FIRST SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 49387/11
Pero KRŽEVSKI
against the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 24 November 2015 as a Chamber composed of:
Päivi Hirvelä, President,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
Ledi Bianku,
Kristina Pardalos,
Aleš Pejchal,
Robert Spano,
Armen Harutyunyan, judges,
and André Wampach, Deputy Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 12 July 2011,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Pero Krževski, is a Macedonian national who was born in 1936 and lives in Skopje.
2. The Macedonian Government (“the Government”) are represented by their Agent, Mr K. Bogdanov.
A. The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
4. In 2000 the applicant lodged a civil action against his employer, claiming payment of salary supplements. With decisions delivered on 3 March and 22 October 2003 respectively, the Skopje Court of First Instance and the Appeal Court both rejected the applicant’s claim, considering it as having been withdrawn.
5. On 11 February 2005 the applicant applied to the first-instance court for the proceedings to be resumed. The first-instance court ordered the applicant to make his claim more specific. In a reply dated 15 December 2005, the applicant specified that the claim concerned the payment of a 20% increase of his salary, as well as another employment-related allowance. In this connection he referred to his written submissions of April 2001 in which he specified his claim.
6. On 19 December 2005 the first-instance court held that the applicant had not specified the value of his claim to an extend allowing the court to rule on it. Furthermore, the court pointed out that it could not take into consideration his submissions of 2001 since they had been made in proceedings which had terminated with a final decision in 2003. As the applicant could not seek that those final proceedings be resumed, the court rejected the applicant’s request. This decision was confirmed on appeal by the Skopje Court of Appeal on 15 June 2006.
7. On 11 August 2008 the applicant contested these decisions by means of an appeal on points of law. On 30 January 2008 the Supreme Court allowed the applicant’s appeal, quashed the lower courts’ decisions and remitted the case for fresh examination. The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:
“... In the present case, the first-instance court correctly ordered [the applicant] to make the claim more specific. According to [this] court, [the applicant] complied with this order and with submissions of 15 December 2005, he specified the claim ... According to the Supreme Court, the claim is (sufficiently) specified and the proceedings can continue. The lower courts’ decisions to reject the claim as incomplete (неуредна) are wrong.
In view of the foregoing, (the court) decided in accordance with ... the Civil Proceedings Act of 1998, which was in force when the first-instance court delivered its decision ...”
8. By decisions of 7 November 2008 and 21 May 2009 respectively, the first-instance court and the Appeal Court both dismissed the applicant’s claim on the merits.
9. On 21 July 2009 the applicant challenged these decisions by means of an appeal on points of law.
10. By a decision of 17 February 2011, the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s appeal as inadmissible ratione valoris, finding that the value of the claim was below the statutory threshold specified in section 372 § 2 of the 2005 Civil Proceedings Act (see paragraph 14 below). The court established that the subject matter of the dispute was the payment of salary supplements. Since it did not concern “termination of employment”, which was specified, under section 372(3) of the 2005 Civil Proceedings Act, as a dispute in which an appeal on points of law was always allowed irrespective of the value of the claim, the court declared the applicant’s appeal inadmissible. It further stated that:
“The [applicant] did not specify the value of the claim in his action. In such circumstances, the value of the claim is to be determined on the basis of the amount of court fees paid. The [applicant] paid court fees in the amount of 600 denars (Macedonian denars, MKD), which corresponds to the claim value of MKD 40,000, which is below the (statutory threshold) of MKD 500,000. The appeal on points of law is accordingly inadmissible given the (low) value of the claim.”
11. This decision was notified to the applicant on 30 March 2011.
B. Relevant domestic law
1. Civil Proceedings Act of 1998 (Official Gazette nos.33/1998 and 44/2002)
12. Section 368 §§ 1 and 2 of the 1998 Act provided that parties concerned could lodge an appeal on points of law against a second-instance final decision within thirty days of the service of that decision. An appeal would be inadmissible in a property-related dispute which, inter alia, concerned a pecuniary claim, if the value of the claim in the dispute as specified by the plaintiff did not exceed MKD 1,000,000.
13. Under paragraph 4 of that section an appeal was always allowed in disputes which concerned (i) maintenance; (ii) compensation claims for loss of maintenance due to death of the care provider; (iii) copyright disputes; (iv) industrial-property-related disputes; and disputes concerning unfair competition and anti-competitive behaviour.
2. Civil Proceedings Act of 2005 (published in Official Gazette no. 79/2005)
14. Under section 372 §§ 2 and 3, parties can lodge an appeal on points of law if the value of the claim in the dispute exceeds MKD 500,000. An appeal is always allowed irrespective of the value of the claim in disputes concerning (i) maintenance; (ii) compensation claims for loss of maintenance due to the death of the care provider; (iii) labour disputes concerning termination of employment; (iv) copyright disputes; (v) industrial-property-related disputes and disputes concerning unfair competition and anti-competitive behaviour.
15. Under section 474, if a first-instance decision was delivered before the 2005 Act became operable, the proceedings are conducted under the rules that were applicable at that time. If the first-instance decision was set aside after this Act became operable, the proceedings continue under this Act.
16. Under section 477, the 2005 Act entered into force on 29 September 2005 and it became operable on 29 December 2005.
COMPLAINT
17. The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that the Supreme Court had applied an inconsistent case-law in the same proceedings regarding his appeals on points of law.
THE LAW
18. The applicant complained about the allegedly conflicting decisions of the Supreme Court regarding his appeals on points of law. He relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. The parties’ submissions
19. The Government submitted that the Supreme Court’s decision of 30 January 2008 had been delivered under the 1998 Act, which, according to them, provided that an appeal on points of law was always allowed in labour disputes irrespective of the value of the claim. After the remittal, the proceedings continued under the 2005 Act, which became applicable under sections 474 and 477 of the 2005 Act. The applicant’s appeal on points of law of 21 July 2009 was rejected under section 372 of the 2005 Act, which listed “labour disputes concerning termination of employment” among exceptional cases in which appeals on points of law were always allowed, irrespective of the value of the claim. Since the applicant’s case did not concern termination of employment, but a pecuniary claim whose value was below the statutory threshold, the Supreme Court had correctly rejected the applicant’s appeal as inadmissible. Since the 2005 Act became applicable on 29 December 2005, the applicant must have known that his appeal of 2009 would have no prospect of success.
20. The applicant submitted that the Supreme Court should not reject his appeal, but, instead, should order him to pay court fees in an amount that would allow it to examine his appeal on the merits. He further alleged that he had been a victim of a plot with a political background.
B. The Court’s assessment
21. The Court reiterates that the right to a fair trial must be interpreted in the light of the Preamble to the Convention, which declares the rule of law to be part of the common heritage of the Contracting States. One of the fundamental aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal certainty (see Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999‑VII).
22. Furthermore, conflicting decisions in similar cases heard in the same court which, in addition, is the court of last resort in the matter may, in the absence of a mechanism which ensures consistency, breach that principle and thereby undermine public confidence in the judiciary (see Beian v. Romania (no. 1), no. 30658/05, §§ 36-39, ECHR 2007‑XIII; Tudor Tudor v. Romania, no. 21911/03, § 29, 24 March 2009; and Spaseski and others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), no. 15905/07, 27 September 2011), such confidence being one of the essential components of a State based on the rule of law. Consequently, the Contracting States have the obligation to organise their legal system so as to avoid the adoption of discordant judgments (see Nejdet Şahin and Perihan Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 13279/05, § 55, 20 October 2011).
23. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the impugned proceedings started in 2005 and ended in March 2011, when the Supreme Court’s decision was served on the applicant. The first- and second-instance courts initially rejected the applicant’s claim finding that it was not specific enough. Those decisions were set aside by the Supreme Court, which held that the applicant’s claim was sufficiently detailed and ordered the lower courts, in the renewed proceedings, to examine it on the merits. Given the fact that the first-instance court’s decision was delivered on 19 December 2005, namely before 29 December 2005, the date when 2005 Act became operable under section 474 of the 2005 Act (see paragraph 15 above), this first round of proceedings was conducted under the 1998 Act.
24. After the remittal, the proceedings continued under the 2005 Act. The first- and second-instance courts dismissed the applicant’s claim on the merits. By the decision of 17 February 2011, the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s appeal on points of law as inadmissible ratione valoris. The court held that the subject matter of the dispute concerned a pecuniary claim and that it did not fall under any exceptional category enumerated in section 372 § 3 of the 2005 Act, including “labour relations regarding termination of employment”. Accordingly, the admissibility of the applicant’s appeal was to be determined on the basis of the rule contained in sub-paragraph 2 of this provision. The Supreme Court found that the value of the applicant’s claim had been below the statutory threshold, and accordingly rejected his appeal as inadmissible. Having regard to its limited jurisdiction regarding the interpretation and application of the domestic law, the Court does not find any indication of arbitrariness as to the way in which the Supreme Court applied the rules concerning the admissibility of the applicant’s appeal on points of law. All the more so, the applicant did not argue that the value of his claim had been above the statutory threshold specified in the 2005 Act.
25. In such circumstances, the Court observes that the Supreme Court’s decisions of 2008 and 2011 concerned neither identical issues nor identical legal rules applied at the time when were they delivered.
26. The Supreme Court’s decision of 2008 concerned the lower courts’ finding that the applicant’s claim had not met the formal requirements to be examined on the merits, notably it had not been specific enough. It did not deal at all with the issue of admissibility of the applicant’s appeal. The decision of 2011 was rendered after the lower courts had dismissed the applicant’s claim on the merits and it concerned non-compliance of the applicant’s appeal on points of law with the admissibility rules specified in the 2005 Act, which in the meantime had become operable. For these reasons, the Court considers that the Supreme Court’s decisions do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the principle of legal certainty (see, in contrast, Balažoski v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, no. 45117/08, 25 April 2013).
27. It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 17 December 2015.
André Wampach,Päivi Hirvelä
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy