Lavents v. Latvia

Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi

Karar Metni

Information Note on the Court’s case-law 47

November 2002

Lavents v. Latvia - 58442/00

Judgment 28.11.2002 [Section I]

Article 6

Criminal proceedings

Article 6-1

Impartial tribunal

Making of statements in press by judge dealing with case: violation

Article 6-2

Presumption of innocence

Making of public statements about case by presiding judge: violation

Article 8

Article 8-1

Respect for family life

Prohibition on family visits to prisoner: violation

Respect for correspondence

Control of prisoner's correspondence: violation

Facts: In June 1995, the applicant was investigated in connection with the offence of sabotage as a result of his activities as Chairman of the board of directors of the largest bank in Latvia, whose insolvency had had serious consequences for the national economy and led to the ruin of thousands of individuals. He was charged with further offences contrary to banking and economic law and also with illegal possession of firearms. The applicant was placed in provisional detention in July 1995. Various steps relating to his detention and to the investigation were taken until October 1996, when the prosecutor issued the final charge. Between December 1996 and Mars 1997, the applicant was in hospital, under supervision. In June 1997, he was sent for trial before the Riga Regional Court and the trial began in October 1997. From that date, owing to serious health problems, the applicant was placed under house arrest with constant police supervision, until September 1998, when he was returned to prison; his applications for release were all rejected. In October 1997, the largest Latvian daily newspaper published an official joint communication from the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice, in which they expressed their disagreement with the order placing the applicant under house arrest. During the same month, the judges of Riga Regional Court confirmed the custodial measure and withdrew from the case, invoking the pressure brought to bear by the Government. The case was then assigned to a differently constituted bench of that court. In October 1997, an order was made for seizure and examination of the applicant's correspondence, including his correspondence with his lawyers. While he was in the prison hospital, visits by his family were prohibited. Between April and June 2000, the applicant was transferred to a hospital outside the prison and he was able to meet his family. In September 2000, he was taken to the hospital in Riga central prison, but when it proved impossible to provide him with adequate medical treatment he had to be transferred to an ordinary hospital. In November and December 1999, the national press published statements by the President of the bench of Riga Regional Court dealing with the case. She expressed her views, in particular, on the applicant's numerous requests that she withdraw from the case and on the grounds of defence prepared by the applicant's lawyers, which she claimed not to understand. In August 2001, following a serious heart attack, the applicant was placed in the intensive care unit of a hospital in Riga, where he remained under supervision on the date on which the judgment was adopted. By a judgment of December 2001, the applicant was found guilty of the offences charged and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment. His appeal was pending on the date of adoption of the judgment.

Law: Article 6 § 1 (impartial tribunal) – in her statements published in the press, the President of the bench of Riga Regional Court dealing with the case criticised the applicant's means of defence. She also made predictions as to the outcome of the case and dismissed the possibility of a full acquittal. What is more, she expressed her astonishment at the applicant's persistence in pleading not guilty to all the charges and suggested that he prove his innocence. In the eyes of the Court, such statements do not constitute a mere “negative assessment of the applicant's case” but amount to adopting a definite position on the outcome of the case, with a clear preference for finding the accused guilty. Apart from the reasons which led the judge to express her views in that manner, her statements are not compatible with the requirements of Article 6 § 1 and the applicant had the strongest reasons to fear that the judge lacked impartiality.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

Article 6 § 2 – In her first public interview, the President of the bench of Riga Regional Court dealing with the case stated that she did not yet know “whether the judgment [would] convict [the applicant] or acquit [him] in part”. In the eyes of the Court, such an assertion clearly showed that the judge was already convinced of the applicant's guilt, at least on one of the charges, and that she precluded the possibility of finding him completely innocent. As regards the second public interview, the judge expressed her great astonishment that the accused should persist in pleading not guilty to all the charges. In particular, she drew the journalists' and readers' attention to one charge where the applicant's approach seemed most incomprehensible and illogical. Such assertions are also tantamount to recognising that the applicant was guilty. Moreover, the Court can only express its surprise that the judge should suggest that the accused prove to the court that they were not guilty. Owing to its general nature, such a statement is contrary to the very principle of the presumption of innocence.

Conclusion: violation (unanimously).

Article 8 – a. As regards the seizure and examination of the applicant's correspondence: Article 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure leaves too much latitude to the national courts: it merely identifies the categories of offences that might justify such a measure, designates the authority competent to apply it and defines the precise procedure for the measure. On the other hand, it does not indicate either the duration of the measure or even the reasons that might justify it; furthermore, the checking of the applicant's correspondence, which was ordered in 1997, continued to apply on the date of adoption of the judgment. The law in question does not indicate with sufficient clarity the extent and procedure for the exercise of the discretion of the authorities in the sphere in question. The applicant did not enjoy the minimum level of protection desired by the pre-eminence of the law in a democratic society.

Conclusion: violation (six votes to one).

b. As regards the ban on family visits in prison: the applicant's wife and daughter were not allowed to visit him during three separate periods, the longest of which was one year and seven months. What is more, that ban – which constitutes an interference – was absolute. Furthermore, before being returned to prison, the applicant had spent more than eleven months under house arrest, where his contacts with his family were unlimited; it does not appear that the applicant made any attempt during that period to take advantage of those contacts to arrange any collusion or to hinder the investigation of his case. In those circumstances, the application of such a strict measure was not really indispensable in order to attain any legitimate aims that might have been pursued. That measure was therefore not necessary in a democratic society.

Conclusion: violation (six votes to one).

The Court holds, by six votes to one, that there has been a violation of Articles 5 § 3 and 6 § 1 (reasonable time) and, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Articles 5 § 4 and 6 § 1 (tribunal established by law).

Article 41 – The Court awards the applicant the sum of €15,000 for costs and expenses.

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