KUIBISHEV v. BULGARIA

FOURTH SECTION

PARTIAL DECISION

Application no. 39271/98
by Valentin KUIBISHEV
against Bulgaria

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 18 January 2001 as a Chamber composed of

MrG. Ress, President,
MrI. Cabral Barreto,
MrV. Butkevych,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrJ. Hedigan,
MrM. Pellonpää,
MrsS. Botoucharova, judges,
and Mr V. Berger, Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application introduced with the European Commission of Human Rights on 5 November 1997 and registered on 9 January 1998,

Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a Bulgarian national, born in 1954 and living in Bulgaria. He is represented before the Court by Mr M. Ekimdjiev, a lawyer practising in Plovdiv.

A.  The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.

1.  The course of the criminal proceedings against the applicant

On 8 April 1993 a preliminary investigation was opened against the applicant who was suspected of a continuing serious offence of forgery of bank guarantees and their use with a view to obtaining bank credits for himself and one of his business partners (Section 212 of the Criminal Code).

On 14 July 1993 the investigator charged the applicant and ordered his detention pending trial on the ground that there was a danger of his absconding.

Between 1993 and 1996 the applicant resided in the Netherlands. He had submitted a request for asylum which was dismissed. Upon his return to Bulgaria, on 11 September 1996, he was arrested and detained pending trial.

The Public Prosecutor examined a handwriting expert report according to whom one of the signatures on the bank guarantee no. CK 1735 did not belong to the bank official whose name had been indicated but to the applicant. Other signatures in respect of both bank guarantees most probably did not belong to the persons whose names had been indicated. Both bank guarantees had been stamped with the same seal, which did not correspond to the seals used by the bank. The handwriting in the section “an outgoing number” of the bank guarantees was that of the applicant. The printed part of both the bank guarantees had been typed on the same typing machine.

On an unspecified date the preliminary investigation was concluded and on 4 June 1997 the Public Prosecutor submitted an indictment against the applicant to the Sofia City Court under Section 212 of the Criminal Code. The applicant was indicted because:

“[He was suspected of] having committed a continuing offence between 30 October 1992 and 11 December 1992 in Sofia, as he forged and used documents [bank guarantees nos. CK 1735 and CK 3085…] and tried to obtain material gain for himself and another natural person …”

The hearings of 4 July 1997, 12 September 1997 and 10 December 1997 before the Sofia City Court were adjourned as some of the summoned key witnesses did not appear before the court and there was a need to examine additional documents.

The trial resumed before the Sofia City Court on 26 January 1998, but it had to be adjourned again as the key witness did not appear.

On 15 June 1998 the applicant was acquitted of part of the initial charges under Section 212. The court further found that the applicant forged the bank guarantees in question with the intention to use them. He was found guilty under Sections 212 § 2 and 308 of the Criminal Code and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of five years. The court reserved its reasoning. The decision was not submitted by the applicant.

From the applicant’s submissions it cannot be established whether he became aware that the facts of his case were subsumed under Section 308 of the Criminal Code only when the verdict against him had been declared or at some prior stage of the trial.

On 24 June 1998 the applicant appealed against the judgment to the Sofia Appellate Court on the grounds, inter alia, that there was a breach of his right to defence as he had not been initially charged under Section 308 of the Criminal Code, and as the lower court erred in fact when it found that the applicant had forged the bank guarantees in question.

The Sofia Appellate Court cancelled the hearing scheduled for 12 February 1999 and transmitted the case-file back to the Sofia City Court as it found that the prosecution had appealed against the Sofia City Court’s decision before having been served with the reasoning.

On 28 May 1999 the Sofia Appellate Court found the applicant guilty of having forged bank guarantees with intention to use them (Section 308 of the Criminal Code) and acquitted him of the charges of serious fraud (Sections 209 and 210 of the Criminal Code). It accordingly reduced the applicant’s sentence to three years’ imprisonment. The decision was not submitted by the applicant.

On 25 June 1999 the applicant lodged an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of Cassation. He complained that he was found guilty of an offence of which he had not been previously charged and that therefore he could not prepare a proper defence. His appeal on points of law was dismissed on 10 December 2000. The decision was not submitted by the applicant.

2.  Other criminal proceedings against the applicant

On an unspecified date in 1992 the applicant was sentenced by the Peshtera District Court to a suspended term of imprisonment.

On 27 January 1997 the Pazardziski Regional Court upheld the Pazardziski District Court’s decision by which the applicant had been found guilty on misappropriation charges. The applicant was sentenced to ten months’ imprisonment. On 13 October 1997, the Supreme Court of Cassation quashed the judgment and terminated the criminal proceedings against the applicant in connection with that criminal offence as the prosecution had become time-barred.

3.  The applicant’s detention

On 11 September 1996 the applicant was arrested and detained pending trial.

On 23 April 1997 the applicant filed an application for release on bail with the Sofia City Court. On 2 May 1997, the court dismissed his application sitting in camera, as the applicant had been sentenced to ten months’ imprisonment by the Pazardziski Regional Court for having committed another offence.

On 12 May 1997 the applicant appealed against the above decision to the Supreme Court of Cassation through the Sofia City Court. On 16 May 1997 the latter confirmed the decision of 2 May 1997 but did not transmit the file to the Supreme Court of Cassation. The decision of 16 May 1997 stated there were no new facts militating for the applicant’s release and that his detention was prima facie necessary under Section 152 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see the relevant domestic law).

However, at the public hearing of 4 July 1997, thе Sofia City Court set aside its decision of 16 May 1997 and transmitted the appeal to the Supreme Court of Cassation.

On 7 August 1997 the Supreme Court of Cassation rejected the appeal on the ground that the applicant lacked a legal interest for this appeal to be examined, as an appeal against the decision of 4 July 1997 on the applicant’s appeal of 2 July 1997 was pending before it (see below).

At the hearing of 4 July 1997 the Sofia City Court dismissed the applicant’s fresh application for release of 2 July 1997. The applicant had argued that there had been insufficient evidence that he had committed the offence and that no evidence had been adduced as to the existence of a danger of his absconding, committing further offences or obstructing the course of justice. He had also relied on the Convention.

The court held, inter alia, that:

a)  there had been a danger of the applicant’s absconding as he and his wife had sought asylum in the Netherlands at the time when the investigation proceedings had been pending against him;

b)  the offence had been committed during the suspended term of imprisonment to which he had been sentenced in 1992 for having committed another offence, which was why there was a danger that he might commit further offences; and

c)  the courts were bound to implement domestic law even when it contravened Article 5 § 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights and other treaties ratified by Bulgaria.

On 7 July 1997 the applicant appealed against the decision to the Supreme Court of Cassation, through the Sofia City Court, on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence that he had committed the offence, and that all the witnesses had been heard and all other evidence examined. There was, therefore, no danger of his obstructing the course of justice. Confiscation of his passport and bail would be sufficient guarantees against absconding. He further argued that Article 5 § 4 of the Convention had been directly applicable in the domestic law. He also requested that his application for release be examined at a public hearing.

On 23 October 1997 the Supreme Court of Cassation, sitting in camera, upheld the Sofia City Court’s decision on the ground that there was a danger of the applicant’s absconding or committing further offences. The issue of whether there had been sufficient evidence or prima facie reasonable suspicion that a person committed an offence within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention could be settled only in the judgment at the end of the trial and not when taking a decision on an application for release. The Supreme Court of Cassation further held that the courts were not vested with the appropriate power to declare whether there was a contradiction between the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Convention.

On 10 December 1997 the applicant again appealed to the Sofia City Court against the detention order invoking a new fact in his favour. Indeed, on 13 October 1997, the Supreme Court of Cassation had quashed the judgment of 27 January 1997 of the Pazardziski Regional Court which had convicted the applicant for having misappropriated funds and which had been a ground on which the court had dismissed the applicant’s application for release on 2 May 1997. The applicant further invoked Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, arguing that his detention had been unreasonably long, that there had been no legitimate purpose in prolonging his detention and that the latter was contrary to the relevant treaties ratified by Bulgaria. The applicant’s application for release was dismissed on the same day as the court found that there was still a danger that he might abscond, in view of his stay in the Netherlands. The court also took due account of the fact that the other criminal proceedings against the applicant had been terminated on 13 October 1997 by the Supreme Court of Cassation. However, the applicant was suspected of having committed the offence in question during the suspended term of imprisonment to which he was sentenced by the Peshtera District Court for having committed another offence.

On 12 December 1997 the applicant lodged a subsequent appeal with the Supreme Court of Cassation. It was dismissed on 15 January 1998 at a closed hearing on the grounds that he was charged with a serious offence with intent and that there was a danger of his absconding.

The applicant’s application for release of 26 January 1998 was dismissed on the same day by the Sofia City Court on the grounds that he was charged with a serious offence with intent, that he had sought asylum in the Netherlands and that the offence with which he was charged had been committed at the time when he had been sentenced to a suspended term of imprisonment for having committed another offence. Therefore, there was a danger that the applicant might abscond or commit further offences.

On 29 January 1998 the applicant appealed against the above decision to the Supreme Court of Cassation. On 11 March 1998 the appeal was dismissed on the ground that he was charged with serious offences with intent, that there were no new facts militating for release and that there was a danger of his absconding.

B.  Relevant domestic law and practice

1.  Criminal Code

Section 212 provides that a person who misappropriated funds with the use of a forged document shall be sentenced to up to eight years’ imprisonment. In serious cases the perpetrator may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment between ten and twenty years.

Section 308 provides that a person who forges an official document with intention to use it shall be punished with a term of imprisonment of up to three years.

2.  Code of Criminal Procedure

(a)  Legal criteria for detention on remand

Paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of Section 152, as in force at the relevant time until August 1999, provide as follows:

“(1)  Detention on remand shall be imposed [in cases where the charges concern] a serious wilful crime.

(2)  In the cases falling under paragraph 1 [detention on remand] may not be imposed if there is no danger of the accused’s obstructing the course of justice, absconding or committing further offences.”

…

(4)  Detention on remand may also be imposed [in cases where the charges concern] offences other [then the ones] set out in paragraph 1 of this Section when they are punishable with a term of imprisonment, if:

1.  there is a danger of the detainee’s absconding, obstructing the course of justice or committing further offences.

…”

Paragraph 3 as in force until August 1997, provided as follows:

“(3)  The exception set out in paragraph 2 [of Section 152] shall not be applicable when another preliminary investigation is pending against the detainee as well as in the cases of recidivism.”

According to Section 93 paragraph 7 of the Criminal Code a “serious” crime is one punishable by more than five years' imprisonment.

According to the Supreme Court’s practice, Section 152 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure requires that a person charged with a “serious wilful crime” shall be detained pending trial. The only exception is provided for by Section 152 § 2 of the Code, which empowers the prosecutor not to detain an accused where it is clear beyond doubt that there is no danger of his absconding or committing further offences. Such a danger must be shown objectively not to exist as, for example, in the case of an accused who is seriously ill, or elderly, or is detained on other grounds such as serving a sentence (опред. No. 1 от 4.5.1992. по н.д. 1/92. на ВС II н.о., Сб. 1992/93, стр. 172; опред. No. 4 от 21.2.1995 по н.д. 76/95 на ВС II н.о.; опред. No. 78 от 6.11.1995 по н.д. 768/95 на ВС II н.о.; опред. No. 24 по н.д. 268/95 на ВС, I н.о., Сб.1995, стр. 149). In some other decisions, the Supreme Court has nevertheless embarked on an analysis of the particular facts to justify findings that there existed a danger of absconding or of offending (опред. No. 76 от 25.07.1997 по н.д. No. 507/97 на ВС II н.о., бюл. кн. 9-10/97, стр. 5; опред. No. 107 от 27.05.1998 по н.д. 257/98 на ВС II н.о., бюл. кн. 3-4/98, стр. 12).

(b)  Appeals against detention before the trial

Section 152 § 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as in force until August 1997, provided as follows:

“The detained person shall be provided immediately with a possibility of filing an appeal before the competent court against the [imposition of detention]. The court shall rule within a time-limit of three days from the filing of the appeal by means of a final decision.”

The First Criminal Division of the Supreme Court has held that, in deciding on appeals against detention on remand, it is not open to the court to inquire whether there exists sufficient evidence supporting the charges against the detainee, but only to examine the lawfulness of the detention order (опред. No. 24 от 23.5.1995 по н.д. 268/95, I н.о. на ВС, Сб. 1995, стр. 149).

In a decision of 17 September 1992 the First Criminal Division of the Supreme Court found that the imposition of detention on remand could be contested before a court only once (опред. No. 94 по н.ч.х.д. 754/92, I н.о. на ВС, Сб. 1992-93, стр. 173). Until the amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure in August 1997 periodic judicial review of the lawfulness of detention on remand was only possible at the trial stage, when the criminal case was pending before a court.

(c)  Appeals against detention during the trial

Under Section 304 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the detainee's requests for release at the trial stage of the criminal proceedings are examined by the trial court. The Code does not provide for any limitation on the number or frequency of the requests for release. It follows from Section 304 §§ 1 and 2 that such requests may be examined in camera or at an oral hearing. The law does not require the trial court to decide within a particular time-limit.

The trial court's decision, as regards a request for release, is subject to appeal to a higher court (Section 344 § 3). The appeal must be lodged within seven days (Section 345) with the trial court (Section 348 § 4 in conjunction with Section 317, until February 1998 and Section 318). According to Section 347, after receiving the appeal, the trial court, sitting in camera, shall decide whether there are reasons to annul or alter its decision. If it finds no such reasons, the trial court transmits the appeal to the higher court.

Section 348 provides that the appellate court may examine the appeal in camera or, if it considers it necessary, at a public hearing. The law does not require the appellate court to rule within a particular time-limit.

(d)  Appeal proceedings

Under Sections 312, 314 and 315, which came into force in April 1998, the appellate court reviews whether the first instance court’s decision is lawful, well-founded and just. The appellate court has jurisdiction to examine all the evidence admissible under the Code of Criminal Procedure and to assess matters of fact.

COMPLAINTS

1.  The applicant complains under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that his detention was unlawful as he was detained in breach of the “procedure prescribed by law”.

2.  The applicant complains under Articles 5 §§ 1 and 3, 13 and 14 of the Convention that by virtue of an amendment introduced to the Code of Criminal Procedure on 13 August 1997, which limited the length of detention of detainees against whom a preliminary investigation was still pending, he was discriminated against in comparison with persons who were detained after that date, as the amendment was not retroactive. He was also discriminated against as this limitation of the period of detention only applied to the detainees against whom an indictment had not yet been submitted to the court.

3.  The applicant complains under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that he was not brought promptly before a judge. He argues, in particular, that the investigator before whom he was brought could not be regarded as officer exercising judicial power within the meaning of this Article. He also invokes Article 13 of the Convention.

4.  He further complains under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention that his detention was unreasonably long, as the case was not of great complexity. The hearings were scheduled with at least one-month time difference and no procedural activities were carried out by the authorities in the meanwhile. He also invokes Article 13 of the Convention.

5.  The applicant complains under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention that on 2 May 1997 the Sofia City Court dismissed his application sitting in camera in breach of the “equality of arms” principle. He also invokes Article 13 of the Convention.

He further complains that the Supreme Court of Cassation took its decisions of 7 August 1997, 23 October 1997 and 15 January 1998 in camera.

6.  He complains under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention that the judicial review of his detention was purely formal. The courts only examined whether the applicant had been charged with a serious crime with intent and refused to release him stating that another preliminary investigation was pending against him. He complains in particular about the Supreme Court of Cassation’s decision of 23 October 1997, in which that court stated that domestic courts did not have jurisdiction to assess whether domestic law was compatible with the Convention.

7.  He complains under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention of the impossibility to obtain a periodic judicial review of the lawfulness of detention until the day the preliminary investigation was concluded.

8.  He also complains under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention that his applications for release were not examined speedily by the courts. For example, his application for release submitted on 7 July 1997 was examined by the Supreme Court of Cassation on 23 October 1997.

9.  He further complains under Article 6 § 1 that the criminal proceedings against him which commenced in 1993 were unreasonably long.

10.  The applicant complains under Article 6 § 3 (a) and (b) of the Convention that he was convicted for an offence with which he had not been previously charged and that, therefore, he could not prepare a proper defence and apply for the taking of additional evidence. He complains that nothing in the indictment indicated that he might have been charged with having forged bank guarantees with the intention to use them and that the legal classification of that particular offence was missing from the indictment.

THE LAW

1.  The applicant’s complaints under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention

(a)  The applicant complains under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that his detention was unlawful.

Article 5 § 1, insofar as relevant, provides as follows:

“Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:

(a)  the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;

…

(c)  the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;

…”

In the light of all the material in its possession, the Court does not find any indication that the applicant’s detention was at any moment unlawful or ordered otherwise than “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1. It further considers that the detention until 15 June 1998 fell within the ambit of Article 5 § 1 (c) of the Convention, as it was ordered for the purpose of bringing the applicant before the competent legal authority on the suspicion of having committed criminal offences. As regards the alleged lack of a reasonable suspicion, the Court is not convinced by the applicant’s arguments in this respect. The charges against the applicant were based on documents, testimonies and other evidence which indicated that he might have forged bank guarantees and used them with a view to obtaining an unlawful gain for others.

Insofar as the applicant’s complaint also concerns his detention pending appeal, the Court observes that a detention “after conviction by a competent court” falls under Article 5 § 1 (a) of the Convention, even if it is considered as detention on remand under domestic law (the B. v. Austria judgement of 28 March 1990, Series A no. 175, pp. 14-16, §§ 35-40).

In this respect, the Court finds nothing capable of showing that the applicant’s conviction had no basis in domestic law or was arbitrary.

It follows that the complaint under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention is inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and that it must be rejected under Article 35 § 4.

(b)  The applicant complains under Articles 5 §§ 1 and 3, 13 and 14 of the Convention that by virtue of an amendment introduced to the Code of Criminal Procedure on 13 August 1997, he was discriminated against in comparison with persons who were detained after that date as the amendment did not have a retroactive effect. He also complains that he was discriminated against as this limitation of the period of detention only applied to the detainees against whom an indictment had not yet been submitted to the court.

The Court finds nothing in the applicant’s submissions or the materials in the case which would give rise to an issue under Articles 5 §§ 1 and 3, 13 and 14 of the Convention.

It follows that the above complaints are inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention and must be rejected under Article 35 § 4.

2.  The applicant’s complaints under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention

The applicant complains under Articles 5 § 3 and 13 of the Convention that he was not brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power, that his pre-trial detention was unreasonably long and that he does not have an effective remedy in this respect.

The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case-file, determine the admissibility of these complaints and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.

3.  The applicant’s complaints under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention

Article 5 § 4 provides as follows:

“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”

(a)  The applicant complains under Article 5 § 4 and 13 of the Convention that on 2 May 1997, the Sofia City Court dismissed his application sitting in camera in breach of the “equality of arms” principle and that he does not have an effective remedy in this respect. He also complains that the Supreme Court of Cassation took its decisions of 7 August 1997, 23 October 1997 and 1 January 1998 in camera.

The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case-file, determine the admissibility of these complaints and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.

(b)  The applicant complains under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention that the judicial review of his detention was purely formal.

The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case-file, determine the admissibility of these complaints and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.

(c)  The applicant complains under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention about the impossibility to obtain a periodical judicial review of the lawfulness of his detention until the day the preliminary investigation was concluded.

The Court notes that the applicant was detained on 11 September 1996 and that he filed his first application for release with a domestic court only on 23 April 1997, even though according to the domestic law he could immediately appeal the detention order to a court. On 4 June 1997 an indictment was already submitted to the competent court and the proceedings entered in the trial stage. At that stage the domestic law does not provide for any limitation on the number or frequency of the requests for release. In these particular circumstances, the Court considers that the applicant cannot complain that it was impossible for him to obtain a periodic judicial review of the lawfulness of his detention.

It follows that the above complaint is inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

(d)  The applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention that his applications for release were not examined speedily by the courts.

The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case-file, determine the admissibility of these complaints and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.

4.  The applicant’s complaints under Article 6 of the Convention

(a)  The applicant complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the criminal proceedings against him were unreasonably long.

The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case-file, determine the admissibility of this complaint and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.

(b)  The applicant complains under Article 6 § 3 (a) and (b) of the Convention that he was convicted for an offence with which he had not been previously charged, and that therefore he could not prepare a proper defence.

This Article, insofar as relevant, provides as follows:

“Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:

(a)  to be informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;

(b)  to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;

…”

According to the Pelissier and Sassi v. France judgment, the scope of the above provision must in particular be assessed in the light of the more general right to a fair hearing guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In criminal matters the provision of full, detailed information concerning the charges against a defendant, and consequently the legal characterisation that the court might adopt in the matter, is an essential prerequisite for ensuring that the proceedings are fair (Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 52, 25 March 1999, unpublished).

The Court further considered that sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 6 § 3 were connected and that the right to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation had to be considered in the light of the accused’s right to prepare his defence (ibid, § 54).

In the instant case, the indictment stated that the applicant was suspected of having forged bank guarantees by which he tried to obtain material gain for himself and another natural person. Although in the indictment the more complex Section 212 of the Criminal Code was explicitly mentioned, the elements of the offence set out in Section 308 of the Criminal Code were clearly stated, i.e. forgery of an official document with intention to use it. Therefore, the Court considers that the applicant, who was assisted by a lawyer, at that stage ought to have been aware of the possibility that a verdict that he forged bank guarantees with intention to use them might have been reached by the court.

The Court further recalls that the trial court should have afforded the applicant the possibility of exercising his defence rights on the issue in a practical and effective manner and, in particular, in good time. The applicant only complains that Section 308 of the Criminal Code was not mentioned in the indictment and that therefore his right to prepare a proper defence was curtailed. However, from his submissions it cannot be established that he became aware that the facts of his case were also classified under Section 308 of the Criminal Code only when the verdict against him had been declared or at some prior stage of the trial.

Regarding the applicant’s right to defence, the Court further notes that before the Appellate Court which has jurisdiction to reassess matters of fact by the first instance court, the applicant was able to present his defence regarding Section 308 of the Criminal Code and to request examination of witnesses and to adduce new evidence.

In the light of the above, the Court concludes that there has been no breach of the applicant’s rights to be informed in detail of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence.

It follows that the complaint under Article 6 § 3 (a) and (b) is inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Decides to adjourn the examination of the applicant’s complaints that he was not brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power, that his pre-trial detention was unreasonably long and that he does not have an effective domestic remedy in this respect, that on several occasions his applications for release were not examined speedily, that the Sofia City Court and the Supreme Court of Cassation took their decisions on the applicant’s detention in camera, that the judicial review of his applications for release was purely formal and that the criminal proceedings against him were unreasonably long;

Declares inadmissible the remainder of the application.

Vincent BergerGeorg Ress
RegistrarPresident

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