FIFTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 49472/19
Natalya Mykhaylivna KYRYCHENKO
against Ukraine
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 20 November 2025 as a Committee composed of:
María Elósegui, President,
Andreas Zünd,
Mykola Gnatovskyy, judges,
and Martina Keller, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 49472/19) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 11 September 2019 by a Ukrainian national, Ms Natalya Mykhaylivna Kyrychenko (“the applicant”), who was born in 1979 and lives in Nikolpol;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The case concerns the applicant’s complaint about the outcome of civil proceedings brought by her. She relied on Articles 1, 6, 13, 14 and 17 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
2. The applicant used to work for a fire brigade unit (“the unit”) which was registered as a separate legal entity but was subordinate to the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (“the SES”).
3. The applicant was made redundant in May 2016. She alleged that the reason for her redundancy was that she had complained about not being paid her wages in full.
4. On 13 July 2017 the Nikopol Local Court awarded the applicant certain amounts which had been due to her on her dismissal but had not been paid.
5. Domestic law provides that, if amounts due to an employee leaving his or her post are not paid in full, the employee can claim, as compensation, his or her average wage in respect of the whole period from the termination of employment to the date of full settlement (“average-wage compensation”).
6. On 17 January 2018 the applicant lodged a claim against the unit, seeking average-wage compensation.
7. On 19 January 2018 the SES decided to liquidate the unit. As part of the liquidation process, it appointed a liquidation commission and set a time-limit of two months for the submission of creditors’ claims.
8. On 25 April 2018 the applicant lodged a claim against the SES which was identical to the one she had lodged against the unit. The applicant sought to demonstrate that the unit was a separate legal entity only on paper as it had no separate assets and was entirely subject to the SES’s instructions. She also asserted that the SES was acting in bad faith as the representative of the unit and that she in fact had to be considered an employee of the SES.
9. On 14 November 2018 the Nikopol Local Court rejected the claim. Concerning the applicant’s complaints against the unit, the court held that, after the liquidation procedure had started, the collection of any sums due from the unit had been possible only by applying to the liquidation commission and asking the liquidator to add a claim to the register of accepted creditors’ claims; however, the applicant had failed to make such an application. In support of that finding, the court referred to a decision of the Supreme Court concerning the liquidation of a bank. As to the applicant’s complaints against the SES, the court held that, being a separate entity, the SES was not a successor to the unit and could not be held liable for its obligations.
10. In her subsequent appeals the applicant argued that the chairman of the liquidation commission should have represented the unit in court but had avoided doing so. Having known about the applicant’s claim in court, he had been under an obligation to include it in the register but had failed to do so. In so far as the claim related to the SES, the applicant argued that the independence of the unit had been purely fictitious, and that it had not been a separate entity but merely a de facto representative of the SES.
11. On 12 March 2019 the Dnipro Court of Appeal upheld the first‑instance court judgment.
12. On 15 April 2019 the Supreme Court declared a further appeal by the applicant inadmissible ratione valoris (see Azyukovska v. Ukraine [Committee] (dec.), no. 26293/18, § 10, 9 October 2018).
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
13. The applicant, without formulating any specific arguments, relied on Articles 1, 6, 13, 14 and 17 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. She stated that she had not received her wages in full while working for her former employer and that when she had complained about the matter she had been dismissed. The first‑instance court had “allowed the defendant to avoid liability [and had] flagrantly breached domestic legislation”, a situation which the higher courts had not corrected. The courts had dragged out the examination of the case in favour of the defendant and inflicted non-pecuniary damage on the applicant (who had been dismissed for “invented reasons”) instead of protecting her property rights in respect of her salary. That conduct had breached Article 3 of the Constitution of Ukraine, which provided that “[t]he human being, his or her life and health, honour and dignity, inviolability and security are recognised in Ukraine as the highest social value”. Under Article 41 of the Constitution, “[e]veryone has the right to own, use and dispose of his or her property, and the results of his or her intellectual and creative activity”.
14. The Court observes that the applicant did not cite any specific grievances under the Convention but simply disagreed with the outcome of the proceedings, without formulating any specific arguments in that regard.
15. In this connection, the Court reiterates that it is not its task to take the place of the domestic courts. It is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic legislation. The Court is not a court of appeal from the national courts and it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, § 186, 6 November 2018, with further references). The Court should not act as a court of fourth instance and will not therefore question under Article 6 § 1 the national courts’ assessment, unless their findings can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable (see López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], nos. 1874/13 and 8567/13, § 149, 17 October 2019, with further references).
16. The applicant was given an opportunity to raise her factual and legal arguments before the domestic courts. Those arguments were duly examined by the courts, which provided reasons for their decisions. The Court does not find that the courts’ decisions were arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable. Although the applicant disagreed with the outcome of the proceedings, there is no indication that there were any restrictions on her ability to participate in them effectively and make submissions.
17. To the extent that the applicant complained about the length of proceedings, they lasted from 17 January 2018 to 15 April 2019 at three levels of jurisdiction, which is not excessive.
18. In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the complaints under Article 6 of the Convention are manifestly ill‑founded, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.
19. The applicant relied on Article 14 of the Convention but did not explain in what way she had been treated differently or on what grounds. Her complaint in that regard amounts in essence to a mere disagreement with the outcome of the proceedings (compare Kinský v. the Czech Republic, no. 42856/06, §§ 119‑21, 9 February 2012). Accordingly, it is manifestly ill‑founded, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.
20. The Court further considers that the applicant’s grievances in the present case fall outside the scope of Article 17 of the Convention (see Mozer v. the Republic of Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 11138/10, § 222, 23 February 2016) and any complaint in that regard is manifestly ill‑founded, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.
21. As for the applicant’s reference to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court does not discern any arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable finding in the decisions of the domestic courts that would amount to an unjustified interference with the applicant’s property rights. This complaint is, therefore, also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention.
22. Lastly, concerning the complaint under Article 13, inasmuch as it can be considered as a separate complaint, the Court, in view of the above conclusions, is of the opinion that in the circumstances of the present case the applicant did not have any arguable grievance in terms of the Convention and that Article 13 does not apply (see Walter v. Italy (dec.), no. 18059/06, 11 July 2006). It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention.
23. It follows that the application is inadmissible and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 11 December 2025.
Martina Keller María Elósegui
Deputy Registrar President