LEONTII v. ROMANIA

FOURTH SECTION

DECISION

Application no. 54854/21
Serghei LEONTII
against Romania

The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 2 December 2025 as a Committee composed of:

 Ana Maria Guerra Martins, President,
 Anne Louise Bormann,
 Sebastian Răduleţu, judges,
and Valentin Nicolescu, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to:

the application (no. 54854/21) against Romania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) on 29 October 2021 by a Moldovan national, Mr Serghei Leontii (“the applicant”), who was born in 1972, lives in Bubuieci and was represented by Ms M. Dinu, a lawyer practising in Bucharest;

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

1.  The application concerns the alleged lack of impartiality of judges (S.I.M. and M.I.) who convicted the applicant on appeal.

2.  On 27 April 2015 the applicant and several other individuals were indicted for organising a criminal group and being complicit in forgery. According to the indictment, the group had forged official documents, including identity cards, which they had then sold. The applicant had allegedly transported the forged documents.

3.  On 3 December 2019 the Maramureș District Court convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him to two years and eight months’ imprisonment.

4.  The applicant appealed against his conviction to the Cluj Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”), where the case was assigned to a bench of two judges (composed of S.I.M. and M.I.).

5.  On 27 October and 10 November 2020 S.I.M. and M.I. delivered interim decisions in the case, in preparation for the appeal hearing.

6.  On 18 November 2020, following an application by the applicant and the co-accused, S.I.M. and M.I. delivered an interim decision declaring null and void the evidence obtained by the prosecution in cooperation with the Romanian Intelligence Service. The first‑instance court had relied on that evidence to convict the applicant and the co-accused (see paragraph 3 above), but the judges excluded it from the case.

7.  On 14 December 2020 the Cluj County Police Inspectorate (“the Police Inspectorate”) submitted a written request to the Court of Appeal, seeking a copy of the first-instance judgment in the applicant’s trial (see paragraph 3 above) and the interim decisions delivered by S.I.M. and M.I. in the case (see paragraphs 4-6 above). The request stated that those documents were needed for an ongoing criminal investigation (file no. 804/P/2020) concerning the offence of trading in influence under Article 292 of the Criminal Code. The request did not, however, provide further information about the scope of the investigation, the underlying facts, or the identity of any suspects.

8.  On 18 December 2020 S.I.M. provided the Police Inspectorate with the requested information.

9.  On 21 December 2020 S.I.M. and M.I. submitted identical applications to recuse themselves from the case (declarații de abţinere) under Article 64 §1 (f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They stated that their applications had been prompted by the fact that the Police Inspectorate was conducting an investigation in connection with the resolution of the applicant’s criminal case, concerning the commission of the offence of trading in influence. The judges considered that their recusal was necessary to eliminate any suspicion that might arise regarding their impartiality in adjudicating the case, even as regards appearances, as part of the fair-trial guarantees owed to the parties.

10.  On 21 December 2020 a different bench of the Court of Appeal, by an interim decision, dismissed the applications for recusal as ill‑founded. It referred to the applicable legal principles, including the Court’s case-law, and specifically to Article 64 § 1 (f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and noted that the position of a judge was incompatible with the impartial examination of a case where there was a reasonable suspicion of his or her impartiality being affected.

11.  The Court of Appeal further stated that the reasons put forward by the judges in their applications for recusal (see paragraph 9 above) could not constitute grounds for recusal. It added that, as the arguments adduced by the two judges were not conclusive (concludente) and the reasons provided could not be substantiated, there were no legal or well‑founded grounds to justify their recusal.

12.  On 10 March 2021 S.I.M. and M.I., sitting as a two-judge bench of the Court of Appeal, dismissed the applicant’s appeal and upheld the conviction delivered at first instance (see paragraphs 3-4 above).

13.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal (contestație în anulare) under Article 64 § 1 (f) and Article 426 (d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the Court of Appeal’s decision of 10 March 2021, alleging that it had been delivered by judges whose positions were incompatible with an impartial examination of the case. He argued that, given the ongoing criminal investigation in file no. 804/P/2020 (see paragraph 7 above), there had been a reasonable suspicion that S.I.M.’s and M.I.’s impartiality was compromised. He further submitted that the Police Inspectorate had requested copies of the interim decisions delivered by those judges – including the decision of 18 November 2020, by which evidence had been excluded from the file (see paragraph 6 above) – and that S.I.M. had provided them (see paragraph 8 above). Lastly, he contended that, on the basis of the Police Inspectorate’s request (see paragraph 7 above), it could be inferred that S.I.M. and M.I. were being investigated for trading in influence in connection with the case they had been adjudicating.

14.  On 22 April 2021 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s extraordinary appeal as inadmissible.

15.  The Court of Appeal noted that, during the appeal proceedings, S.I.M.’s and M.I.’s applications for recusal had been dismissed as unfounded (see paragraphs 9-11 above). It further noted that the issues raised concerning the alleged lack of impartiality had already been known during the appeal proceedings, when they had been examined and rejected through the procedure for recusal, and that no new circumstances had arisen to justify an extraordinary appeal.

16.  The court further stated that a final decision could only be set aside where a fundamental defect was discovered after the conclusion of the proceedings. If such issues had been known during the trial, they had to be raised through the ordinary appeal avenue. Since the grounds of the applicant’s appeal were identical to those relied on by the judges in their applications for recusal and had already been examined when those applications had been dismissed, the extraordinary appeal was inadmissible.

17.  Lastly, the Court of Appeal also noted that the applicant’s grounds of appeal did not contain any arguments specifically addressing the alleged incompatibility of the judges’ position with an impartial examination of his case. The matters raised by the applicant – including those referring to a possible connection between the criminal investigation in file no. 804/P/2020 and the case against him – had already been examined when the judges’ earlier applications for recusal had been considered. As no new elements had been advanced, the extraordinary appeal amounted to an ordinary appeal in disguise, which was inadmissible, as reopening the matter would undermine the authority of res judicata.

18.  On 5 October 2021 the High Court of Cassation and Justice dismissed an appeal on points of law (recurs în casație) lodged by the applicant as inadmissible.

THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT

19.  Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant complained that the judges S.I.M. and M.I. had lacked impartiality on account of the criminal investigation allegedly conducted in connection with the criminal case against him.

20.  The Court’s principles relating to the impartiality of judges, as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, were reiterated in, among other authorities, Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal ([GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, §§ 144-50, 6 November 2018).

21.  The Court observes at the outset that the applicant has not alleged that S.I.M. and M.I., who sat on the appeal bench, held any personal bias or animosity against him (contrast Kyprianou v. Cyprus [GC], no. 73797/01, § 122, ECHR 2005-XIII). The applicant’s complaint must therefore be examined from the perspective of the objective impartiality test (see, among other authorities, Alexandru Marian Iancu v. Romania, no. 60858/15, § 66, 4 February 2020). Specifically, the Court must address the question of whether the applicant’s doubts, which stemmed from the specific situation, may be regarded as objectively justified in the circumstances of the case (see George‑Laviniu Ghiurău v. Romania, no. 15549/16, § 64, 16 June 2020).

22.  As a preliminary remark, the Court notes that the two judges on the bench which convicted the applicant on appeal sought to recuse themselves from the case under Article 64 § 1 (f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They referred to the request for information made by the Police Inspectorate regarding an ongoing criminal investigation into allegations of trading in influence, and to the possibility that their continued participation in the applicant’s case might cast doubt on their impartiality (see paragraph 9 above). In dismissing their applications for recusal, the Court of Appeal found the judges’ arguments inconclusive and held that the reasons provided could not be confirmed (see paragraphs 10-11 above). The Court further notes that the applications were couched in general terms, referring only to the Police Inspectorate’s request for information (see paragraph 7 above) without providing further details, and appeared to have been lodged as a precautionary measure (see, mutatis mutandis, Alexandru Marian Iancu, cited above, § 69, and George-Laviniu Ghiurău, cited above, § 65).

23.  The Court observes that the Police Inspectorate’s request for information provided no details about the alleged facts, the scope of the investigation, or the identity of any suspects, including the judges themselves. It notes, moreover, that the applicant did not request the judges’ recusal during the appeal proceedings. Had he done so with proper justification, it would have enabled the domestic courts to clarify the circumstances surrounding the request for information and to determine whether any legitimate concerns existed as to the judges’ impartiality. Instead, the applicant raised those concerns only in his extraordinary appeal, after being convicted by the same bench (see paragraph 13 above). That appeal, which was essentially based on the same evidence and arguments as the judges’ applications for recusal (see paragraph 9 above), was dismissed as inadmissible on the grounds that the issues raised had already been known, examined and rejected during the appeal proceedings, and that no new circumstances had arisen to justify reopening the matter (see paragraphs 14‑17 above).

24.  While the Court notes that an application for recusal lodged during the appeal proceedings on the same grounds as those relied on by the judges in their applications for recusal might likewise have been dismissed, the applicant has not argued that he was prevented from submitting a substantiated application, duly supported by additional evidence, or that the domestic courts would have refused to examine it. In those circumstances, although the applicant’s failure to seek the judges’ recusal raises serious doubts as to whether he properly exhausted domestic remedies, the Court finds it unnecessary to determine that issue, since the complaint is in any event manifestly ill‑founded for the reasons set out below.

25.  Turning to the applicant’s complaints before the Court, his allegations concerning the appeal bench’s impartiality merely repeat the grounds raised in his extraordinary appeal, and rely on the same evidence that was before the Court of Appeal when it dismissed the applications for recusal and the extraordinary appeal. Referring to the two elements, factual and legal, that a complaint or “claim” should comprise (see, mutatis mutandis, Grosam v. the Czech Republic [GC], no. 19750/13, § 88, 1 June 2023), the Court notes that in the present case, however, the applicant has not articulated his complaint in a substantiated manner, with specific and reasoned arguments, relying instead on vague and repetitive allegations.

26.  On the basis of the evidence before it, the Court finds no discernible reason to conclude that the police request for information was capable of casting doubt on the impartiality of the appeal bench. It notes that the applicant’s allegations rest solely on the fact that during the appeal the police requested from the appeal bench a set of documents, including decisions delivered by the two judges, and on his claim in the extraordinary appeal that the investigation had been conducted in relation to the bench (see paragraph 13 above). However, as there is no evidence that the judges were personally named or formally targeted by the investigation, the Court considers the applicant’s claim to be speculative.

27.  As for the Court of Appeal’s reasoning in respect of the applications for recusal (see paragraphs 10-11 above), given that those applications relied on the same grounds as those advanced by the applicant, the Court sees no basis to depart from that assessment. On the contrary, it notes that the judges sought to recuse themselves from the case on what appears to have been a precautionary basis, and that the Court of Appeal applied the relevant Convention standards, examining the issue of impartiality in the light of the facts available at the time.

28.  Accordingly, on the basis of the material before it, the Court finds no appearance of either an objective or subjective lack of impartiality on the part of the judges sitting on the appeal bench. It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.

29.  The applicant also raised other complaints under Article 6 §§ 1, 2 and 3 of the Convention.

30.  The Court considers that, in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, these complaints either do not meet the admissibility criteria set out in Articles 34 and 35 of the Convention or do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention.

31.  It follows that this part of the application must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,

Declares the application inadmissible.

Done in English and notified in writing on 15 January 2026.

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 Valentin Nicolescu Ana Maria Guerra Martins
 Acting Deputy Registrar President