FOURTH SECTION
PARTIAL DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 48910/99
by Ari Kalevi LAUKKANEN
against Finland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 21 May 2002 as a Chamber composed of
SirNicolas Bratza, President,
MrM. Pellonpää,
MrA. Pastor Ridruejo,
MrsE. Palm,
MrM. Fischbach,
MrJ. Casadevall,
MrS. Pavlovschi, judges,
and Mr M. O’Boyle, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged with the European Court of Human Rights on 15 February 1999,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Ari Laukkanen, is a Finnish national, who was born in 1953 and apparently lives in Hämeenlinna without a permanent address. He is represented before the Court by Mr Jukka Juntunen, a lawyer practising in Hämeenlinna.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.
The criminal investigations against the applicant
On 18 August 1997 the applicant was arrested in Mikkeli, being suspected of an unauthorised possession of a weapon, namely a gas pistol, when he was caught by the police in a vehicle in which a murder suspect sought by the police was also found. The gas pistol was seized from the applicant by the arresting officer, Constable T. The applicant was taken to the police prison of the Mikkeli Police District and interrogated in respect of the unauthorised possession of a weapon.
The following day the applicant was transferred to the police prison of the Kouvola Police District and arrested there on suspicion of the attempted theft of a motor vehicle. Before being transferred from Mikkeli to Kouvola, the applicant had requested that his luggage, which had been in the vehicle, be returned to him. The request was refused even though he was not informed whether his luggage had been seized or not. It appeared much later, during the relevant criminal proceedings against the applicant, that part of his belongings which had been in the luggage had been seized already on 18 August 1997.
In Kouvola the applicant was interrogated as a suspect in respect of the above-mentioned attempted theft of a motor vehicle and also of an aggravated theft (a burglary of a shoe shop) and a theft of a motor vehicle. After that he was transferred to the police prison of the Jämsä Police District where, on 22 August 1997, he was remanded for trial by a decision of the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätt) of Jämsä at the request of Chief Inspector Y. The request was based on suspicion of the above-mentioned shoe shop burglary and theft of a motor vehicle. He was also assessed as posing a risk of continuing to commit offences.
The applicant made a complaint to the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätt) about the allegedly illegal deprivation of his liberty. The complaint was refused by the Court of Appeal on 5 September 1997.
The first hearing before the District Court
The first oral hearing in the criminal proceedings against the applicant was held before the District Court of Jämsä on 19 September 1997. The applicant was charged with five offences. He denied the charges. Two witnesses were heard. They both identified the applicant as the suspect they had seen at the time of the events concerned. One of them, Mr S., stated that in Jämsä both witnesses were shown a picture in which they had both recognised the applicant. Later in Lahti he was asked by the same police officers to identify the same suspect, who had been standing behind a one-way mirror. No identification parade was organised and the suspect had been shown alone. The other witness, Mr N., however denied having seen any picture of the suspect. Having heard the evidence, the public prosecutor noted that the way the identification of the applicant was organised by the police was negligent as it appeared that the applicant’s picture had been shown very informally during a coffee break. It did not, however, change the fact that both witnesses had also identified the applicant at the court hearing and that they had been very sure of the applicant’s identity. The applicant’s counsel argued that the identification could not be used as evidence under the circumstances.
Also two other witnesses were heard to identify various objects (amongst other things knifes, drills and shoes) which had been seized from the applicant and his co-accused on 18 August 1997.
The fifth witness, Mr K., recalled that he had been shown six or seven pictures of various people when he had been asked to identify the applicant and his co-accused. The police officer in question had recorded the identification of the suspects in the minutes made of her police interrogation. However, no notes had been made of the other pictures. When he was re-heard later, notes had been made of the other people’s pictures as well.
Also a sixth witness, taxi-driver H., recognised the applicant and his co-accused. He stated that he had been shown numerous pictures on two different occasions and that he had also seen the applicant’s co-accused through a one-way mirror at the police station. The applicant’s picture had, however, been a separate computerised colour-print and the rest of the pictures had been normal photos which had been in a file. He had not been sure of the applicant’s identity until the court hearing when he had had an opportunity to look at him more thoroughly.
The seventh witness did not recognise the applicant.
Having heard all the witnesses, the public prosecutor again noted that the procedure concerning identification of the suspects at the police could be criticised. However, several witnesses had identified the applicant and his co-accused. The police should not show pictures of the suspected persons to the witnesses before asking them to identify the suspects. The other evidence presented (i.e. the objects seized from the applicant and the technical evidence, including, inter alia, the applicant’s fingerprint found at one of the crime scenes) proved that the applicant and his co-accused were guilty as charged. He also requested that both accused be remanded in custody for trial.
The applicant noted that he had been living in Riihimäki in an apartment he had been renting since 1995. If he was remanded in custody, he would risk losing his lease. As one of the charges against the applicant (possession of a knife and other equipment suitable for committing offences when wandering around without a permanent address) concerned a provision of law which could only be applied to people without a permanent address (i.e. to so-called vagrants), it could not be applied to the applicant.
The District Court adjourned the case until 3 October 1997 and remanded the applicant in custody as a risk was found to exist that the applicant would continue committing offences if released.
The second hearing before the District Court
At the second hearing before the District Court on 3 October 1997, the applicant informed the court that he had served summons on Constables T. and S. to appear before the court to give evidence but that they were not able to attend the hearing for personal reasons. Various explanations were submitted by the applicant as to whether he could have been legally in possession of the objects which had been seized from him.
Insofar as the applicant was charged with having been in possession of various objects suitable for committing offences, the public Prosecutor recalled that the ancient Act on Vagrants (irtolaislaki, lagen om lösdrivare) had been abolished. However, the concept of “a vagrant” was still maintained in Chapter 44, Section 19, of the Penal Code (rikoslaki, strafflag). The applicant and his co-accused had both stated that they had been wandering around for weeks. The public prosecutor thus insisted that they be regarded as “vagrants” within the meaning of the Penal Code. The applicant denied being “a vagrant” and argued that the public prosecutor had failed to show that any of the items in question had even been present at a scene of an offence.
Two more witnesses were heard about the events in question. Neither of them could identify the applicant.
The applicant requested an adjournment of the hearing in order to call Constables T. and S. to give evidence. He insisted that the defects in the showing of the applicant’s picture to the witnesses must not be held against the applicant. The applicant’s counsel also stressed that the applicant had tried to contact the persons with whom he had been at the time of the alleged offences but had failed as he did not know their official names.
The public prosecutor requested that the applicant be remanded in custody as he was going to face two more charges in another case in the near future. The risk that he was going to continue committing offences still existed.
The applicant requested to be released so that he could contact the people he wanted to hear as witnesses.
The District Court adjourned the case until 17 October 1997 and ordered that the applicant be remanded in custody until the next hearing.
The third hearing before the District Court
Several witnesses were heard at the last hearing of the case before the District Court on 17 October 1997.
The applicant called Mrs K. to give evidence about his whereabouts at the time of the alleged offences. According to her statement, the applicant had arrived at her place in Mikkeli on 16 August 1997. He had already a week earlier brought some luggage to her apartment. That luggage had not been removed from the apartment until the police seized it. The witness knew also the applicant’s co-accused who too had visited her apartment during the relevant weekend.
The applicant also called Constables S., V., T. and L. as witnesses. They all gave evidence about the conduct of the criminal investigations against the applicant and their own participation in it. Constable T. recalled that he had caught the applicant and his co-accused in a vehicle and that he had then seized a gas pistol, a knife and a so-called “multi-tool” from the applicant. He had not, however, written or signed the minutes of the seizure as he had at that time already worked several hours of over-time and had left his place of duty before the minutes were written. He had driven the vehicle in question to the police station and recalled that all the items had been left inside the vehicle. He did not know who had written the minutes of the seizure.
The public prosecutor informed the court about other pieces of evidence which had been recorded from the scene of the offences but which had proved to have no value as evidence (locks of hair which later proved to be animal hair, somebody else’s fingerprints, footprints which could not be compared with anything, etc.). The applicant demanded that the comparison with the footprints and the footwear seized from them should be carried out as their shoes had been seized for investigative purposes. It was important for the applicant’s defence that he had access also to all the counter-evidence in his favour.
The public prosecutor pointed out that he had not even claimed that footprints found on the scene of the offence belonged to the applicant. Also the applicant’s fingerprint found at the same place could have been there for a long time and did not necessarily have anything to do with the events in question. As the fingerprint had been taken from a roll of plastic bags, the public prosecutor, however, found it to be too much of a co-incidence that the plastic bags the applicant had touched somewhere had somehow been taken to the scene of the events where the applicant denied ever having been.
According to the public prosecutor Chapter 44, Section 19, of the Penal Code had to be interpreted so that a person wandering around, i.e. “a vagrant”, was not allowed to have in his possessions any objects which he could use when committing a burglary (i.e. keys or skeleton keys). The applicant argued that he could not be regarded as “a vagrant” as he had a permanent address. He requested to be released immediately. In his opinion it was unreasonable to continue his remand in custody as he had apparently already lost his apartment because of the time he had spent in custody. If released now, he could possibly still settle the matter with his landlord.
The District Court’s judgment of 17 October 1997
The applicant was convicted on eight counts, found not guilty on two counts and sentenced to fourteen months’ imprisonment. The court also ordered that, inter alia, twenty-seven car keys and a skeleton key be confiscated from the applicant.
In its reasoning the District Court found that the identification of the applicant and his co-accused by the witnesses before the court was sufficient to convict him regardless of the fact that his picture had been shown to the witnesses by the police before they had been asked to identify him during the pre-trial investigations. It was, however, noted that the identification on the basis of the applicant’s picture before identification in person had not been recorded in any of the police reports. This, together with the fact that there had been no pictures of other persons for the witnesses to choose from, reduced the credibility of the applicant’s identification. Taking into account all the evidence submitted during the proceedings, the court nevertheless found it sufficiently established that the applicant and his co-accused had committed the offences of which they had been found guilty.
As to Chapter 44, Section 19, of the Penal Code, the District Court found the provision applicable and in force even though the comparable provision of the old Act on Vagrants had been abolished. According to the court, the notion of “vagrant” has its own independent meaning in the Penal Code. The relevant provision forbids a person who is wandering around and living rough to be in a possession of certain equipment, if that equipment can, in the light of that person’s behaviour and other circumstances, be considered to be in his possession with the intention of committing an offence.
The District Court ordered the applicant to be imprisoned immediately as he had been sentenced to more than one year’s imprisonment. His criminal record revealed that he had often been convicted of numerous offences committed within a short period of time. Thus, it was likely that he would continue his criminal activities if released. Ordering the applicant’s imprisonment could not be regarded as unreasonable because of the nature of his conviction, his age, or his other personal circumstances.
The applicant’s complaints about the deprivation of his liberty
Each time when the District Court ordered that the applicant be remanded in custody until the next hearing, the applicant complained to the Court of Appeal. He claimed, inter alia, that there were no grounds for keeping him in custody as he had an apartment which he was about to lose because of the proceedings against him.
The Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s complaints on 1 October 1997, 14 October 1997 and 10 November 1997 respectively, finding that the applicant’s criminal record supported the allegation that he would continue to commit offences if released.
The applicant requested leave to appeal from the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen), arguing that his human rights were being continuously violated as he had been deprived of his liberty because of a mere fear of further offences which he might commit some time in his life. The Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal on 18 December 1997 and 4 February 1998 respectively.
The applicant’s appeal to the Court of Appeal against his conviction
The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal, requesting that the charges be quashed or, alternatively, that his sentence be reduced. He also requested that he be released immediately and that the items confiscated from him be returned. He argued that the judgment was based on the identifications made by witnesses N. and S. in the incorrect way described above. The applicant requested that an oral hearing be held before the Court of Appeal in order to rehear witnesses N. and S. According to the applicant, the District Court should not have accepted the identifications as evidence after it had itself criticised the way in which the identifications had been carried out.
The applicant also argued that he had not been afforded an opportunity to call certain witnesses before the District Court’s hearing of 17 October 1997 as he only learned about their real identity when Mrs K. was heard as a witness on that day. He also wished an opportunity to hear Mrs K. before the Court of Appeal.
He also alleged that a large amount of technical evidence which would have supported his innocence had not been submitted to the court.
Further, he noted that the police officer who had allegedly carried out the seizure of his belongings had actually not done so. Therefore, the applicant still did not know who had carried out the seizure.
The applicant also contested his conviction as “a vagrant”. He argued that Chapter 44, Section 19, of the Criminal Code was not applicable to his case, adding that as he had had a permanent address since January 1995 he could not be interpreted as being “a vagrant”.
The Court of Appeal’s decision of 17 February 1998
On 17 February 1998 the Court of Appeal upheld the District Court’s decision without an oral hearing. It recalled that the witnesses who possibly knew something about the visit of the applicant and his co-accused to Mikkeli had not been named at the District Court’s hearing of 19 September 1997, when they were mentioned for the first time. At the hearing of 3 October 1997 the applicant had, however, informed the court that he had not been able to contact the proposed witnesses because he knew them only by their nicknames. At the third hearing Mrs K. had been called to give evidence. The applicant and his co-accused had requested a further adjournment in order to hear two more witnesses whom Mrs K. had been able to name, but the District Court had refused the request. In the Court of Appeal’s opinion, it was highly unlikely that the applicant and his co-accused would have failed to inform the police that they had an alibi for the time of the alleged offence had they really had one. It was only much later when they claimed that they had an alibi and, even then, they could not name anyone to confirm this. According to the available information, they should have been able to name at least Mrs K. already at an earlier stage of the proceedings. Thus, the Court of Appeal found that the applicant and his co-accused had lied when they had claimed that they had spent the weekend with Mrs K. in Mikkeli. It was not necessary to rehear Mrs K. As the proposed new witnesses could not bring any new information to the case, the Court of Appeal rejected the request for an oral hearing.
As to the identification of the suspects, the Court of Appeal noted that the District Court had taken into account the possible uncertainties in this regard. There was, however, plenty of other evidence to support the applicant’s conviction and thus no room for reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
As to the applicant’s conviction as “a vagrant” within the meaning of Chapter 44, Section 19, of the Penal Code, the Court of Appeal recalled that the old Act on Vagrants was revoked on 1 January 1987. According to the travaux préparatoires of the Act on Welfare for Intoxicant Abusers (päihdehuoltolaki, lag om missbrukarvård), which replaced the Act on Vagrants, Chapter 44, Section 19, of the Penal Code was not to be amended. The Court of Appeal, thus, found that the revoked Act on Vagrants had not lost its relevance for the interpretation of Chapter 44, Section 19, of the Penal Code. According to Section, subsection 1(4), of the revoked Act on Vagrants “a vagrant” is, inter alia, a person who by his way of life endangers public order or safety. The Court of Appeal noted that the applicant had been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for, inter alia, offences against property on numerous occasions during the last ten years. It therefore found that the applicant endangered public order and safety by his criminal way of life and was, accordingly, to be regarded as “a vagrant” within the meaning of Chapter 44, Section 19, of the Penal Code.
The Court of Appeal also ordered that the applicant be kept imprisoned.
The applicant’s appeal to the Supreme Court
The applicant requested leave to appeal from the Supreme Court, claiming that he had been denied a right to hear witnesses on his behalf before the District Court and the Court of Appeal. He also insisted that Mrs K. should be reheard as a dispute had arisen concerning the interpretation of her statement.
The applicant recalled that the identification of the applicant and his co-accused had been conducted in an erroneous manner and argued that his conviction had been based on that illegal identification.
According to the applicant, the District Court refused him the right to submit evidence in support of his defence. The evidence submitted against him, i.e. the explanations concerning his belongings which had been seized from him by an unidentified police officer, did not support the conviction either. The technical evidence gathered by the police and supporting his story was not submitted to the court. It had also gone unnoticed by the courts that he had already been in possession of the seized objects before the alleged offences had taken place.
He requested that the conviction be quashed or, at least, that the case be referred back to the District Court or a Court of Appeal for an oral hearing.
The Supreme Court’s decision of 17 September 1998
On 17 September 1998 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal.
Subsequent complaints
On 28 October 1998 the applicant requested the Supreme Court to re-open the criminal proceedings against him as, in his opinion, so many faults had been committed by the police and the courts during the proceedings that it merited to be re-examined. The Supreme Court rejected the request on 16 December 1998.
Meantime, on 30 July 1998, the applicant reported the alleged failures of the police to the County Administrative Board (lääninhallitus, länsstyrelsen) and insisted that a criminal investigation be instituted against the Chief Inspector Y. who was in charge of the irregular conduct of the seizure of his belongings. On 24 September 1999 the local public prosecutor decided not to institute criminal investigations against Mr Y. The applicant’s subsequent complaint to the State Prosecutor General’s Office was rejected by State Prosecutor H. on 5 August 1999 as the matter had already been examined by the Parliamentary Ombudsman (the applicant has not submitted a copy of the Parliamentary Ombudsman’s decision to the Court).
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains, under Article 6 of the Convention, that
(a) he did not have a fair hearing because he was not allowed to hear witnesses on his behalf. In particular, it would have been important to hear Mrs K. before the Court of Appeal;
(b) the indictment against him was based on the illegal seizure of his belongings by an unidentified police officer;
(c) his conviction was based on an identification of the suspects which had been erroneously conducted by the police, as acknowledged by the courts. He also points out that none of the domestic courts took this into account in their judgments; and
(d) he was prevented from defending himself in an effective way as the part of the technical evidence, which was gathered by the police and which would have supported his statements, was not submitted to the courts.
2. He complains, without invoking any Articles of the Convention, that he was regarded as “a vagrant” even though the Act on Vagrants was revoked in 1987 and even though he had a permanent address.
3. He also complains, under Article 5 of the Convention, that he was illegally deprived of his liberty as the only reason he was kept in custody was the alleged risk of his continuing committing offences if released. The reasons used for his remand for trial before the District Court proceedings had begun were false and unsubstantiated.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains, under Article 6 of the Convention, about the conduct of the police and the domestic courts, preventing him from having a fair hearing in criminal proceedings against him. In particular, he alleges that (a) he was not allowed to hear witnesses on his behalf, (b) the indictment against him was based on the illegal seizure of his belongings by an unidentified police officer, (c) his conviction was based on an identification of the suspects which had been erroneously conducted by the police, and (d) he was prevented from defending himself in an effective way as the part of the technical evidence, which was gathered by the police and which would have supported his statements, was not submitted to the courts.
Article 6 reads, insofar as relevant, as follows:
“1. In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal established by law. ...
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:
...
(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
...
(d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against him; ...”
The Court recalls that it is normally not competent to deal with a complaint alleging that errors of law and fact have been committed by domestic courts. An exception could be made where the Court considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or one of its Protocols, for instance in that a judgment has no legal justification and thereby violates a party’s right to receive a fair trial. As a general rule, however, it is for the domestic courts to assess evidence before them, in particular since they have the benefit of hearing witnesses and assessing their credibility. The task of the Convention organs when considering a complaint under Article 6 is to ascertain whether the proceedings, considered as a whole, including the way in which evidence was taken and submitted, were fair.
As the requirements of Article 6 § 3 represent particular aspects of the right to a fair trial guaranteed in Article 6 § 1, the Court has examined the application for the point of view of these provisions taken together.
The Court observes that the applicant’s conviction was based on an assessment of a significant amount of corroborative circumstantial evidence. Also the police officers involved in the pre-trial examination were called to give evidence. Contrary to the applicant’s assertion the Court notes that the statements made in the course of the pre-trial investigation by those witnesses who had been shown the applicant’s picture before they had been asked to identify him did not play any decisive role in the applicant’s conviction. While it is true that in the hearings held before the District Court some of the witnesses recognised the applicant and some did not, there is nothing suggesting that the Court should call into question the conclusions drawn by the domestic courts on the basis of such evidence. The Court furthermore notes that the applicant was assisted by counsel throughout the domestic proceedings and that it has not been alleged that he was prevented from questioning the witnesses in the proceedings before the District Court in respect of the identification of the applicant or the seizure of his belongings. Insofar as the applicant alleges that part of the evidence gathered by the police was destroyed, the Court notes that it is normal not to submit to the courts items of evidence which do not bring any new information to the findings of the pre-trial investigations. Having regard to the domestic courts’ margin of appreciation in assessing evidence before them, the Court is satisfied that there is no indication of a violation of the applicant’s rights in this respect either. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded.
Insofar as the applicant can be understood to complain about the lack of an oral hearing before the Court of Appeal, the Court recalls that the instrument of ratification of the Convention deposited by the Finnish Government on 10 May 1990 contained a reservation in respect of Article 6 § 1, according to which Finland could not guarantee a right to an oral hearing before the courts mentioned in the reservation, including, among others, the Courts of Appeal and the Supreme Court. The reservation was applicable to the proceedings before the Court of Appeal at issue in the present case. As there can be no doubt about the validity of the reservation (see the Helle v. Finland judgment of 19 December 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII, § 44), it must be concluded that Finland was under no obligation to ensure that an oral hearing took place before the Court of Appeal. This complaint is therefore incompatible with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3.
It follows that this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
2. The applicant complains, without invoking any Articles of the Convention that he was regarded as “a vagrant” even though the Act on Vagrants was revoked in 1987 and despite the fact that he had a permanent address.
The Court has examined this part of the application under Article 7 of the Convention which reads as follows:
“1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.
2. This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.”
The applicant stresses that even though the Act on Vagrants was revoked already in 1987 the District Court convicted him as “a vagrant” and that the District Court’s judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal which, in its judgment of 17 February 1998, explicitly referred to the revoked Act on Vagrants.
The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the case file, determine the admissibility of this complaint and that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.
3. The applicant complains, under Article 5 of the Convention, that he was illegally deprived of his liberty as he was kept in custody during the pre-trial investigations and the court proceedings only on the basis of his alleged risk to continue committing offences if released.
Article 5 of the Convention reads, insofar as relevant, as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
...
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
...
3. Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.
4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.
...”
The Court recalls that the applicant was arrested on 18 August 1997 as being suspected of an unauthorised possession of a weapon. He was then arrested the following day as being suspected of an attempted theft of a motor vehicle, and later interrogated on suspicion of various other offences as well. The original deprivation of his liberty was, thus, clearly justified by Article 5 § 1(c) of the Convention on the basis of pre-trial investigations pending against him.
The Court further recalls that the applicant was remanded for trial by a decision of the District Court on 22 August 1997, i.e. four days after he had been first arrested. The criminal proceedings against the applicant were instituted almost immediately against the applicant and the first oral hearing was held before the District Court on 19 September 1997, i.e. less than a month later. The question of the deprivation of the applicant’s liberty was assessed and decided separately at each court hearing until he was convicted by the District Court on 17 October 1997. The Court is thus satisfied that the deprivation of the applicant’s liberty was justified within the meaning of Article 5 §§ 1(a) and (c) of the Convention. It also notes that the applicant was brought promptly before a judge for the assessment of the necessity of the deprivation of his liberty and that he could, and did, challenge the District Court’s decisions concerning the lawfulness of his detention within the meaning of Article 5 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Decides to adjourn the examination of the applicant’s complaint that he was regarded as “a vagrant” even though the Act on Vagrants was revoked in 1987;
Declares inadmissible the remainder of the application.
Michael O’BoyleNicolas Bratza
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy