SECOND SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 57232/00
by Marta KISSOVÁ
against Slovakia
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 14 June 2001 as a Chamber composed of
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrA.B. Baka,
MrG. Bonello,
MrsV. Strážnická,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrM. Fischbach,
MrA. Kovler, judges,
and Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application introduced on 18 April 2000 and registered on 14 May 2000,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mrs Marta Kissová is a Slovakian national, born in 1946 and living in Nová Dedinka.
A. The circumstances of the case
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
On 20 October 1991 the applicant acquired, at a public auction, a business situated in a commercial centre in Bratislava in accordance with the relevant provisions of the State Property Transfer Act of 1990 (see “Relevant domestic law” below). On 22 October 1991 the owner of the premises in which the business was situated concluded a tenancy agreement with the applicant as required by Section 15 of the State Property Transfer Act. The tenancy agreement was concluded for a period expiring on 31 October 1996. On 23 February 1993 the ownership of the commercial centre was transferred to a private limited company.
As the new owner and the applicant failed to reach an agreement as regards the tenancy of the premises, the owner sued the applicant and claimed that she should vacate the premises.
On 6 September 1993 the Bratislava III District Court (then Obvodný súd, at present Okresný súd) granted the action and on 23 May 1994 the Bratislava City Court (Mestský súd) upheld this decision. The judgments stated, inter alia, that the original tenancy agreement of 22 October 1991 was void as it had not been approved by the competent administrative authority as required by the law. On 29 September 1994 the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law.
On 14 February 1994 the applicant filed an action with the Bratislava III District Court claiming that the new owner of the premises should be ordered to conclude a tenancy agreement with her for a five years’ period pursuant to Section 15 of the State Property Transfer Act. She joined the text of the agreement to be concluded to her action.
On 11 December 1996 the Bratislava III District Court granted the action and ordered the defendant to conclude a tenancy agreement with the applicant as suggested by the latter. The defendant appealed.
On 26 June 1998 the Bratislava Regional Court (Krajský súd) overturned the first instance judgment. The Regional Court held, inter alia, that the applicant had benefited from her right under Section 15 of the State Property Transfer Act in that she had concluded a tenancy agreement with the original owner.
On 10 September 1998 the applicant filed an appeal on points of law. She alleged that the tenancy agreement of 22 October 1991 was void and that she had not, therefore, used the premises de iure. She maintained that the period during which she had used the premises could therefore not be taken into consideration when determining her right under Section 15(1) of the State Property Transfer Act.
On 29 September 1999 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal on points of law. It established that the applicant had used the premises de facto for a certain time. In the Supreme Court’s view, it was irrelevant whether this use had been covered by a valid legal title when examining whether and to what extent the applicant’s right under Section 15(1) of the State Property Transfer Act had been respected. The Supreme Court concluded that the applicant was entitled to claim that the new owner should conclude a tenancy agreement with her only for the outstanding period, i.e. so that the overall period during which she would be able to effectively use the premises amounts to five years. The Supreme Court further recalled that in cases when a plaintiff seeks the injunction that an agreement be concluded and the draft text of such an agreement is joined to the action, a court can either grant the action or reject it, but it lacks jurisdiction to modify the terms of the agreement proposed by the plaintiff. The Supreme Court’s judgment was served on 28 October 1999.
B. Relevant domestic law
Section 15 of the State Property Transfer Act of 1990 (Zákon o prevodoch vlastníctva štátu k niektorým veciam na iné právnické alebo fyzické osoby, Coll. No. 427/1990), as in force until 31 October 1991, provides that a person who acquired a business under the provisions of this Act has the right to have an agreement on tenancy of the premises in which the business is located concluded with the owner of the premises or, as the case may be, his or her legal successor. The duration of the tenancy agreement should be two years unless the parties otherwise agree.
Under Section 15(1) of the State Property Transfer Act, as in force from 1 November 1991, the persons concerned have the right to have such a tenancy agreement concluded for a period of five years.
Under Section 15(2) of the State Property Transfer Act, as in force from 1 November 1991, when the person concerned and the owner of the premises fail to reach an agreement as regards the rent, its amount shall be determined by the competent administrative authority in accordance with the relevant law.
COMPLAINT
The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that her property rights were violated in that the courts dismissed her action for a tenancy agreement to be concluded with the new owner of the premises in which her business was located.
THE LAW
The applicant complains that her property rights were violated in that the courts failed to ensure respect for her right to have a tenancy agreement concluded in accordance with the relevant provisions of the State Property Transfer Act. She alleges a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which provides as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
The Court notes that in its judgment of 29 September 1999 the Supreme Court acknowledged that Section 15(1) of the State Property Transfer Act of 1990 entitled the applicant to have a tenancy agreement concluded with the owner of the premises so that she could run her business without disturbance. Thus the applicant had a legitimate and judicially enforceable expectation of obtaining effective tenancy of the premises in question. Her claim therefore constituted a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see, e.g., the Pine Valley Developments Ltd. and Others v. Ireland judgment of 29 November 1991, Series A no. 222, p. 23, § 51; the Pressos Companía Naviera S.A. v. Belgium judgment of 20 November 1995, Series A no. 332, p. 21, § 31).
In determining the modalities under which the applicant could realise her right to conclude a tenancy agreement the domestic courts controlled the use of her property within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It must therefore be established whether the interference complained of was lawful and proportionate to the aim pursued (see the Pine Valley Developments Ltd. and Others v. Ireland judgment cited above, pp. 25-26, §§ 57-59).
To the extent that the applicant complains that the courts did not apply the relevant law correctly, the Court recalls that it is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law. According to Article 19 of the Convention, the Court’s duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. It is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see Garcia Ruiz v. Spain, no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999-I and the Pine Valley Developments Ltd. and Others v. Ireland judgment cited above, pp. 23-24, § 52).
In its judgment of 29 September 1999 the Supreme Court found that the purpose of Section 15(1) of the State Property Transfer Act was to ensure that persons who acquired a business under the relevant provisions of that Act could run it without disturbance in that they were entitled to have a tenancy agreement concluded with the owner of the premises for a period of five years. It recalled that the applicant had used the premises de facto for a certain period under a tenancy agreement which courts had later found to be void. In its view, this period should nevertheless be taken into account when deciding on compliance with Section 15(1) of the State Property Transfer Act in the applicant’s case. In this context, the Supreme Court considered it irrelevant that the earlier use of the premises had not been covered by a valid legal title.
In the Court’s view, this decision was not arbitrary. Accordingly, the interference complained of was in accordance with the relevant domestic law, as interpreted and applied by the domestic courts. The control of use of the applicant’s property pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring that the relevant legislation be correctly applied in the particular circumstances of the case and that the principle of legal certainty be respected. It was, therefore, “in accordance with the general interest” for the purposes of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
In its judgment the Supreme Court confirmed that the applicant was entitled to have a tenancy agreement concluded with the new owner of the premises so that the overall period during which she would be able to run her business amounts to five years. In these circumstances, the Court sees no appearance of disproportionality in the decision complained of. The dismissal of the applicant’s action did not, therefore, infringe her right to peacefully enjoy her possessions guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy