AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 26367/95
by Pentti LOIKKANEN, Markku LOIKKANEN and
the Estate of late Ms. Mirja Liisa ATTILA
against Finland
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 15 May 1996, the following members being present:
Mr. C.L. ROZAKIS, President
Mrs. J. LIDDY
MM. E. BUSUTTIL
A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
A. WEITZEL
M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 2 November 1994
by Pentti LOIKKANEN, Markku LOIKKANEN and the Estate of late Ms. Mirja
Liisa ATTILA against Finland and registered on 31 January 1995 under
file No. 26367/95;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The first and second applicants are Finnish citizens, born in
1935 and 1948 respectively. The first applicant is a professor residing
in Espoo and the second applicant is an airline pilot residing in
Helsinki. The third applicant is the undistributed estate of the late
Mirja Liisa Attila. The estate, which has legal personality, is
represented by one of the heirs, Mr. Mikko Attila. Before the
Commission the applicants are represented by Mr. Markku Fredman, a
lawyer practising in Helsinki.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be
summarised as follows.
The applicants are joint owners of a piece of real property known
as Salmi 9:32 in Savonlinna, which has an area of 55.8 hectares. The
neighbouring piece of property, known as Salmenranta 9:39, was owned
by a person named T. The latter property had a right of way (tieoikeus,
vägrätt) over a six-metre-wide road encumbering the applicants'
property.
On 20 April 1990 a person named G bought a parcel (määräala,
område) of T's original estate (kantatila, stamlägenhet), i.e. of
Salmenranta. On 7 September 1990 G's spouse became a joint owner of the
parcel.
At the end of August 1990 G, with the help of a person named P,
felled about 200 trees situated on the applicants' property within the
six-metre-wide area covered by the right of way. Furthermore, in the
middle of September 1990, when the road was used for bringing building
materials to G's parcel, a bridge belonging to the applicants' property
collapsed. G and his wife subsequently replaced the bridge with another
construction.
In September 1990 administrative proceedings began before an
Expert (toimitusinsinööri, syssloman) with a view to separating
(lohkominen, styckning) G's parcel from the original estate. On
19 November 1990 the separation was terminated and G's parcel was
transformed into an independent piece of real property. It was also
decided that the already-existing right of way over a six-metre-wide
road, encumbering the applicants' property, would benefit G's land.
Later, in administrative proceedings on 17 May 1991, the location
of the road was transferred to another place in accordance with the
applicants' request and the existing right of way encumbering the
applicants' property was accordingly transferred to that area.
Due to the fact that the applicants had reported the felling of
timber to the police, the police conducted a preliminary investigation.
As a result of the preliminary investigation G and P were charged with
reckless felling of timber (haaskaaminen, åverkansbrott) as well as
unauthorised building on another person's property (luvaton
rakentaminen toisen maalla, olovlig byggande på mark som är i en annans
besittning) contrary to chapter 33 sections 1 and 5 of the Criminal
Code as it stood. Furthermore, the applicants sued G and P for damages.
The case was heard by the City Court (raastuvanoikeus,
rådstuvurätten) of Savonlinna. The applicants were assisted or
represented by counsel. The City Court heard evidence from the parties
and from one witness called by the applicants and from one witness
called by the accused. The parties did not call any further witnesses.
On 6 August 1992 the City Court found G and P guilty on the
charges against them and sentenced both of them to 55 day-fines,
totalling FIM 1,815 and FIM 4,785 respectively. Furthermore, the City
Court obliged them to pay compensation of FIM 7,004 as regards the
trees and of FIM 1,000 as regards the bridge. The City Court found
that, under the Act on Private Roads, G, as the owner of the parcel,
had had the right temporarily to use the six-metre-wide road over which
T's original property had a right of way. It found, however, that this
right of use did not include the right to fell the trees growing on the
road area. It found that G and P had felled the trees without being
authorised to do so.
The applicants as well as the accused appealed to the Court of
Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten) of East Finland.
On 21 January 1994 the Court of Appeal acquitted G and P on the
charges brought against them. It found that there was no reason to link
a parcel-owner's right to make use of his possessions to the separation
process. As G's property had had the right to be served by the relevant
road in its entirety, i.e. in a width of six metres, he and P had not
committed a crime by felling the trees growing on the road area.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal found that the applicants had no right
to grow trees on the relevant road area and, therefore, the felling of
the trees had not caused them damage for which compensation should be
paid. The Court of Appeal quashed the City Court's judgment as regards
the compensation for the trees. As regards the compensation for the
bridge, the Court of Appeal upheld the City Court's judgment.
On 2 May 1994 the Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta
domstolen) refused the applicants leave to appeal.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicants complain that the Court of Appeal, by its
judgment, failed to protect their right to peaceful enjoyment of their
possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention. They maintain that the Court of Appeal erred in law in
holding the legal status of an owner of a parcel of land to be equal
to that of an owner of an already-separated piece of real property.
They complain that their possession rights as regards the trees growing
on their property were violated. They maintain, furthermore, that the
alleged deprivation of their possessions was not in the public interest
or lawful, since the relevant legislation was so unclear that the two
courts came to different conclusions. They maintain that the State was
obliged to enact laws clearly defining this type of action as
punishable.
2. The applicants maintain that the Court of Appeal tolerated their
neighbours' allegedly unauthorised actions although their neighbours'
right of way ought to have been confirmed only in the separation
proceedings. Therefore, the applicants complain that their civil rights
and obligations were not determined in a fair hearing within the
meaning of Article 6 of the Convention.
THE LAW
1. The applicants complain that the Finnish courts, by their
decisions in the present case, disregarded their right to peaceful
enjoyment of their possessions. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to
the Convention reads:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject
to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it
deems necessary to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest or to secure the
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."
The Commission notes that the dispute concerned the
interpretation of the right of way. In this respect the Commission
recalls that the dispute was examined by the Court of Appeal, which,
acting within its competence and applying what it considered to be the
relevant rules of the applicable law, found it established that G and
P had not committed a crime nor caused such damage to the applicants'
timber as should be compensated for, since the applicants had not had
the right to grow the relevant trees. The fact that the courts
acquitted the accused and that the applicants were only partly
successful in bringing compensation proceedings does not mean that the
respondent State has disregarded the applicants' rights under Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.
In these circumstances there is no basis upon which it could be
held that the applicants' rights secured to them by Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) have been violated.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. The applicants complain, further, that their civil rights and
obligations were not determined in a fair hearing within the meaning
of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention since the courts tolerated
their neighbours' actions although their neighbours' rights ought to
have been confirmed only in the separation proceedings.
Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention reads, in so far as
relevant, as follows:
"1. In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... , everyone is entitled to a fair ...
hearing ... by (a) ... tribunal ...
... "
The Commission notes that in the court proceedings complained of
the applicants were able to call all the witnesses whose evidence they
considered relevant. As regards the evaluation of the evidence the
Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the
Convention, the Commission's only task is to ensure the observance of
the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention whereas it
is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of
law or fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it
considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of
any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention (cf., for
example, No. 21283/93, Dec. 5.4.94, D.R. 77-A p. 81).
In the instant case the Commission has not found any appearance
of a violation of the right to a fair hearing within the meaning of
Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.
It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
Secretary to the First Chamber President of the First Chamber
(M.F. BUQUICCHIO) (C.L. ROZAKIS)
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy