Communicated on 2 November 2016
FOURTH SECTION
Application no. 20433/15
Róża KROTLA and Andrzej ROJEWSKI
against Poland
lodged on 21 April 2015
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The applicants, Ms Róża Krotla and Mr Andrzej Rojewski, are Polish nationals who were born in 1934 and 1927 respectively and live in Sosnowiec and Katowice. They are sister and brother. They are represented before the Court by Mr J. Forystek, a lawyer practising in Cracow.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.
1. Background of the case
In 1944 the Bystrzyca estate (a palace, park complex and farm land) owned by the applicants’ father was taken over by the State, pursuant to the provisions of the Polish Committee of National Liberation’s decree on agrarian reform of 6 September 1944 (Dekret PKWN o przeprowadzeniu reformy rolnej – the 1944 Decree) (hereinafter “the decree”).
2. Administrative proceedings
On 18 May 1998 the applicants asked the Lublin Governor (Wojewoda Lubelski) to decide that the Bystrzyca palace and the park complex had not fallen within the scope of the decree.
On 12 July 2002 the Lublin Governor refused the applicants’ request. The applicants appealed.
On 10 September 2002 the Minister of Agriculture and Country Development (Minister Rolnictwa i Rozwoju Wsi) (hereinafter “Minister of Agriculture”) quashed this decision and remitted the case to the first‑instance authority.
In August 2003 the Lublin Governor again refused the applicants’ request. This decision was upheld by the Minister of Agriculture on 10 August 2006. Following an appeal lodged by the applicants, on 18 December 2006 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court (Wojewódzki Sąd Administracyjny) quashed both decisions and remitted the case to the first-instance authority. The court noted that the authorities had failed to establish whether the palace and the surrounding park had had functional and economic links with the farm land.
On 17 January, 5 May and 6 November 2008 the applicants lodged pleadings with the Lublin Governor specifying the details of their request, in particular by submitting the exact plot numbers.
On 5 January 2009 the Lublin Governor refused for the third time to give a decision that the Bystrzyca palace and park complex had not fallen within the scope of the decree and had not been designated for the purposes of the agrarian reform. Following a further appeal lodged by the applicants, on 23 April 2009 the Minister of Agriculture again quashed the Governor’s decision and remitted the case. The Minister observed that the Governor had failed to take account of the applicants’ modified requests and had based its decision on their original request of 1998. Furthermore, the first-instance authority had failed to establish beyond any doubt whether the palace and the park had formed one estate together with the farm land.
On 15 February 2010 the Lublin Governor gave a decision again refusing the applicants’ request. The Minister of Agriculture upheld that decision on 14 June 2010. Following yet another appeal lodged by the applicants, on 9 March 2011 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court quashed both decisions and remitted the case to the first-instance authority. The court held that the authorities had failed to establish, with reference to the supporting evidence, whether the palace and the surrounding park had functional and economic links with the farm land.
On 25 January 2012 the Lublin Governor yet again refused the applicants’ request. The Minister of Agriculture quashed that decision and remitted the case on 28 May 2012. The Minister indicated that the Governor should hear evidence from certain witnesses.
On 31 October 2013 the Lublin Governor decided that the Bystrzyca palace and park complex had not fallen within the scope of the agrarian reform.
On 26 November 2013 the Mayor of Lublin District (starosta powiatu), representing the State Treasury, lodged an appeal with the Minister of Agriculture. On 30 April 2014 the Minister of Agriculture quashed the Governor’s decision.
The proceedings are still pending.
3. Complaints about inactivity
On 27 July 2006 the applicants lodged a complaint about the inactivity of the Minister of Agriculture with the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court. On 4 October 2006 the applicants withdrew their complaint, since meanwhile (on 10 August 2006) the Minister had delivered a decision on the merits. The court discontinued the proceedings on 11 October 2006.
On 14 March 2014 the applicants sent a letter to the Minister of Agriculture asking for the examination of their case to be expedited (“wniosek o przyspieszenie rozpoznawania sprawy”).
On 13 June 2014 they lodged a complaint with the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court alleging inactivity on the part of the Minister of Agriculture. They complained that the proceedings had already lasted 12 years (since the first Minister’s decision had been given).
On 22 October 2014 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court (case no. I SAB/Wa 365/14) gave judgment. The court held that while there had been some delays in the proceedings before the Minister of Agriculture, those delays had not been significant. The court observed that the Minister’s decision had been given on 30 April 2014, that is within four months from the date of the Mayor’s appeal.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
1. Inactivity of the administrative authorities
The relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for excessive length of administrative proceedings, in particular the applicable provisions of the Code of Administrative Procedure and the 2002 Act on Proceedings before Administrative Courts, are set out in the Court’s judgment in the case of Grabiński v. Poland (no. 43702/02, §§ 60-65, 17 October 2006).
On 3 December 2010 Article 37 of the Code of Administrative Proceedings and section 3 of the Act on Proceedings before Administrative Courts were amended (the amendments entered into force on 11 April 2011).
Article 37 § 1 of the Code of Administrative Proceedings, as amended, provides that a party to administrative proceedings may lodge a complaint not only about an authority’s failure to handle the case within the time‑limits referred to in Articles 35 and 36, but also about undue delay in conducting the proceedings (przewlekłe prowadzenie postępowania).
Section 3(2) of the Act on Proceedings before Administrative Courts, as amended on 11 April 2011, provides that a party to administrative proceedings may lodge a complaint with an administrative court alleging that an authority responsible for issuing an administrative decision has been inactive or that there has been undue delay in the proceedings. Under section 149, if a complaint is well-founded, an administrative court must oblige the authority concerned to issue a decision, or to perform a specific act, or to confirm, declare, or recognise a right or obligation provided for by law.
On 15 August 2015 the Act on Proceedings before Administrative Courts was further amended in that if a complaint about inactivity is well founded an administrative court may give a decision on the merits and additionally, impose a fine on the authority or grant compensation to the applicant.
2. Remedies for excessively lengthy judicial proceedings
The relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for excessively lengthy judicial proceedings, in particular the applicable provisions of the 2004 Act, are presented in the Court’s judgment in the case of Rutkowski and Others v. Poland (nos. 72287/10, 13927/11 and 46187/11, §§ 75-92, 7 July 2015).
COMPLAINTS
The applicants complain under Article 6 of the Convention that the administrative proceedings in their case were excessively lengthy.
They further allege a breach of Article 13, on the grounds that their complaint about the inactivity of the administrative authorities was not effective.
They also complain in substance, without invoking any provisions of the Convention, of their prolonged inability to regain their rights to the property in question.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Was the length of the administrative proceedings in the present case in breach of the “reasonable time” requirement contained in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention?
2. Did the applicants have at their disposal an effective domestic remedy for their complaint under Article 6 § 1, as required by Article 13 of the Convention?
3. Does the present case concern existing possessions or a legitimate expectation of acquiring possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (compare Malhous v. the Czech Republic (dec.) [GC], no. 33071/96, ECHR 2000-XII; Broniowski v. Poland (dec.) [GC], no. 31443/96, §§ 98-102, ECHR 2002-X)?
If so, does the length of the administrative proceedings in the present case give rise to an interference with the applicants’ right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, in breach of that provision (compare Lyubomir Popov v. Bulgaria, no. 69855/01, §§ 119-124, 7 January 2010)?
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