FIRST SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 64151/00
by Giorgio KRASZEWSKI
against Italy
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 23 May 2002 as a Chamber composed of
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrsF. Tulkens,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrE. Levits,
MrA. Kovler,
MrV. Zagrebelsky, judges,
and Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 9 December 2000,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is an Italian national, born in 1955 and living in Pino Torinese (Turin). He is represented before the Court by Mrs A. Tinivella, a lawyer practising in Turin.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant is the owner of an apartment in Turin, which he had let to V.D.F.
In a registered letter of 10 February 1992, the applicant informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 August 1992 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date.
In a writ served on the tenant on 27 May 1992, the applicant reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Turin Magistrate.
By a decision of 26 June 1992, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Turin Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 August 1993.
On 29 September 1993, the applicant served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.
On 26 October 1993, he served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 7 December 1993.
Between 7 December 1993 and 7 October 1998, the bailiff made nine attempts to recover possession.
Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant was not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.
Pursuant to section 6 of Law no. 431/98, the enforcement proceedings were suspended until 14 June 2000.
On 14 June 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the apartment.
THE LAW
The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that his inability to recover possession of his apartment amounted to a violation of the right to property.
The applicant further complains under Article 6 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings and about the denial of his right of access to a court.
The Government argue that the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies on the grounds that he failed to challenge the refusal of police assistance before the administrative courts.
The Court recalls that it has already dismissed this objection in the Immobiliare Saffi case (see the judgment Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, §§ 40-42, ECHR 1999-V). The Court sees no reason to depart from its previous finding. This objection should therefore be rejected.
The Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously. In their opinion, the interference with the applicant’s property rights was not disproportionate; therefore, there is no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
As to the length of the enforcement proceedings, the Government submit that the delay in granting police assistance is justified on grounds of the order of priorities established according to public-safety requirements. In any event, the Government stress that following the entry into force of Law no. 431 of 9 December 1998, the Prefect is no longer competent to determine the order of priority for the enforcement of the evictions. The date of enforcement should now be set by the District Court.
The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy