FIRST SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 9839/03
by Lyubov KUZNETSOVA
against Russia
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 24 May 2007 as a Chamber composed of:
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrL. Loucaides,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrA. Kovler,
MrsE. Steiner,
MrK. Hajiyev,
MrD. Spielmann, judges,
and Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 10 March 2003,
Having regard to the decision to apply Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and examine the admissibility and merits of the case together.
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mrs Lyubov Yevgenyevna Kuznetsova, is a Russian national who was born in 1957 and lives in Volgograd. The Russian Government were represented by Mr P. Laptev, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
1. Commercial proceedings
The applicant purchased a flat from a private company. It subsequently transpired that the flat was under charge. On 6 October 1999 and 9 March 2000 the Commercial Court of the Volgograd Region declared the sale of the flat to the applicant void ab initio and transferred the title to it to a Mrs S.
2. Civil proceedings
On 31 May 2000 the applicant sued the original seller, claiming recognition of her title to the flat. By judgment of 28 June 2000 the Krasnooktyabrskiy District Court of Volgograd accepted her claim. This judgment became final. On 3 October 2000 it was set aside because the judgment of 9 March 2000 had not been taken into account, and the proceedings resumed.
Having re-examined the applicant’s claim against the original seller, on 26 December 2000 the District Court discontinued the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. On 31 May 2001 the Presidium of the Volgograd Regional Court re-opened the proceedings by way of supervisory review. On 13 July 2001 the District Court issued a new decision discontinuing the proceedings, which was again quashed by way of supervisory review on 24 August 2001 for similar reasons.
Between 8 October 2001 and 22 January 2002, and then between 18 February and 27 March 2002 the proceedings were either adjourned or stayed upon the applicant’s requests. On 4 April 2002 the Krasnooktyabrskiy District Court rejected the applicant’s claim for recognition as a good faith purchaser of the flat. The applicant appealed to the Volgograd Regional Court. After she had complied with the formal requirements, her appeal was scheduled for hearing. On 25 September 2002 its examination was adjourned until 9 October 2002 due to the applicant’s illness. On 9 October 2002 the Volgograd Regional Court quashed the judgment of 4 April 2002 and remitted the case for a re-examination. It found that the District Court had failed to examine some of the applicant’s claims and relevant circumstances of the case.
In November and December 2002 and January 2003 the proceedings were stayed at the other party’ requests. The applicant did not challenge these suspensions of the proceedings.
By judgment of 12 March 2003 the Krasnooktyabrskiy District Court dismissed again the applicant’s claim. On 25 March and 23 May 2003 the judgment was rectified. On 30 July 2003 the Volgograd Regional Court quashed the judgment and remitted the matter to the district court for a fresh decision. The proceedings were stayed on 30 September until 28 November 2003 due to Mrs S.’s illness. The hearings scheduled for 25 February and 3 March 2004 were adjourned because the presiding judge T. was involved in another case or had a meeting in the town hall.
On 31 March 2004 the Krasnooktyabrskiy District Court stayed the proceedings at the other party’s request. On 11 August 2004 the Volgograd Regional Court quashed that decision. On 3 September 2004 the District Court rejected as unfounded the applicant’s bias complaint in respect of judge T. and adjourned the hearing at the other party’s request.
By judgment of 9 September 2004 the Krasnooktyabrskiy District Court declared the sale of the flat void ab initio and ordered the respondent company to pay 405,935 Russian roubles to the applicant. The Volgograd Regional Court upheld that judgment on 3 February 2005.
3. Other proceedings
In a litigation between the original seller and third persons, including Mrs S., on 8 December 2000 the Krasnooktyabrskiy District Court upheld Mrs S.’s title to the flat. The court refused to process the applicant’s appeal against the judgment on the ground that she had no standing in those proceedings. Apparently, the applicant did not appeal against this refusal.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complained that the length of the civil proceedings regarding her title to the flat had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. She also alleged that Judge T. had not been impartial and had wrongly decided the case.
2. The applicant complained under Article 13 that she had no effective remedy against the excessive length of the civil proceedings.
3. Referring to Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.1, the applicant complained that the State had not been found liable for the unlawful sale of the flat and that she had not been able to appeal against the judgments of 9 March and 8 December 2000.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complained about an excessive length of the civil proceedings under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which provides as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
The Government considered that the proceedings had ended on 12 March 2003. They submitted that their length was accounted for by the complexity of the case and the applicant’s frequent recourse to the appeal procedures to challenge procedural decisions given in the case. The applicant, her representative and other parties had often defaulted which had led to adjournments. The proceedings had been stayed on several occasions upon the applicant’s or the other party’ requests.
The applicant submitted that the proceedings had been unlawfully stayed several times, in particular in 2001 and 2003. She acknowledged her responsibility for certain delays preceding the judgment of 4 April 2002.
The Court notes that the proceedings in question began on 31 May 2000, when the applicant lodged her civil action, and ended on 3 February 2005, when the Volgograd Regional Court took the final judgment in the case. The period between 28 June 2000, when the first judgment was given, and 3 October 2000, when it was quashed, shall not be included in the overall duration of the proceedings (see Markin v. Russia (dec.), no. 59502/00, 16 September 2004). The same applies to the periods from 26 December 2000 to 31 May 2001, and from 13 July to 24 August 2001. The proceedings therefore took three years and nearly ten months. During this period the case was examined several times by the courts at two levels of jurisdiction.
The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and that of the relevant authorities, and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII).
The Court considers that the applicant’s civil case was a relatively complex one. The domestic courts had to rule on conflicting claims of two persons who claimed title to the flat and determine liability of two companies. However, the Court cannot accept that the complexity of the case, taken on its own, was such as to justify the overall length of the proceedings (see Malinin v. Russia (dec.), no. 58391/00, 8 July 2004).
As to the applicant’s conduct, the Court reiterates that the applicant cannot be blamed for taking full advantage of the resources afforded by national law in the defence of her interests (see, among others, Sokolov v. Russia, no. 3734/02, § 38, 22 September 2005). However, it should be noted that on several occasions the proceedings were stayed or hearings were adjourned at her request. The Court finds that the applicant is, at least in part, responsible for the delays in the proceedings that occurred between 8 October 2001 and 22 January 2002, and between 18 February and 27 March 2002. The delay in the processing of her appeal against the judgment of 4 April 2002 is also imputable to the applicant. On several occasions the applicant and her representative did not attend the hearings. The Court finally notes that the applicant did not object to decisions by which the proceedings were stayed.
As regards the conduct of the authorities, the Court recalls that only delays attributable to the State may justify a finding of a failure to comply with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 (see Des Fours Walderode v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 40057/98, 4 March 2003). In the present case, the Court considers that the overall period less the period attributable to the applicant’s conduct leaves the authorities accountable for approximately three years and five months. The Court observes that the case has been remitted several times to the first instance court for a re-examination and recalls that in principle the involvement of numerous instances does not absolve the judicial authorities from the obligation to comply with the “reasonable time” requirement (see Ivanova v. Russia (dec.), no. 74705/01, 1 April 2004). However, the Court does not find that the overall length of the proceedings in the present case was seriously affected by any significant delays caused, for example, by the first instance court’s failure to remedy any procedural defects identified in the course of the proceedings and to re-examine properly the case (compare, Uglanova v. Russia, no. 3852/02, § 34, 21 September 2006). There were no lengthy periods of inactivity attributable to the State apart from a delay caused by the suspension of the proceedings on 31 March 2004 until early September 2004. Otherwise, hearings were scheduled at regular intervals and the parties’ requests were promptly examined.
Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the Court finds that the “reasonable time” requirement has been complied with. It follows that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
2. The applicant also complained that she had no effective domestic remedy at her disposal for the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, as required under Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.”
The Court recalls that Article 13 guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they may happen to be secured in the domestic legal order. The effect of Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the substance of an “arguable” complaint under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 157, ECHR 2000‑XI).
Referring to the foregoing considerations under Article 6 § 1, the Court concludes that in the present case the applicant has no “arguable” complaint under that provision (see Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A no. 131, p. 24, § 54). It follows that her complaint under Article 13 is manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
3. The Court has also examined the remainder of the applicant’s complaints as submitted by her. However, having regard to all the material in its possession, it finds that these complaints do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Decides to discontinue the application of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention and declares the application inadmissible.
Søren NielsenChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy