Information Note on the Court’s case-law 192
January 2016
L.E. v. Greece - 71545/12
Judgment 21.1.2016 [Section I]
Article 4
Positive obligations
Article 4-1
Trafficking in human beings
Shortcomings in response to criminal complaint of human-trafficking: violation
Facts – The applicant, who is of Nigerian origin, arrived in Greece in 2004 with the help of K.A., in return for a debt pledge of EUR 40,000. Once on Greek territory, K.A. allegedly confiscated her passport and forced her to work as a prostitute. She was arrested on several occasions for prostitution and breach of the legislation on the entry and residence of aliens. In November 2006, while being held in detention pending expulsion, the applicant filed a complaint against K.A. and his spouse D.J. She was assisted in that step by the non-governmental organisation Nea Zoi, which provides practical and psychological support to women who have been forced into prostitution, with which she had been in contact for about two years. The director of Nea Zoi was questioned and corroborated the applicant’s claims.
Law – Article 4
(a) The legislation in force at the material time – The relevant legislation provided the applicant with practical and effective protection.
(b) Sufficiency of the operational measures taken to protect the applicant – The key date was that on which the applicant indicated to the police officers that she was a victim of human-trafficking. From that date, the police services had taken immediate action, entrusting the applicant to the specialised anti-trafficking department. In addition, the expulsion proceedings that were pending against her had been discontinued and she was issued with a residence permit allowing her to remain on Greek territory. Lastly, the applicant had been formally classified as a victim of human-trafficking.
However, that status was only granted about nine months after the applicant’s complaint, in part because the statement given by the director of Nea Zoi was not included in the case file in good time, as a result of inadvertence on the part of the police authorities. That period could not be described as reasonable, especially as the authorities’ omission could have had adverse consequences on the applicant’s personal situation, since her release could have been delayed as a result. It followed that this delay in recognising the applicant as a victim of trafficking amounted to a substantial failing in terms of the operational measures that they could have taken to protect her.
(c) Effectiveness of the police investigation and the judicial proceedings – With regard to D.J.’s acquittal, in a 42-page judgment and after taking into consideration several witness statements from persons involved in the case, the assize court had concluded that it was not established that the defendant had forced the applicant into prostitution. The assize court could not be accused of issuing an arbitrary or insufficiently reasoned judgment entailing a breach of the procedural obligation under Article 4.
As to the adequacy of the police investigation, the police authorities had reacted promptly to the applicant’s complaint and the initial investigation had been completed in due time. However, a number of aspects of the proceedings had been unsatisfactory.
Firstly, the applicant’s complaint had initially been rejected by the prosecutor, who did not have available the witness statement by the director of the NGO Nea Zoi. In addition, the relevant judicial authorities had not resumed examination of the applicant’s complaint of their own motion following the addition of that statement. It was the applicant who had revived the proceedings. Lastly, it was not until June 2007 that the prosecutor had ordered that criminal proceedings be brought. No explanation had been provided as to this period of inactivity, which had lasted for more than five months. Those acts or omissions had had the effect of prolonging the period between the disclosure of the disputed situation and criminal proceedings being brought against K.A. and D.J. Yet this period had been crucial for ensuring prompt progress in the proceedings. Secondly, a number of shortcomings in the preliminary inquiry and the investigation of the case had compromised their effectiveness. Thus, no measure had been ordered once it was realised that K.A. was not resident at the address under surveillance. Yet stepping up the search for K.A. would appear to have been crucial at that point, given that D.J., his presumed accomplice, had already been summoned for police questioning as part of the preliminary investigation. Thirdly, there had been considerable delays in both the preliminary inquiry and investigation of the case, for which no explanation had been provided.
Lastly, with particular reference to K.A., the main presumed perpetrator of the acts of trafficking against the applicant, the evidence did not indicate that the police had taken further tangible steps to find him and bring him before the courts, other than entering his name in the police criminal research database. Thus, for example, there was nothing in the case file to suggest that the Greek authorities had established contact or instigated cooperation with the Nigerian authorities for the purpose of arresting K.A.
In the light of the foregoing, there had been a lack of promptness in taking operational measures in the applicant’s favour and shortcomings with regard to the Greek State’s procedural obligations under Article 4 of the Convention.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 41: EUR 12,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
(See also the factsheet Slavery, servitude and forced labour)
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
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