LESNÍ SPOLEČNOST PŘIMDA, A.S. v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC

FIFTH SECTION

PARTIAL DECISION

AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application no. 11997/05
by LESNÍ SPOLEČNOST PŘIMDA, A.S.
against the Czech Republic

The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 8 July 2008 as a Chamber composed of:

Peer Lorenzen, President,
Karel Jungwiert,
Volodymyr Butkevych,
Renate Jaeger,
Mark Villiger,
Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Deputy Section Registrar,

Having regard to the above application lodged on 25 March 2005,

Having deliberated, decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant, Lesní společnost Přimda, a.s., is a joint-stock company with its seat in Přimda. It is represented before the Court by Mrs R. Tunklová, of the Czech Bar.

A. The circumstances of the case

The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant company, may be summarised as follows.

By Resolution no. 323 of 29 April 1992 of the Government of the Czech Republic and the decision of the Ministry of Administration of National Property and Privatisation of 30 April 1992, privatisation project no. 3132 of the State enterprise Západočeské státní lesy Plzeň was approved.

On the basis of that project, the applicant company was founded on 1 September 1992. In accordance with the privatisation project approved by the Government, the property transferred to it included the building in issue. The applicant company's title to the building was recorded in the Register of Real Property (evidence nemovitostí) accordingly and the applicant company began to use it.

On 8 December 1995 the municipality of P. brought a civil action against the applicant company, seeking a declaration that the municipality was the owner of the building. It referred to the Act on Transfer of Certain Property of the Czech Republic to Municipalities (Law no. 172/1991), which provided that certain property was to be ipso jure transferred to municipalities with effect from the date on which the law came into force, that is, on 24 May 1991.

Judgments of the Tachov District Court of 14 June 1996 and of 18 November 1997 in favour of the plaintiff were quashed by the Plzeň Regional Court on 19 May 1997 and on 19 January 1999 respectively. The Regional Court held that the first-instance court had failed to properly establish the facts of the case and instructed it to supplement the evidence.

On 19 December 2000 the Tachov District Court again allowed the action, holding that the conditions set forth in section 2(1)(c) of Law no. 172/1991 were met, specifically that the plaintiff had been the owner of the property in issue as of 31 December 1949 and that the property was owned by the State as of the date on which the above-mentioned law had come into force. Responding to one of the applicant company's objections and with reference to the conclusions of an expert opinion produced further to a request of 1 November 1999 by the court, it concluded that the building owned by the plaintiff as of 31 December 1949 was identical to the one in issue. Notwithstanding the reconstruction works carried out by the applicant company's legal predecessor, the building had not lost its character, that is, it had not ceased to exist and a new building had not been created.

In an appeal of 19 February 2001 the applicant company alleged that the reasoning of the first-instance court's judgment did not comply with the statutory requirements. Further, the applicant company challenged the interpretation by the first-instance court of section 2(1)(c) of Law no. 172/1991 and the court's conclusion that a new building had not been created.

On 21 August 2002 the Plzeň Regional Court upheld the first-instance judgment. The appellate court found that the reasoning of the judgment had been in compliance with the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure since it referred, inter alia, to the expert opinion and it had therefore been possible to ascertain the evidence on which the court had based its decision. The appellate court further rejected the applicant company's interpretation of the provision cited above and accepted the interpretation given by the first-instance court. Lastly, it upheld the conclusion that the original building had never ceased to exist.

On 21 March 2003 the Supreme Court, holding that the courts had decided in compliance with the established case-law and that therefore no issue of crucial legal importance arose, rejected an appeal on points of law by the applicant company as inadmissible.

On 15 September 2004 a constitutional appeal by the applicant company alleging a violation of the right to a fair hearing and its property rights was dismissed as manifestly ill-founded. The Constitutional Court found that the applicant company had merely disputed the ordinary courts' findings of fact and law and had presented the same legal opinion again. However, its status as a party to the proceedings had been respected and the courts had examined enough evidence and reasoned their decisions. As to the alleged violation of property rights, the Constitutional Court reiterated that the relevant provision of domestic law protected ownership that had already been established and not a mere claim. Therefore, ownership that was merely the subject of legal proceedings did not enjoy constitutional protection.

On 10 April 2007 the applicant company brought an action in the Prague 1 District Court under Law no. 82/1998 as amended, seeking damages for the length of the civil proceedings.

On the same grounds, the applicant company lodged an application with the Ministry of Justice on 11 April 2007.

B. Relevant domestic law and practice

The relevant domestic law and practice concerning remedies for the excessive length of judicial proceedings are set out in the Court's decision in the case of Vokurka v. the Czech Republic ((dec.) no. 40552/02 §§ 11, 25-33, 16 October 2007).

At the material time, the relevant provisions of Law no. 172/1991 as amended read as follows:

Section 2

“(1) As of the date when this law comes into force, the following property shall be transferred to municipalities:

...

(c) Buildings with land constituting a single functional unit with the building,

...

which were owned by municipalities as of 31 December 1949 and provided that they are owned by the Czech Republic ...”

Section 8

“Within one year after acquiring the ownership of real estate in accordance with this law, municipalities shall be obliged to file an application with the Geodetic Centre to record [the title to] such real estate in the Register of Real Property.”

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant company complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the length of the proceedings had been unreasonable.

2. Relying on the same provision, it challenged the interpretation by the domestic courts of section 2(1)(c) of Law no. 172/1991. Additionally, it alleged that the courts had not stated sufficient reasons for their conclusions, had not dealt with its arguments and had ignored evidence in its favour.

3. The applicant company further submitted that the Tachov District Court's practice of assigning, within a certain period, all new cases to one particular, newly appointed judge violated its right to a hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

4. Lastly, the applicant company alleged that it had been deprived of its possessions, in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It claimed that it had acquired bona fide the property in issue in 1992, when the State had founded the applicant company and assigned the building to its corporate assets. The title to the property had been recorded in the Register of Real Property accordingly. The applicant company could not have been aware that the State had transferred to it property that had earlier been ipso jure transferred to a municipality. Moreover, the municipality of P. had failed to comply with section 8 of Law no. 172/1991 by not filing an application to record its newly established title to the building in issue to the Register of Real Property.

The applicant company submitted in conclusion that it had been deprived of its property without a fair balance between the public interest and the protection of fundamental rights having been struck.

THE LAW

1. The applicant company complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the proceedings. The relevant part of that provision reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”

The Court notes that in the case of Vokurka (cited above, § 65) it found the compensatory remedy provided for by Law no. 82/1998 as amended to be effective for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention in respect of complaints about the length of judicial proceedings in the Czech Republic.

In the instant case the applicant company decided to resort to this remedy. However, according to the information submitted to the Court, both the proceedings before the Ministry of Justice and the domestic courts seem to be still pending.

The Court therefore considers that the applicant company has not exhausted domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. The complaint must therefore be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

2. Relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the applicant company challenged the national courts' interpretation of domestic legislation and the lack of reasoning in their decisions.

The Court reiterates that, according to Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. It is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999-I). It is the national authorities, in particular courts and tribunals, that are charged with interpreting the internal law of a Contracting Party (see, among many other authorities, Brualla Gómez de la Torre v. Spain, judgment of 19 December 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VIII, § 31).

Regarding the instant case, the Court observes that it is evident from the decisions of the national courts which provisions of domestic law were applied and what evidence they relied on when establishing the facts of the case. As instructed by the appellate court, the first-instance court supplemented the evidence with an expert opinion. The applicant company was represented by a lawyer during the domestic proceedings and had the opportunity to present its arguments, to which the courts responded adequately by means of reasoned conclusions.

The Court can see no reason why the interpretation by the domestic courts of section 2(1)(c) of Law no. 172/1991 should be challenged. There is nothing in the case file to indicate that the domestic proceedings were unfair or that the national courts proceeded arbitrarily.

It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.

3. The applicant company submitted that the assignment of cases to judges at the Tachov District Court did not comply with the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The relevant part of that provision reads as follows:

“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”

The Court finds, however, that those complaints were not raised – either in form or in substance – in a constitutional appeal to the Constitutional Court.

The Court therefore considers that the applicant company has not exhausted domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. The complaint must therefore be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

4. Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant company complains that its right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions was infringed. That provision reads as follows:

“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”

The Court considers that it cannot, on the basis of the file, determine the admissibility of this complaint. It is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 54 § 2 (b) of the Rules of Court, to give notice of this part of the application to the respondent Government.

For these reasons, the Court unanimously

Decides to adjourn the examination of the applicant company's complaint concerning the violation of its property rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;

Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible.

Stephen PhillipsPeer Lorenzen
Deputy RegistrarPresident

 

Full & Egal Universal Law Academy