FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 66073/01
by Milan ĽALÍK
against Slovakia
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 18 June 2002 as a Chamber composed of
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrM. Pellonpää,
MrsE. Palm,
MrsV. Strážnická,
MrM. Fischbach,
MrJ. Casadevall,
MrR. Maruste, judges,
and Mr M. O’Boyle, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 3 January 2001 and registered on 15 February 2001,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Milan Ľalík, is a Slovakian national, who was born in 1953 and lives in Bratislava. He is represented before the Court by Mrs E. Ľalíková, a lawyer practising in Bratislava.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The applicant is a Supreme Court judge. Pursuant to Section 19 of Act No. 420/1991 on Remuneration of Judges and Trainee Judges, judges’ pay is to be adjusted proportionally to the actual increase or decrease in the average salary of persons employed within the national economy where such an increase or decrease exceeded ten per cent in the course of the preceding calendar six months.
On 22 March 1999 the National Council of the Slovak Republic adopted Act No. 57/1999. It introduced an amendment to the Remuneration of Judges and Trainee Judges Act of 1991 in that the procedure of adjustment of the pay of judges provided for in Section 19 was not to be applied during the period from 1 April 1999 to 31 December 1999. As a result, the applicant’s pay was not adjusted, leading to an earning difference of approximately 15,000 Slovakian korunas.
By virtue of Act No. 57/1999, a similar adjustment of the remuneration of the President of Slovakia, of the members of the National Council and of the Government, of the constitutional judges as well as of other high ranking public officials was also suspended for the same period.
On 2 July 1999 a group of Members of Parliament filed a petition to the Constitutional Court in which they alleged that the above amendment was contrary to the Constitution and that it risked undermining the independence of judges. The representative of the National Council submitted written observations on the petition which stated, inter alia, that the suspension complained of was a part of comprehensive restrictive measures affecting the whole national budget which were adopted upon the proposal of the Government with a view to remedying the adverse economic situation. Furthermore, the suspension extended to all public officials whose remuneration was to be adjusted in accordance with the same principle.
The Constitutional Court dismissed the petition on 4 July 2000. The decision stated that the amendment in question did not jeopardise the independence of judges, and that the Constitution did not exclude that the remuneration of judges be linked to and reflect the developments in the domestic economy. The provision under which the procedure to adjust the remuneration of judges in accordance with the general economic indicators was suspended did not, therefore, infringe the Constitution.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that his property rights were violated in that his pay was not adjusted in accordance with Section 19 of the Remuneration of Judges and Trainee Judges Act of 1991 for the period from 1 April 1999 to 31 December 1999.
The applicant further alleges that the requirement of independence and impartiality of judges laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention was infringed as a result of the amendment to the Remuneration of Judges and Trainee Judges Act of 1991 under which the adjustment of their pay was suspended.
Finally, the applicant complains that the suspension of the adjustment of his pay amounts to an infringement of Article 53 of the Convention and of Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe, and that it is incompatible with Recommendation No. R(94)12 on the independence, efficiency and role of judges as well as with other documents concerning this issue adopted within the Council of Europe.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains that his property rights were violated in that his pay was not adjusted in accordance with Section 19 of the Remuneration of Judges and Trainee Judges Act of 1991 for the period from 1 April 1999 to 31 December 1999. He alleges a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 which provides as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
The applicant originally had the right to have his pay adjusted in accordance with Section 19 of the Remuneration of Judges and Trainee Judges Act of 1991. The Court will therefore assume that he had a property interest eligible for protection under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It must therefore be established whether the interference complained of was lawful and proportionate to the aim pursued (see, e.g., the Pine Valley Developments Ltd. and Others v. Ireland judgment of 29 November 1991, Series A no. 222, pp. 25-26, §§ 57-59).
The Court finds that the aforementioned interference was in accordance with the relevant law, namely Act No. 57/1999. It pursued, by means proportionate to that aim, the legitimate general interest in restricting the public expenditure in view of the economic difficulties existing in the country. In particular, the failure to adjust the applicant’s remuneration cannot be said to have been disproportionate, bearing in mind its temporary character and actual impact, and also the fact that such a measure extended to all public officials whose remuneration is subject to adjustment in the same way. Accordingly, there is no appearance of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
2. The applicant further alleges that the requirement of independence and impartiality of judges was infringed as a result of the amendment to the Remuneration of Judges and Trainee Judges Act of 1991 under which the adjustment of their pay was suspended. He alleges a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention which, in so far as relevant, provides:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal...”
The Court lacks jurisdiction to examine in abstracto whether or not a particular measure affected the independence and impartiality of judges of a Contracting Party as a whole. In accordance with Article 19 of the Convention, its role is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto. As regards Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in particular, the Court’s role is to examine whether the guarantees, inter alia, of an independent and impartial tribunal were respected in proceedings concerning the determination of a person’s “civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge” against such a person. The applicant in the present case was not, however, involved in such proceedings.
It follows that this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.
3. The Court has also examined the complaints which the applicant makes under Article 53 of the Convention, under Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe and with reference to Recommendation No. R(94)12 on the independence, efficiency and role of judges as well as to other documents governing this issue and adopted within the Council of Europe but finds, to the extent that such complaints have been substantiated and are within its competence, that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention or its protocols.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application inadmissible.
Michael O’BoyleNicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy