FIRST SECTION
DECISION
AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application no. 46471/99
by L.B. and Others
against Italy
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 7 March 2002 as a Chamber composed of
MrC.L. Rozakis, President,
MrsF. Tulkens,
MrP. Lorenzen,
MrsN. Vajić,
MrE. Levits,
MrA. Kovler,
MrV. Zagrebelsky, judges,
and Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights on 2 October 1998,
Having regard to Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention, by which the competence to examine the application was transferred to the Court,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicants are three Italian nationals, born in 1908, 1929 and 1935 and living respectively one in Turin and the others in Tronzano Vercellese. They are represented before the Court by MM. G. and R. Vitucci Righini di Sant’Albino, lawyers practising in Turin.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
The applicants are the owners of an apartment in Turin, which they had let to M.M.
In a writ served on the tenant on 8 January 1992, the applicants informed the tenant of their intention to terminate the lease and summoned him to appear before the Turin Magistrate.
By a decision of 19 February 1992, which was made enforceable on the same day, the Turin Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 19 February 1993.
On 22 February 1993, the applicants served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises.
On 18 March 1993 they served notice on the tenant informing him that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 2 April 1993.
Between 2 April 1993 and 13 January 1999, the bailiff made fourteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicants were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession.
Pursuant to article no. 6 of Law no. 431/98, the evictions proceedings were suspended until 20 January 2000.
On 27 January 2000, the applicants recovered possession of the apartment.
THE LAW
The applicants complain under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention that their inability to recover possession of their apartment amounted to a violation of the right to property.
The applicants further complain under Article 6 of the Convention about the duration of the eviction proceedings.
The Government argue that the applicants have not exhausted domestic remedies on the grounds that he failed to challenge the refusal of police assistance before the administrative courts.
The Court recalls that it has already dismissed this objection in the Immobiliare Saffi case (see the judgment Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, §§ 40-42, ECHR 1999-V). The Court sees no reason to depart from its previous finding. This objection should therefore be rejected.
The Government maintain that the measures in question amount to a control of the use of property which pursues the legitimate aim of avoiding the social tensions and troubles to public order that would occur if a considerable number of orders for possession were to be enforced simultaneously. In their opinion, the interference with the applicants’ property rights was not disproportionate; therefore, there is no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.1.
As to the length of the enforcement proceedings, the Government submit that the delay in granting police assistance is justified on grounds of the order of priorities established according to public-safety requirements. In any event, the Government stress that following the entry into force of Law no. 431 of 9 December 1998, the Prefect is no longer competent to determine the order of priority for the enforcement of the evictions. The date of enforcement should now be set by the District Court.
The Court considers that the application raises complex and serious issues which require a determination on the merits. It follows that it cannot be considered manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. No other ground for declaring the application inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Declares the application admissible, without prejudging the merits of the case.
Erik FriberghChristos Rozakis
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy