AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 26376/95
by Catherine Irene LAYLLE
against Germany
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 4 September 1996, the following members being present:
Mrs. J. LIDDY, President
MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
E. BUSUTTIL
A. WEITZEL
C.L. ROZAKIS
G.B. REFFI
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 29 November 1994
by Catherine Irene LAYLLE against Germany and registered on 1 February
1995 under file No. 26376/95;
Having regard to:
- the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission;
- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
10 October, 30 November 1995 and 8 February 1996 and the
observations in reply submitted by the applicant on 7 December
1995, 13 February, 3 April and 3 May 1996;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant has British and French nationality and lives in
London. The facts of the application, as submitted by the parties, may
be summarised as follows.
The particular facts of the case
The applicant married a German citizen in 1984. Two children
were born, in 1985 and 1987. The couple lived in London until after
the birth of the first child, when they moved to Germany. In 1992, the
marriage broke down. By a notarised agreement between the husband and
the applicant, it was agreed that the children would live with their
mother in London, continue their education at the French lycee, and
that most of their holidays would be spent in Germany with the father.
The father failed to return the children to their mother after
the summer holidays in 1994. On 30 August 1994, on the applicant's
originating summons, the High Court in London made an ex parte order
under the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985. The order provided
that the children were made wards of court, and that they were to be
placed in the interim care and control of the mother. The order also
declared that the retention of the children outside England and Wales
was wrongful pursuant to Article 3 of the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction ("the Child Abduction
Convention", which has been incorporated into English law). The
wardship was later lifted.
The applicant began proceedings in Germany to secure the return
of her children under the Child Abduction Convention. On 19 September
1994 the children were heard by the Verden District Court (Amtsgericht)
in the presence of a member on the local Youth Office (Jugendamt), but
not in the presence of the parents. On 20 September 1994, after
hearing both parents and a member of the Youth Office, and after
considering an expert report presented by the father, the District
Court ordered the applicant's husband to surrender the two children to
the applicant so that they could return to the United Kingdom. The
court recited the father's claims that return of the children would
entail the risk of psychological damage to the children, and the
applicant's claims that the children had been living with her for over
two years and that to return them would be in their interest and would
not entail any psychological damage. The court referred to Article 12
of the Child Abduction Convention, found that there was no serious risk
of psychological damage to the children within the meaning of Article
13 of that Convention and that the children's expressed wish not to be
returned was not relevant because of their lack of years, and ordered
the return of the children. The court also referred to the European
Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions concerning
Custody of Children.
According to the applicant, the father then arranged for the
children to be taken away from the court and examined, over a
considerable period of time, by a child psychologist.
The father and the Youth Office appealed.
It appears that on 30 September 1994 a further ex parte order of
the High Court in London declared that the father's retention of the
children was a wrongful retention within the meaning of Article 3 of
the Child Abduction Convention.
On 20 October 1994 the Celle Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht)
quashed the order of 20 September 1994 and refused the applicant's
request for return of the children. The applicant was present and was
represented by two lawyers. In the absence of the children's parents
and the Youth Office representative, the Court of Appeal heard the
children by way of a personal conversation lasting some 45 minutes.
The children repeated their wish to remain with their father. The
Court informed the parties of the outcome of the conversation with the
children, and gave them the opportunity to comment.
The Celle court accepted that the conditions for the application
of the Child Abduction Convention were met, and referred expressly to
Article 3. It noted that the children had stated before the District
Court that they preferred to stay with their father, and that they had
repeated this wish before the Court of Appeal. It also noted that its
function was not to determine what was in the children's best
interests, but rather (pursuant the Child Abduction Convention) to
bring about the status quo ante unless Article 13 of that Convention
applied. It pointed out that there was no fixed age-limit below which
children's views could not be considered, and found that the children,
then 7 and 9 years of age, were of such an age and degree of maturity
that it was appropriate to take account of their views.
The court continued:
"A. ... pushed his mother away with his hands (at the beginning
of the hearing). To begin with he sat crying on one of the back
rows of seats ... After he had received evasive answers to his
spontaneous questions whether he now had to go back to his
mother, he hid his face in his ... arms and remained sobbing in
this position ... He was told that on this day only the question
of a provisional return would be decided, whilst the decision on
his and his brother's custody would only be considered in future
custody proceedings. At this, A. became calm, but immediately
asked for how long he would have to go back to his mother, if at
all. He did not accept the objection that he might be better off
with his mother on educational grounds, at least until the
question of custody has been decided, as he had a negative stands
vis-à-vis the circumstances of his life in London hitherto ("weil
er den Umständen seines bisherigen Lebens in London in jeder
Hinsicht ablehnend gegenübersteht") ... He gave as a reason for
his decision that he wanted to live with his father ... that he
was after all German. ... He considered [the English] had a
different character, but could not explain that concept. It
became clear, however, from his description of various
circumstances which obviously upset him.
"He confirmed again that he has no friends in school, and, apart
from his brother, he is the only German there and is insulted and
teased as a "Nazi"...
"... He explained that he talks English with his classmates. He
said that he generally gets up at 7.00 a.m. or 7.30 a.m., by
which time his mother has already left. Breakfast is made by the
nurse, who brings him ... to school at about 8.30 a.m., and picks
him up again in the late afternoon. The mother comes home at
about 6.00 p.m., but usually does not stay very long, but
generally leaves the house again in the evening ... The children
speak French with their mother and English with the nurse ...
"[In connection with the relationships within the family before
the parents separated, A.] remembers that he lived in the
Schlüterstraße in Hamburg ... He did not accept the comparison
between the French school in Hamburg and that in London, in
particular because the school in Hamburg is attended by many
German children, while in the school in London there were no
other German children. A. reproached his mother ... that she is
never there, and only has time for the children at the weekend
... The children seem to know very little about running around
... table games, trips and other activities. On the other hand,
A. clearly brightened up when talking about the school ... which
he now attends. He stressed particularly that in the short time
since school began he has made friends with several children, and
he reports enthusiastically about his father's house which is on
its own in the woods ... and his games with his new friends.
"On the basis of its extensive and intensive discussion with A.,
the Court is convinced that this boy suffers from severe
pressure. He is convinced that his mother "simply took" him and
his brother. ... He obviously thinks in German and, to be
understood, has to "translate" ... His whole social environment
is, from his point of view, dominated by foreign languages, as
German is not spoken at home or in school ... With regard to
other socio-cultural differences, in particular the considerable
effort needed at school and the corresponding lack of
[recreational facilities], A.'s refusal to return to his mother
is perfectly understandable. So far as can be established in the
framework of these proceedings ..., this refusal is not based on
a sudden idea or a passing mood, as often happens with younger
children, nor is it based on "emotional influences" from the
[father] or on the continuing holiday mood, as the holidays ended
almost two months ago ... The members of the Court cannot be
said to have no personal experience in this area, as they are all
grandfathers or fathers of children of just this age. ... It
would be an act of violence not to take account of A's refusal.
"The same applies mutatis mutandis for the brother. C. cannot
express himself as clearly as his brother because of his age.
But he also refuses expressly and firmly to return to his mother
... Even with the nurse he was only able to speak English ..."
In her constitutional appeal, which she made in her own name and
her sons', the applicant alleged violation of Articles 6 paras. 2 and
3 and Article 2 para. 1 together with Article 1 of the Basic Law
(family rights and the right to dignity and development of the person),
and of the principles of fairness and of the rule of law. She
emphasised in particular that the Court of Appeal had decided the
appeal on the basis of its own impression of the children's evidence,
without undertaking any enquiries (such as independent reports) which
could establish whether - especially as the children had been in close
contact with a child psychologist employed by the father - the children
were of an age that their opinion should be taken into account.
The Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) declined to
deal with the applicant's constitutional complaint on 9 March 1995.
It recalled that the assessment of facts and the interpretation of
ordinary law was a matter for the specialist courts, and it found no
indication that the Court of Appeal's decision involved a fundamentally
wrong consideration of the importance of the parents' rights or the
children's rights. The Court saw no problems of constitutional law
arising from the fact that the judges decided the case on the basis of
their own findings, rather than calling for any further investigations.
Substantive access proceedings are apparently still pending
before the German courts; the applicant did not pursue an appeal in
custody proceedings.
Relevant law and practice
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
Article 3
"The removal or the retention of a child is to be considered
wrongful where -
(a) it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a
person, an institution or any other body, either jointly or
alone, under the law of the State in which the child was
habitually resident immediately before the removal or
retention; and
(b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were
actually exercised, either jointly or alone, or would have
been so exercised but for the removal or retention. ..."
Article 12
"Where a child has been wrongfully removed or retained in terms
of Article 3 ..., the authority concerned shall order the return
of the child forthwith."
Article 13
"Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the
judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is
not bound to order the return of the child if the person,
institution or other body which opposes its return establishes
that -
...
(b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose
the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise
place the child in an intolerable situation.
The judicial or administrative authority may also refuse to order
the return of the child if it finds that the child objects to
being returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at
which it is appropriate to take account of its views.
In considering the circumstances referred to in this Article, the
judicial and administrative authorities shall take into account
the information relating to the social background of the child
provided by the Central Authority or other competent authority
of the child's habitual residence."
COMPLAINTS
The applicant alleges a violation of Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the
Convention. She alleges that the decision of the Celle Court of Appeal
was arbitrary in that inter alia the court took its decision on the
basis of its own interrogation of two children aged 7 and 9, she was
not heard at all, no reference was made to the fact that she had not
seen the boys for over four months by the time of the decision and so
they must have been influenced by the father, and that the children
were too young for the case to be wholly decided on their own
statements.
She also alleges that the local Youth Office is partial and is
ignoring the damage to her children, and that she has not been able to
visit the children properly whilst the proceedings were pending.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 29 November 1994 and registered
on 1 February 1995.
On 4 July 1995 the Commission decided to communicate the
application to the respondent Government.
The Government's written observations were submitted on
10 October 1995, with an addition on 30 November 1995. The applicant
replied on 7 December 1995, and the Government commented on that reply
on 8 February 1996. On 13 February 1996 the applicant commented on the
Government's paper of 30 November 1995. She made still further
submissions on 3 April 1996 and 3 May 1996.
On 23 January 1996 the Commission granted the applicant legal
aid.
THE LAW
1. The applicant alleges violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the
Convention. She complains that the Celle Court of Appeal was biased,
that its decision was arbitrary, and the proceedings before it were
unfair.
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention provides, so far
as relevant, as follows.
"1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations
... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing ... by an
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. ..."
The Government submit that it is not clear whether Article 6
(Art. 6) applies to the proceedings at issue in the application before
the Commission, as the only question to be determined was the
application under the Child Abduction Convention, which aimed at
restoring the status quo ante in terms of the law on custody and
access, rather than determining substantive (civil) custody or access
rights. They underline that at the hearing before the Celle Court of
Appeal, the applicant was present in person, and was represented by two
lawyers, who made submissions on the merits of the case. The
Government see no indication whatever of any lack of impartiality on
the part of the court, and underline that the proceedings were
conducted strictly in accordance with the relevant provisions of
domestic law. They note that the mere fact that there are lawyers and
doctors among the relatives of the children's father is not sufficient
to indicate bias, even in a relatively small town like Verden, and in
any event, the Verden decision was favourable to the applicant, and it
was the Celle Court which found against her.
The applicant considers that Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention
applies because the Child Abduction Convention concerns civil aspects
of child abduction. In connection with the hearing before the Celle
Court of Appeal, she claims that by solely hearing the children,
without an interpreter, the court denied her rights. She claims that,
in any event, the proceedings were not properly conducted because
children of 7 and 9 are far too young to be heard by a court, and
because they were accompanied by a psychologist chosen by the father
and had been subjected to undue influence by the father all summer.
The applicant also considers that the Court of Appeal was not impartial
because it took into account a report from the Verden Youth Office
which had not put questions to her, and because a member of the Youth
Office expressed the opinion that the children should remain in
Germany, at least for the interim.
The Commission first notes that the present application is
limited to questions arising in connection with the proceedings under
the Child Abduction Convention, as it is only in that respect that the
applicant has put her complaints to the Federal Constitutional Court.
The Commission next notes that the applicant had a right in
German law to go to the courts and to allege a violation of the Child
Abduction Convention, and that the result of such proceedings could
have been conclusive for the question of where the children were to
live. Moreover, the proceedings were clearly to determine a dispute
as to the interpretation of that convention. The Commission is not,
however required to decide whether that right was "civil" within the
meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, as even if
it was, the complaint is in any event inadmissible for the following
reasons.
As to compliance with Article 6 (Art. 6) of the proceedings in
the present case, the Commission recalls that, in accordance with
Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the
observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the
Convention. In particular, it is not competent to deal with an
application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by
domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have
involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out
in the Convention. The Commission refers, on this point, to its
constant case-law (see eg. No. 458/59, X v Belgium, Dec. 29.3.60,
Yearbook 3 pp.222, 236; No. 5258/71, X v Sweden, Dec. 8.2.73,
Collection 43 pp.71, 77; No. 7987/77, X v Austria, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R.
18 pp. 31, 45; No. 19890/92, Ziegler v. Switzerland, Dec. 3.5.93, D.R.
74 p. 234).
As to the specific points raised by the applicant in connection
with Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, the Commission notes that
the applicant was present and represented at the hearing before the
Court of Appeal on 20 October 1994, and there is no indication that she
requested, through the lawyers, to be able to address the court
herself.
The decision by the Court of Appeal to hear the children in the
absence of the parties cannot of itself violate the applicant's right
to a fair hearing under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention: in
hearing the children in a setting less formal than a court room in the
presence of all the parties, the Court of Appeal was attempting to
obtain the children's views on where they wished to live in
circumstances most likely to give rise to a true picture of their
opinions. The Court of Appeal then informed the parties of the
outcome, and gave the opportunity to comment.
The applicant also complains that the children were too young for
their views to be taken into consideration by the court, and that the
proceedings were therefore unfair. However, the procedural rules to
be applied are, in the first place, a matter for the domestic
authorities; the Convention's concern is rather with the use made of
that evidence. In the context of the present case, it was perfectly
natural for the Court of Appeal to wish to hear the views of the
children (as the Verden court had also done), and the Commission does
not accept that to base a decision on the - wholly relevant - views of
children can of itself violate Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.
Finally in the context of Article 6 (Art. 6), the applicant
complains generally of bias on the part of all those involved: the
Celle Court of Appeal, the Youth Office and the psychologist allegedly
employed by the father. It suffices for the Commission to note that
in the present case the Youth Office exercised a solely advisory
function concerned with child and juvenile welfare, and it did not take
any decision affecting the applicant's rights; and that any
psychologist employed by the father similarly took no decisions which
affected the applicant's rights. The Commission finds no reason to
question the impartiality of Court of Appeal, either in the way with
which it dealt with the evidence from these sources, or in the way it
approached the case generally.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. The applicant alleges a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the
Convention in connection with the refusal of the German courts to
return her children to her after their wrongful retention by their
father.
Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention provides, so far as
relevant, as follows:
"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and
family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with
the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others."
The Government express doubt as to whether a decision to return
a child under the Child Abduction Convention can at all constitute an
interference with family life, but consider that even if it can, any
interference in the present case was justified. They point out that
the proceedings were conducted in accordance with the relevant
provisions of the domestic legislation, and that the aim of both the
Child Abduction Convention and the courts - to serve the best interests
of the child - was clearly legitimate.
As to the proportionality of any interference, the Government
underline that the Child Abduction Convention does not set up an
absolute rule requiring children who have been wrongfully retained to
be returned: rather, it permits of exceptions to the general rule,
allowing account to be taken of the child's best interests in a
particular case. They add that the courts went to considerable lengths
to establish whether the children's wishes should be taken into
account, and what those wishes were, and point to a number of decisions
of the English courts which lay great importance on the opinion of
young children. They consider that the Court of Appeal correctly and
sufficiently substantiated why it was that the children's expression
of their wishes reflected those wishes, and was based on a thought
process sustained by a certain degree of maturity, not simply on a
childish mood. As to the absence of expert reports, the Government
note that the decisions in the case were taken on the basis of a full
hearing of the children, and conformed with the relevant domestic
procedural requirements. They point out that the family panels in the
Courts of Appeal are composed of judges with many years' experience in
family cases. They underline that the Youth Office is an independent
advisory body with a particular expertise in youth matters. It is
required to protect children against dangers to their best interests;
any tension between the applicant and the Youth Office arose because
the applicant did not comply with the terms of an access agreement, and
tried to photograph an official.
The applicant does not agree with the Government. She complains
about the behaviour of her husband and the courts in the custody and
access proceedings and, with particular reference to the proceedings
under the Child Abduction Convention, considers that it was impossible
to establish the real wishes of the children in the present case
because they had been separated from their normal surroundings for such
a length of time. She also considers that it is not appropriate for
a court to decide under Article 13 of the Child Abduction Convention
unless it has had the benefit of reports from the Central Authority and
other authorities referred to in the third paragraph of Article 13 of
that Convention. She claims that the Celle court should have laid more
weight on the decisions of the High Court in London that the retention
of the children was wrongful.
The applicant notes that the term "the well-being of the child"
is not a term which is used as such in the preamble to the Child
Abduction Convention, which stresses the importance of immediate return
of children who have been wrongfully retained. She concludes that
because the Celle court was in effect taking a custody decision when
it should have been taking a decision under the Child Abduction
Convention, the interference had no legitimate aim.
Finally, in connection with the proportionality of the
interference with any legitimate aim, the applicant does not accept
that it is possible to decide under the Child Abduction Convention
purely on the basis of the subjective feelings of children aged 7 and
9. She points out that any child will answer questions on the basis
of short-term considerations, and its well-being may not be best served
by those considerations. She also points out that the Celle court made
no allowance for the fact that the children had been brought up in a
tri-lingual background, and that it failed to give due consideration
to the points militating in favour of return of the children such as
their success in school in England, and the need to maintain relations
with people even when they insult (she refers to the incident where A
said that he was teased as a "Nazi").
The Commission considers that, on the basis of the intention and
wording of the Child Abduction Convention and the wrongful retention
of the children by their father, the applicant could reasonably expect
that the children would be returned to her, and that custody and access
proceedings (if any were necessary) would then take place in England.
The decisions of the German courts not to order the children's return
can therefore be regarded as an interference with her right to respect
for her family life. The interference was, however, in accordance with
the law as the German courts were applying the domestic legislation
which, itself, derived from an international convention designed to
assist in the resolution of problems of precisely the type raised in
present application. The aim of the interference was to implement the
Child Abduction Convention, and thereby attain the most appropriate
balance between the interests of the children and, secondarily, the
respective parents. The interference therefore pursued the legitimate
aim of protecting the "rights and freedoms of others".
As to the necessity for this interference, the Commission recalls
that the review of the Convention organs is not limited to ascertaining
whether a respondent State has exercised its discretion reasonably,
carefully and in good faith. In addition, in exercising their
supervisory jurisdiction, they must look at the case as a whole, and
must determine whether the reasons adduced to justify the interferences
at issue are "relevant and sufficient" (see Eur. Court HR, Olsson v.
Sweden judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, p. 32, para. 68).
In a case such as the present, the Commission must also bear in mind
that the interference at issue concerned a conflict not between a State
which has deprived a parent of custody and the parent, but rather
between two parents who were arguing over the custody of their
children. It is not unreasonable for the State to set up criteria
relating to the well-being of the children when deciding how to
determine such matters. Indeed, in a different type of dispute between
parents over custody, the European Court of Human Rights has noted
that Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-5) (not ratified by Germany, but
not pleaded in the case at issue) makes it clear that as regards
parental rights, the interests of the children are paramount (Eur.
Court HR, Hoffmann v. Austria judgment of 23 June 1993, Series A no.
255-C, p. 59, para. 35).
Applying these criteria to the facts of the present case, the
Commission first notes that the Child Abduction Convention clearly and
unambiguously permits, by the second paragraph of its Article 13, a
refusal to order the return of a child where the child objects to being
returned and has attained an age and degree of maturity at which it is
appropriate to take account of its views. The Commission cannot
therefore share the applicant's objection that taking account of the
views of the child is tantamount to taking a custody decision which is
outside the scope of the Child Abduction Convention.
It is not clear whether the provisions of the third paragraph of
Article 13 of the Child Abduction Convention require, as the applicant
claims, the obtention of information from the relevant Central
Authority or other competent authority when a decision is being taken
under the second paragraph, whether that paragraph only applies in
connection with the first paragraph, or whether it only applies where
such information has been received. However, the Commission is not
required to determine this question because, in any event, the
applicant did not refer to the third paragraph of Article 13 during the
proceedings before the Celle Court of Appeal, nor in her constitutional
complaint. She has therefore not exhausted domestic remedies in this
respect.
The Commission next notes that the Court of Appeal decided the
case on the basis of the statements of the children, having found that
they were of an age and maturity at which it was appropriate to take
account of their views. The Commission agrees with the applicant to
the extent that if a court were to base a decision on the views of
children who were palpably unable to form and articulate an opinion as
to their wishes, the "necessity" for such a decision may not be readily
apparent. The Commission in the present case can certainly not exclude
that children of the age of 7 and 9 may be capable of holding and
expressing firm and coherent views on where they wish to live, and
finds nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeal which could
indicate that the views of the boys in the present case were not
genuine and tenable.
Finally, the Commission recalls the limited nature of the
exercises undertaken both by the Celle Court of Appeal and by itself.
The Celle Court of Appeal was only deciding whether to return the
children to the applicant under the Child Abduction Convention. It
took no decision whatever as to custody and access, and none of the
subsequent proceedings are before the Commission. The Commission
itself exercises a supervisory jurisdiction over the domestic
decisions, but that jurisdiction is not intended to be primary in the
sense that the Commission substitutes its opinion for that of the
domestic authorities.
In the light of these considerations, the Commission finds that
the reasons given by the Celle Court of Appeal for its decision of
20 October 1994 were "relevant and sufficient" within the meaning
ascribed to that phrase by the case-law of the Convention organs. The
interference with the applicant's right to respect for her family life
can therefore be regarded as "necessary in a democratic society ... for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others".
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
3. The applicant alleges a violation of Article 14 of the
Convention, taken with Articles 6 and 8 (Art. 14+6+8) of the
Convention. Article 14 (Art. 14) provides as follows:
"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground
such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status."
The Commission notes that the applicant did not refer to
Article 3 of the Basic Law (equality before the law) in her application
to the Federal Constitutional Court, and it is therefore not clear
whether she has exhausted domestic remedies in connection with her
allegations of discrimination.
However, even if the applicant could be said to have raised a
complaint of discrimination in substance before the Federal
Constitutional Court, the allegation of a violation of Article 14
(Art. 14) of the Convention would nevertheless be inadmissible as the
Commission has found no indication in the documents submitted by the
parties that the authorities behaved in any way discriminatorily
against the applicant in the enjoyment of her Convention rights.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
M.F. BUQUICCHIO J. LIDDY
Secretary President
to the First Chamber of the First Chamber
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy