Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC]

Information Note on the Court’s case-law 189

October 2015

Kudrevičius and Others v. Lithuania [GC] - 37553/05

Judgment 15.10.2015 [GC]

Article 11

Article 11-1

Freedom of peaceful assembly

Criminal sanctions for farmers blocking traffic on major roads for two days: no violation

Facts – The applicant farmers obtained authority to stage a peaceful protest to draw attention to the Government’s alleged lack of action in response to agricultural sector problems. The demonstrations were initially held peacefully as per the authorisations. However, negotiations with the Government stagnated. In order to put pressure on the Government, the applicants went beyond the authorisations and blocked three major highways for two days causing significant disruption. The blockage ended when their demands were met. The applicants were subsequently convicted of “rioting” and sentenced to 60 days’ imprisonment, suspended for one year. They were also ordered not to leave their places of residence for more than seven days without the authorities’ prior agreement.

In a judgment of 26 November 2013 a Chamber of the Court held, by four votes to three, that there had been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention (see Information Note 168). On 14 April 2014 the case was referred to the Grand Chamber at the Government’s request.

Law – Article 11

(a) Applicability – The applicants’ conviction had not been based on any involvement in or incitement to violence, but on the breach of public order resulting from the roadblocks. The disruption of traffic was not a side-effect of a meeting held in a public place, but rather the result of intentional action by the farmers. However, physical conduct purposely obstructing traffic and the ordinary course of life in order to seriously disrupt the activities carried out by others was not at the core of freedom of assembly as protected by Article 11, which might have implications for any assessment of “necessity” to be carried out under the second paragraph of that provision. At the same time, the applicants’ conduct was not of such a nature and degree as to remove their participation in the demonstration from the scope of protection of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly. There was no indication that they had undermined the foundations of a democratic society. Article 11 was therefore applicable.

(b) Merits – The applicants’ conviction amounted to an interference with their right to freedom of peaceful assembly. The interference had a legal basis in the domestic law. The domestic courts’ interpretation of the relevant provision of the Criminal Code was neither arbitrary nor unpredictable. The permits to hold peaceful assemblies contained a warning about the possible liability of the organisers. Moreover, it should have been clear to the applicants that disobeying the lawful and explicit orders of the police to lift the roadblocks could engage their responsibility. The impugned interference was thus “prescribed by law” and had pursued the legitimate aims of the “prevention of disorder” and of the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others”.

The moving of the demonstrations from the authorised areas onto the highways had been a clear violation of the conditions stipulated in the permits. That action had been taken without any prior notice to the authorities and without asking them to amend the terms of the permits. The applicants could not have been unaware of those requirements. Furthermore, their action had not been justified by a need for an immediate response to a current event. The Court had no reason to question the assessment of the domestic courts that the farmers had had at their disposal alternative and lawful means to protect their interests, such as the possibility of bringing complaints before the administrative courts.

In so far as the intentional roadblocks were aimed at pressuring the Government to accept the farmers’ demands, that feature distinguished the instant case from those in which the Court had observed that demonstrations might cause a certain level of disruption to ordinary life, including disruption to traffic. In cases where demonstrators tried to prevent or alter the exercise of an activity carried out by others, the Court had concluded that the inflicting of sanctions had been a reaction proportionate to the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others. The same conclusion should a fortiori be reached in the instant case, as the actions of the demonstrators had not been directly aimed at an activity of which they disapproved, but at the physical blocking of another activity which had no direct connection with the object of their protest.

As could be seen from the Court’s case-law, the intentional serious disruption, by demonstrators, to ordinary life and to the activities lawfully carried out by others, to a more significant extent than that caused by the normal exercise of the right of peaceful assembly in a public place, might be considered a “reprehensible act” and therefore justify the imposition of penalties, even of a criminal nature. Even though the applicants had not performed acts of violence or incited others to engage in such acts, the almost complete obstruction of three major highways in blatant disregard of police orders and of the needs and rights of the road users had constituted conduct which could be described as “reprehensible”. Bearing in mind the margin of appreciation to be accorded in such circumstances, the respondent State had clearly been entitled to consider that the interests of protecting public order outweighed those of the applicants in resorting to roadblocks as a means for the farmers to achieve a breakthrough in their negotiations with the Government.

As to the conduct of the authorities, the police had confined themselves to ordering the applicants to remove the roadblocks and to warning them about their possible liability. They had chosen not to disperse the gatherings even when the applicants refused to obey their lawful orders. When tensions had arisen between the farmers and the truck drivers, the police had urged the parties to the conflict to calm down in order to avoid serious confrontations. Despite the serious disruptions caused by the applicants’ conduct the authorities had thus showed a high degree of tolerance. They had, moreover, attempted to balance the interests of the demonstrators with those of the users of the highways, in order to ensure the peaceful conduct of the gathering and the safety of all citizens, thus satisfying any positive obligation that they might be considered to have had.

As to the sanctions imposed on the applicants, the penalty applied was a lenient 60-day custodial sentence whose execution had been suspended for one year. The applicants had not been sentenced to pay fines and the only actual consequence of their conviction was the obligation, lasting one year, to obtain authorisation if they wanted to leave their places of residence for more than seven days. Such inconvenience did not seem disproportionate when compared to the serious disruption of public order provoked by the applicants.

Lastly, since there was no uniform approach among the member States as to the legal characterisation – as a criminal or an administrative offence – of the obstruction of traffic on a public highway, the domestic authorities had not overstepped the limits of their wide margin of appreciation by holding the applicants criminally liable for their conduct. The fact that other individuals might have obtained more lenient treatment did not necessarily imply that the sanctions imposed on the applicants had been disproportionate.

In sum, the domestic authorities had struck a fair balance between the legitimate aims of the “prevention of disorder” and of the “protection of the rights and freedoms of others”, on the one hand, and the requirements of freedom of assembly on the other, and based their decisions on an acceptable assessment of the facts and on reasons which were relevant and sufficient.

It was not necessary for the Court to address the arguments put forward by the parties in order to determine whether the measures adopted by the authorities could have been justified in the light of the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).* The role of the CJEU had been to establish whether the EU member States had complied with their obligation to ensure the free movement of goods, while the Court’s task in the instant case was to determine whether there had been an infringement of the applicants’ right to freedom of assembly.

Conclusion: no violation (unanimously).

(See Bukta and Others v. Hungary, 25691/04, 17 July 2007, Information Note 99; Lucas v. the United Kingdom (dec.), 39013/02, 18 March 2003; Barraco v. France, 31684/05, 5 March 2009, Information Note 117)

* Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte and Planzüge v. Austria (C-112/00, judgment of 12 June 2003) and Commission v. France (C-265/95, judgment of 9 December 1997).

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This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.

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