIRO
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
Mr. J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 9 July 1990
by Oleg KOZLOV against Finland and registered on the same day under
file No. 16832/90;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the
Rules of Procedure of the Commission;
Having regard to the written observations submitted by the
Government on 9 January and 2 April 1991 and by the applicant on
27 February, 20 March and 20 May 1991;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be
summarised as follows.
The applicant is a citizen of the Soviet Union, born in 1970.
Before the Commission he is represented by Mr. Markku Fredman, a lawyer
practising in Helsinki.
Particular circumstances of the case
In 1987 the applicant began his studies at the university of
Saratov in the Soviet Union. In 1988 he was called up for military
service. In the Soviet Union there is no right to exemption from
military service on the ground of conscientious objections. Having
served for two weeks, the applicant notified the authorities that he
could not continue his military service because it caused him moral
and ethical problems. The applicant was then detained in two
different military hospitals for three and a half months, during which
he was subjected to ill-treatment such as injections of inter alia
sulphuric substances. The medical treatment caused him pain and side
effects such as problems with his eyesight, hearing and faculty of
speech. As a protest the applicant went on hunger strike.
When the applicant was released from the hospital the
authorities put a stamp in his military passport stating that he was
mentally ill. As a result of this he was not allowed to continue his
studies, to work, to choose his domicile, to obtain a passport or a
driving licence, to marry and to found a family or to participate in
public elections, either as a voter or as a candidate.
On 19 June 1990 the applicant hijacked a Soviet aircraft on
its way to Murmansk. The plane landed in Helsinki, where the
applicant gave himself up and was arrested. During the hijacking
nobody was killed or hurt.
Having been arrested, the applicant, on the same day, lodged a
request for political asylum in the United States of America.
On 20 June 1990 he requested political asylum also in Finland. He
asked for leave to submit supplementary documents from the Soviet
Union before the decision regarding asylum was made, in particular so
as to enable his mother in the Soviet Union to send him his military
passport.
On 21 June 1990 the applicant was remanded for trial by the
City Court (raastuvanoikeus, rådstuvurätten) of Helsinki suspected of
having hijacked a civil aircraft. The City Court decided that the
trial would take place before the District Court (kihlakunnanoikeus,
häradsrätten) of Vantaa on 17 July 1990.
On 28 June 1990 the Soviet Government requested the
applicant's extradition to the Soviet Union, referring to the 1974
Bilateral Agreement between Finland and the Soviet Union on the
Prevention of Hijacking of Civil Aircraft (hereinafter "the 1974
Agreement") and a warrant of arrest issued by the K.G.B. The
applicant, however, submits that no such warrant was presented to the
Finnish Government, but only a document according to which the
applicant should be "kept in custody" (according to the translation by
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland) or "kept under
supervision" (according to the translation by the Central Criminal
Police (keskusrikospoliisi, centralkriminalpolisen) of Finland). The
document was issued by the K.G.B. in Latvia and confirmed by the local
"prokurator".
On 29 June 1990 the Ministry of Justice asked the Supreme
Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen) to give its opinion
regarding the extradition matter.
On 2 July 1990 the Finnish Ministry of the Interior rejected the
applicant's request for asylum, stating that according to the United
Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees he had no right
to asylum, since this Convention was not to be applied to a person
suspected of having committed a serious non-political crime outside
the country he has fled from. Furthermore, the applicant had not
presented any plausible reasons supporting his request. The decision
was not subject to appeal.
Subsequently the applicant shut himself up in his cell for a
week, until the police entered into the cell by breaking the door by
force.
On 3 July 1990, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees submitted an opinion to the Ministry of the Interior which,
however, was of a general character and did not deal specifically with
the applicant's case.
On 6 July 1990 the applicant's lawyer lodged a new request for
political asylum in Finland, referring to his previous request that he
be permitted to submit further evidence.
On 10 July 1990 the Supreme Court delivered its opinion to the
Ministry of Justice regarding the extradition. It reads, in its
relevant parts:
"In the present case, there are no circumstances which would
suggest that Kozlov, in Finland, has not been guaranteed his
human rights under the United Nations Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights,
neither do the provisions in these Conventions, having regard
to the facts of the case, constitute an obstacle to the
extradition of Kozlov to the Soviet Union.
Thus, the request for extradition in regard to the (applicant's)
offence of having hijacked an aeroplane may lawfully be granted ..."
The Supreme Court found, however, that extradition could
not be granted in regard to the applicant's offence of having
illegally left the Soviet Union.
On 13 and 16 July 1990 the applicant was examined separately
by a chief physician, a psychiatrist and a psychologist and found to
be mentally healthy.
On 17 July 1990 the applicant was brought before the District
Court of Vantaa in order to be tried for the hijacking offence.
The public prosecutor, at the request of the Ministry of Justice,
requested leave to present the charges in two weeks, referring to lack
of time for preparing the case and to the priority given to the
extradition proceedings. This request was granted by the District
Court. It referred to the 1974 Agreement, the fact that the examination
of the extradition request was still pending, the serious character
and the public importance of the case, and the fact that the prosecutor
had received the criminal investigation documents only on 11 July 1990
and had thus not been given enough time to consider whether the
investigations were sufficient to prepare an indictment. The District
Court furthermore noted that under Finnish law the sentence for the
offence would amount to not less than two years' imprisonment and that
there was a risk that the applicant would abscond.
On 23 July 1990 the applicant's lawyer contacted the applicant's
brother in the Soviet Union by telephone. The latter promised to take the
applicant's military passport to the Embassy of Finland in Moscow,
together with a written account by members of the applicant's family.
Nothing was subsequently heard of in this matter.
On 24 July 1990 the applicant's second request for political
asylum was refused.
On the same day the Ministry of Justice decided to extradite
the applicant to the Soviet Union under the conditions that without
the consent of the Finnish Ministry of Justice he would not be
prosecuted or punished for any offence other than the hijacking
committed prior to his extradition, nor be further extradited to a
third country. The Government further stated their wish that they be
allowed to monitor the investigations and proceedings in the
applicant's case in the Soviet Union. The extradition decision was
not subject to appeal.
On 26 July 1990 the applicant slashed himself with a razor
blade in his cell.
On 27 July 1990 the applicant was handed over to the Soviet
authorities.
In August the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked the Soviet
authorities for permission for its representative to see the
applicant. This was not granted.
From 21 June to 24 July 1990 the applicant was detained under
the Coercive Criminal Investigation Means Act (pakkokeinolaki 450/87,
tvångsmedelslagen 450/87). From 24 July to 27 July 1990 he was
detained under the Extradition Act (laki 456/70 rikoksen johdosta
tapahtuvasta luovuttamisesta, lag 456/70 om utlämning för brott).
The applicant has submitted an undated opinion of Amnesty
International from the summer of 1990 which deals with all Soviet
hijackers who were arrested in Finland and Sweden at that time. It
reads, in its relevant part:
"Over many years Amnesty International has urged the Soviet
authorities (to) bring their domestic legislation into line with
their international commitments on human rights by, among
other things, recognizing the right to conscientious
objection to military service and the right of Soviet
citizens to leave and enter their own country. Amnesty
International would be gravely concerned if, on his return
to the USSR, XXX faced prosecution or imprisonment on these
grounds.
In considering the extradition of XXX to the USSR,
therefore, Amnesty International calls on the
Finnish/Swedish authorities to obtain guarantees from the
Soviet government that he will not be prosecuted on charges
related to his exercise of these human rights."
The Government submitted that following the extradition they
had been informed by the Soviet authorities that a forensic mental
examination had been conducted on the applicant in Latvia and that he
had been found to be "mentally sound". The applicant, however,
claimed to have suffered from mental disorders affecting his criminal
responsibility and requested a new examination. In late September
1990 the applicant was remanded for the second examination, which,
however, had not yet been completed by 21 December 1990. The trial
was expected to be held in January 1991. The Government stated that
they would send an observer to the trial, which whould be open to the
public.
The applicant's lawyer submitted that by late February 1991 he
had not received any information as to the date of the applicant's
trial. He further submitted that for several months he had not
received any information from the Government regarding the proceedings
following the extradition. He finally submitted that the Government
seemed to have uncritically accepted the information given by the
Soviet authorities and contested that the applicant had asked for a
second examination of his mental state.
According to information subsequently provided by the
applicant's lawyer, the applicant was considered mentally sound at the
end of the second psychiatric examination which was concluded in
December 1990. The trial took place on 11-13 March 1991. On
14 March 1991, the Court convicted the applicant of unlawful seizure of
aircraft and sentenced him to five years' imprisonment with "hard
discipline".
The lawyer further stated that he had attended most of the
trial which in his view had not satisfied normal requirements as to
fairness and the rights of the defence. During the trial the applicant
had been placed in a cage with metal bars and his defence counsel had
been sitting five metres away from him, so that they could not
communicate with each other during the proceedings. Requests by the
applicant's counsel to hold the trial in the Latvian language and to
obtain translations of documents from the mental examination in
Finland had not been granted. The applicant's counsel had been
interrupted twice by the President of the Court and had been fined for
contempt of court after he had asked for the President to be replaced
on account of lack of impartiality.
Relevant domestic law and practice
According to the 1974 Agreement a person suspected of having
hijacked a civil aircraft registered in one of the two countries and
which has landed in the other country shall be returned to the country
of registration if the suspect is a citizen of that country.
Extradition based on the 1974 Agreement is regulated by the Act on
the Returning in Certain Cases of Persons Guilty of Hijacking Civil
Aircraft (laki 336/75 siviili-ilma-aluksen kaappaukseen
syyllistyneiden henkilöiden palauttamisesta, lag 336/75 om återförande
i vissa fall av personer som gjort sig skyldiga till kapning av civilt
luftfartyg; hereinafter "the 1975 Act"), as well as by the Extradition
Act. In extradition cases which fall under the 1975 Act Sections 13
to 25 and 34 of the Extradition Act are, insofar as they are
applicable, to be applied.
Section 16 para. 1 of the Extradition Act reads:
"If the person whose extradition is requested, during
the investigation or in a petition submitted to the
Ministry of Justice before the decision, alleges that
lawful conditions for the extradition are not fulfilled, the
Ministry shall, if the extradition request is not immediately
rejected, before its decision ask for the opinion of the
Supreme Court. The Ministry may also otherwise ask for an
opinion, if necessary."
Section 17 of the Extradition Act reads:
"The Supreme Court examines, having regard to Sections 1-10
or other provisions in international treaties binding upon
Finland, whether the request for extradition may be granted.
If the Supreme Court finds an obstacle to the extradition
the request may not be granted."
Under Section 12 para. 4 of the Extradition Act the Government
may, when granting an extradition request, state the conditions under
which the extradition shall take place. However, in cases which fall
under the 1975 Act the Government may only state conditions in order
to prevent the extradited person from being prosecuted or punished for
any offence other than the hijacking committed prior to his extradition
or the further extradition of the person to a third country.
According to Chapter 1, Section 21, of the Act on Pre-Trial
Means of Coercion the Court shall, when remanding a suspect for trial
and provided the examination of the charges has not already started,
decide when the trial will take place. It has to take place within
four weeks, but the Court may for particularly weighty reasons
postpone the trial for two weeks at a time, provided this is requested
by the prosecutor before the day of the trial. The postponement is
not subject to ordinary appeal. However, under Finnish law it is
possible to lodge an extraordinary appeal (kantelu, klagan) on the
basis of an alleged procedural fault by the Court.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains that the denial of asylum in Finland
and his extradition to the Soviet Union violated Article 3 of the
Convention. He submits that, already during his detention in the military
hospital, he has been subjected to treatment contrary to this
provision. He further refers to the unjustified diagnosis according
to which he is mentally ill. He submits that the Goverment, when
deciding to extradite him, failed to demand the revocation of this
unjustified classification by the Soviet authorities. Therefore, he
now risks remaining in a mental institution. Mental hospitals and
psychiatry have recently been used in the Soviet Union to suppress
dissidents. The latitude applied in sentencing hijackers on previous
occasions as well as the legal practice regarding hijacking have been
inhuman, while the enforcement of sanctions has been both degrading
and inhuman. The recent positive developments in the Soviet Union
have not yet reached the military, prisons or mental hospitals.
2. The applicant alleges that in view of the fact that the
warrant for his arrest was issued by the K.G.B., his extradition
exposed him to a serious risk that his case would not be tried by a
tribunal in conformity with the conditions laid down in Article 6
para. 1 of the Convention. He submits that the judicial procedures in
the Soviet Union fail notoriously to meet the standards laid down in
Article 6 of the Convention. Subsequently, he has added that the
trial which took place on 11-13 March 1991 was unfair and did not
respect the rights of the defence.
3. The applicant alleges that he was not promptly informed
about the nature and the ground for the charges against him. He
alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 3 (a) of the Convention.
4. The applicant alleges that because of the postponement of
the trial in Finland he was not tried within a reasonable time. He
complains of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
5. The applicant finally alleges that the grounds given for
the postponement of the trial in Finland violated Article 18 of the
Convention.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 9 July 1990 and registered
on the same day.
On 10 July 1990, following the applicant's request for an
interim measure, the Commission decided under Rule 36 of its Rules of
Procedure not to indicate to the Government that they suspend the
decision on the applicant's extradition pending the Commission's
examination of the admissibility of the case.
Following the extradition decision the applicant, on
24 July 1990, requested that the Commission indicate to the Government
that they suspend the enforcement of this decision pending the
Commission's examination of the case. On 25 July, the request was
rejected by the President of the Commission.
On 5 October 1990 the Commission decided that notice of the
application be given to the respondent Government and that the parties
be invited to submit written observations on the admissibility and
merits of the application.
After an extension of the time limit, the Government's
observations were submitted on 9 January 1991. The applicant's
observations in reply were submitted on 27 February 1991.
The applicant submitted further observations on 20 March and
20 May 1991 and the Government on 2 April 1991.
THE LAW
1. The applicant alleges that the denial of asylum in Finland and
his extradition to the Soviet Union violated Article 3 (Art. 3) of the
Convention.
Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention reads:
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."
The Government submit that the complaint is manifestly
ill-founded. Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention could only come
into play on the basis of objective facts indicating an imminent risk
of ill-treatment in the receiving country. It is up to the applicant
to produce prima facie evidence to show that he has serious and
substantial grounds for fearing treatment contrary to Article 3
(Art.3) of the Convention. It is commonly recognised that the human
rights situation in the Soviet Union has dramatically improved during
the latter half of the 1980's. This has inter alia been reflected in
the treatment of prisoners of conscience. Moreover, there is a marked
change in the field of forensic psychiatry in the Soviet Union. The
fact that the applicant, at the time when he was extradited, risked a
criminal prosecution and trial, including forensic mental
examinations, in the Soviet Union does not in itself raise an issue
under Article 3 of the Convention. Accordingly, there was no reason
to assume that the applicant, when extradited, would be tortured or
otherwise ill-treated in the Soviet Union.
The Government further submit that the 1974 Agreement, as
implemented in the applicant's case, does not in itself constitute a
violation of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention. The wording of the
1974 Agreement admittedly does not mention the substance of Article 3
(Art. 3) of the Convention. However, it is obvious that the
subsequent human rights commitments of Finland prevail over the
provisions of the 1974 Agreement.
The Government further submit that, although the 1974
Agreement allows no reservation to be made in regard to capital
punishment, which is authorised by the Latvian Penal Code, it does not
rule out such reservations where they are necessitated by
international or other commitments of the extraditing State. As the
hijacking did not result in any casualties or serious bodily injuries
the applicant does not face the risk of capital punishment. The
Government on this point refer to the Supreme Court's opinion on the
extradition, in which the exclusion of capital punishment was
specifically discussed.
The Government further refer to the sentences inflicted in the
Soviet Union on two other aircraft hijackers extradited in the course
of 1990 from Sweden and Finland, respectively. They were sentenced to
three and four years' suspended imprisonment, respectively. These
sentences must be considered lenient.
As to the applicant's allegation that he has previously been
diagnosed in the Soviet Union as mentally ill, while he was found to
be mentally sound in the examination carried out in Finland, the
Government contend that this does not constitute any evidence of abuse
of psychiatry. Furthermore, it is hardly possible for an extraditing
country to state demands as to how an extradited person's mental state
should be diagnosed in the future. The same goes for the legal
classification of an extradited person's mental state at the time of
the suspected offence, as the question of criminal responsibility is
to be decided within each legal system. It would be improper, if not
impossible, for the extraditing country to dictate specific conditions
in this respect. Accordingly, the most that can be done by the
extraditing State is to ensure that the subsequent proceedings in the
receiving State are adequately monitored, in order to preclude a
possible risk of abuse. The Government contend that to this end it
has made all necessary efforts.
The applicant submits that the Government's decision to
extradite him appears to be an expression of support for the Soviet
leadership. As to the allegedly lenient sentences inflicted on other
hijackers he submits that his situation is different, as he would face
trial in Latvia, where the Soviet Union has recently used force
against Latvia's democratic institutions. He finally submits that the
omission of capital punishment from the 1974 Agreement indicates
glaring contradictions between the 1974 Agreement and the Convention.
The Commission first recalls that according to its established
case-law the right to asylum and the right not to be expelled or
extradited are not as such included among the rights and freedoms
mentioned in the Convention but that the expulsion or extradition of a
person may nevertheless, in certain exceptional circumstances, raise
an issue under the Convention and in particular under Article 3
(Art. 3). In the Soering case, the European Court of Human Rights
stated as follows (Eur. Court H.R., Soering judgment of 7 July 1989,
Series A No. 161, pp. 35-36, para. 91):
"In sum, the decision by a Contracting State to extradite a
fugitive may give rise to an issue under Article 3 (Art. 3), and hence
engage the responsibility of that State under the Convention,
where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that
the person concerned, if extradited, faces a real risk of
being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment in the requesting country. The
establishment of such responsibility inevitably involves an
assessment of conditions in the requesting country against the
standards of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention."
The Commission also recalls that according to the Court's
case-law ill-treatment, including that in connection with punishment,
must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the
scope of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention. The assessment of this
level depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature
and context of the treatment or punishment, the manner and method of
its execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in
some instances, the sex and state of health of the victim
(above-mentioned Soering judgment, p. 39, para. 100). The Commission
furthermore recalls that for punishment or treatment associated with
it to be "inhuman" or "degrading", the suffering or humiliation
involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of
suffering or humiliation inherent in a given form of legitimate
punishment (Eur. Court H.R., Tyrer judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A
No. 26, pp. 14-15, paras. 29-30).
The Commission has examined the applicant's submissions and
the documents in support of his application. It notes that the
existence of a risk of ill-treatment in a case of extradition should
be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known
or ought to have been known to the Contracting State at the time of
the extradition. However, regard can also be had to information which
has come to light after the extradition, as such information may be of
value in confirming or refuting the appreciation made by the
Contracting State or the well-foundedness of the fears of the
extradited person (Eur. Court H.R., Cruz Varas and Others judgment of
20 March 1991, para. 76, to be published in Series A).
In the present case, the Commission considers that the
information which was available to the Finnish Government at the time
of the extradition with regard to the personal situation of the
applicant and the development in the Soviet Union did not show that
the applicant, upon his extradition, would run a substantial risk of
being exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the
Convention. The information which has subsequently been provided by
the applicant's lawyer about the applicant's trial, conviction and
sentence cannot be considered to show that the applicant has been, or
is likely to be, submitted to treatment or punishment of such gravity
as to be deemed "inhuman" or "degrading" within the meaning of Article
3 (Art. 3) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. The applicant alleges that his extradition would expose him to
a serious risk of not having his case tried by a tribunal in
conformity with the conditions set out in Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention. After the trial had taken place, he
alleged that the requirements of fairness and the rights of the
defence had been disregarded in various respects.
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention reads, in its
relevant parts:
"In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him,
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law ..."
The Government submit that the complaint is manifestly
ill-founded. The applicant has not substantiated his allegation that
the involvement of K.G.B. in his case would render his trial unfair.
The Government admit that the criminal procedure in the Soviet
Union may not be in full harmony with the requirements under Article 6
(Art. 6) of the Convention. However, such harmony cannot be required
as a condition for extradition from a Contracting State to another
country. The Government refer to the Commission's decision in
Application No. 10308/83 (Dec. 3.5.83, D.R. 36 pp. 209-235 at 232), in
which it was expressly held that non-compliance in the receiving State
with the guarantees laid down in Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention
would not in itself make the extradition appear as inhuman treatment.
In any case, there was no reason to doubt that the applicant's trial
would satisfy the minimum standards laid down in the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which the Soviet Union is a
party.
According to the information available to the Government, the
applicant was expected to face a normal criminal trial in the Soviet
Union. This would be open to the public, the press and observers from
international human rights organisations. Moreover, the applicant had
been granted legal representation in the Soviet Union. His lawyer
before the Commission would be notified of the date and place of the
trial as soon as the Government received this information.
The applicant submits that criminal cases which are
investigated by the K.G.B. are decided by the Supreme Court as the
first and only instance. Such proceedings are also less public than
those of other courts.
The Commission recalls that in the Soering case the Court did
not exclude that an issue might exceptionally arise under Article
6 (Art. 6) by an extradition decision in circumstances where the
fugitive has suffered or risks suffering a flagrant denial of a fair
trial in the requesting country (above-mentioned Soering judgment, p.
45, para. 113).
In the present case the Commission finds that the information
available to it as to the situation prevailing in 1990 in regard to
the system of criminal justice with which the applicant would be
confronted upon his extradition is not sufficient to conclude that the
applicant's case is of that exceptional character.
It follows that this part of the application is also
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
3. The applicant alleges that he was not promptly informed about
the charges against him. He alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 3
(a) (Art. 6-3-a) of the Convention, which reads:
"3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the
following minimum rights:
(a) to be informed promptly, in a language which he
understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him; ..."
The Government submit that already during the first
interrogation by the police on 19 June 1990 the applicant was informed
about the charges against him. The application for a detention order
which was presented before the City Court of Helsinki on 21 June 1990
contained a description of the suspected offence and the alleged facts
of its commission. On the latter occasion the applicant admitted the
factual description of the charges. Subsequently, on 13 July 1990,
the applicant appeared before the District Court of Vantaa. On both
occasions he was assisted by legal counsel and an interpreter.
The Commission first notes that, in view of the circumstances,
the applicant must have been immediately aware of the nature of the
charges against him. Moreover, on 21 June 1990, that is two days
after his arrival in Finland, a hearing was held before the District
Court of Helsinki which remanded him for trial. At this hearing, the
applicant was present as well as his lawyer and an interpreter.
There can be no doubt that on that occasion the applicant received
full information about the charges against him.
In these circumstances, the Commission finds no violation of
Article 6 para. 3 (a) (Art. 6-3-a) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
4. The applicant alleges that because of the postponement of the
trial in Finland he did not receive a trial within a reasonable time.
He alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
The Government submit that the complaint is manifestly
ill-founded. They submit that the reasonableness of the length of the
proceedings must be considered as a whole. In the present case, the
especially weighty reasons for the postponement of the trial as stated
in the District Court's decision were the need to allow the prosecutor
enough time to prepare the indictment on the one hand, and the
uncertainty of the pending extradition request on the other. The
pre-trial investigations were further complicated due to the
applicant's own behaviour, notably the fact that he barricaded himself
in his cell for a week, refusing all co-operation with the
authorities. The police record and other investigation material were
not ready for the prosecutor until 11 July 1990. Moreover, had the
indictment been presented in the District Court it would have been
difficult, from the point of view of judicial independence, for the
executive branch to interfere in the trial by making an extradition
decision. On the other hand, the delay of the extradition decision
was partly due to the fact that the Government wanted to study
carefully the impact of their commitments under the Convention. In
the present case criminal proceedings were discontinued as soon as the
authorities were informed about the extradition decision. On 24 July
1990 the legal basis for the applicant's detention was changed, as he
was henceforward detained under the Extradition Act. Thus, the period
to be taken into consideration when determining whether the length of
the criminal proceedings exceeded the requirements under Article 6
para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention runs from 21 June to 24 July
1990. Such a length does not amount to a violation of Article 6 para.
1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
The Commission recalls that the reasonableness of the length
of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular
circumstances of the case and having regard to the criteria laid down
in the Court's case-law, in particular the complexity of the case and
the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities (see, as
the most recent authority, Eur. Court H.R., Vernillo judgment of
20 February 1991, to be published in Series A). In the present case
the Commission notes that, while a procedure for prosecution in
Finland was initiated, it was interrupted by the applicant's
extradition to the Soviet Union.
In the light of the case-law of the Convention organs the
Commission finds no violation of the applicant's right to a trial
within a reasonable time within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
5. The applicant finally alleges that the District Court's
decision to postpone the trial was based on the prosecutor's statement
that he had not had enough time to prepare the indictment, this being
an interpretation of the Convention detrimental to the applicant. The
applicant alleges a violation of Article 18 (Art. 18) of the
Convention which provides:
"The restrictions permitted under this Convention to
the said rights and freedoms shall not be applied for any
purpose other than those for which they have been
prescribed."
The Government submit that the complaint is incompatible
rationae materiae with the provisions of the Convention, as it seems
to be based on the assertion that the prosecutor's real motive for
invoking the Convention in order to have the trial postponed was to
deprive the applicant of his legitimate rights. On the contrary, the
request was made in the applicant's interest, as the prosecutor
argued that in the short time available it would have been difficult
for him to prepare an indictment which would have satisfied the
requirements under Article 6 paras. 3 (a) and (b) (Art. 6-3-a, 6-3-b)
of the Convention. In any case, the effect of the prosecutor's
argument appears to have been marginal, as the Court in its decision
disregarded his reference to Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.
The Commission finds no appearance of a violation of Article
18 (Art. 18) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application in manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Deputy Secretary to the Commission President of the Commission
(J. RAYMOND) (C.A. NØRGAARD)
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