FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 64332/13
Gizella LÉNÁRT
against Hungary
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 12 June 2018 as a Committee composed of:
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, President,
Egidijus Kūris,
Iulia Motoc, judges,
and Andrea Tamietti, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 1 October 2013,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Ms Gizella Lénárt, is a Hungarian national, who was born in 1951 and lives in Budaörs.
2. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Justice.
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
4. The applicant served as a civil servant from 2002 until 13 July 2012. Upon the termination of her service, a certain part of her severance payment was taxed at 98% in the amount of 886,280 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 3,000 euros (EUR)).
5. Due to subsequent amendments of the relevant legislation, the tax rates applicable to the applicant’s severance payment changed retroactively. Accordingly, the National Tax Authority found that the relevant part of the applicant’s severance payment had been subject to a flat-rate public charge of 25% in the amount of HUF 226,092 (approximately EUR 750). Therefore, the applicant was reimbursed HUF 660,188 (approximately EUR 2,250) by the National Tax Authority on 10 June 2016. The resultant overall tax burden was thus 25%.
COMPLAINT
6. The applicant complained that the imposition of 98% tax on part of her remuneration due on termination of her employment had amounted to a deprivation of property in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.
THE LAW
7. The applicant complained about the levying of the special tax on part of her severance payment. She relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which provides as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
8. The Government contested that argument. They argued that following the introduction of the flat-rate public charge and the subsequent reimbursement (see paragraph 5 above), the criteria for finding a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 were not met in the applicant’s case. In any event, the Government requested the Court to declare the application inadmissible for abuse of the right of application because the applicant failed to inform the Court of the change of the tax regime and the resultant reimbursement.
9. The Court considers that it is not necessary to examine the Government’s argument on abuse of the right of individual petition, the present application being in any event inadmissible for the following reasons.
10. The Court recalls that in the area of social and economic legislation including in the area of taxation as a means of such policies States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation, which in the interests of social justice and economic well-being may legitimately lead them, in the Court’s view, to adjust, cap or even reduce the amount of severance normally payable to the qualifying population. However, any such measures must be implemented in a non-discriminatory manner and comply with the requirements of proportionality (see N.K.M. v. Hungary, no. 66529/11, § 65, 14 May 2013).
11. In the present case, when considering the proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought, it is to be noted that after the applicant was reimbursed, the overall tax burden imposed on her was 25% which cannot be considered disproportionate (see, a contrario, N.K.M. v. Hungary, cited above, §§ 66-76). The interference did not, therefore, impose an excessive individual burden on the applicant.
12. It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 5 July 2018.
Andrea TamiettiPaulo Pinto de Albuquerque
Deputy RegistrarPresident
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