FOURTH SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 7376/10
Mieczysław LIS
against Poland
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting on 21 May 2013 as a Committee composed of:
Päivi Hirvelä, President,
Ledi Bianku,
Paul Mahoney, judges,
and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 31 January 2010,
Having regard to the declaration submitted by the respondent Government on 11 February 2013, requesting the Court to strike the application out of the list of cases and the applicant’s reply to that declaration,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant, Mr Mieczysław Lis, is a Polish national, who was born in 1957 and lives in Łódź.
The Polish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Wołąsiewicz, succeeded by Ms J. Chrzanowska, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the refusal of the legal-aid lawyer to lodge a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court deprived him of access to the Supreme Court.
The applicant complained also of the courts’ assessment of the evidence and challenged the outcome of the proceedings.
THE LAW
A. Access to the Supreme Court
The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the refusal of his legal-aid lawyer to lodge a cassation appeal had deprived him of effective access to the Supreme Court.
By letter dated 11 February 2012 the Government informed the Court that they proposed to make a unilateral declaration with a view to resolving the issue raised by this part of the application. They further requested the Court to strike out the application in accordance with Article 37 of the Convention.
The declaration provided as follows:
“(...) The government hereby wish to express – by way of unilateral declaration – their acknowledgment of the fact that the applicant was denied access to a court in the determination of criminal charges against him in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the court’s failure to instruct the applicant about the renewed time-limit for lodging a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court after the legal-aid lawyer refused to prepare a cassation appeal. Simultaneously, the Government declare that they are ready to pay the applicant the sum of PLN 8,000 which they consider to be reasonable in the light of the Court’s case law (see Bieglecki v. Poland, application no. 33309/02, decision of 21 August 2010). The sum referred to above, which is to cover any pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage as well as costs and expenses, will be free of any taxes that may be applicable. It will be payable within three months from the date of notification of the decision taken by the Court pursuant to Article 37 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In the event of failure to pay this sum within the said three-month period, the Government undertake to pay simple interest on it, from expiry of that period until settlement, at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default periods plus three percentage points.”
In a letter of 5 March 2012 the applicant expressed the view that the sum mentioned in the Government’s declaration was unacceptably low.
The Court recalls that Article 37 of the Convention provides that it may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to one of the conclusions specified under (a), (b) or (c) of paragraph 1 of that Article. Article 37 § 1 (c) enables the Court in particular to strike a case out of its list if:
“for any other reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application”.
It also recalls that in certain circumstances, it may strike out an application under Article 37 § 1 (c) on the basis of a unilateral declaration by a respondent Government even if the applicant wishes the examination of the case to be continued.
To this end, the Court will examine carefully the declaration in the light of the principles emerging from its case-law, in particular the Tahsin Acar judgment (Tahsin Acar v. Turkey, [GC], no. 26307/95, §§ 75‑77, ECHR 2003‑VI); WAZA Spółka z o.o. v. Poland (dec.) no. 11602/02, 26 June 2007; and Sulwińska v. Poland (dec.) no. 28953/03).
Having regard to the nature of the admissions contained in the Government’s declaration, as well as the amount of compensation proposed – which is consistent with the amounts awarded in similar cases – the Court considers that it is no longer justified to continue the examination of the application (Article 37 § 1 (c)).
Moreover, in light of the above considerations, and in particular given the clear and extensive case-law on the topic, the Court is satisfied that respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto does not require it to continue the examination of this part of the application (Article 37 § 1 in fine).
Accordingly, it should be struck out of the list.
B. Remaining complaint
The applicant further complained, relying on Article 6 of the Convention, that the proceedings had been unfair in that the courts had wrongly assessed evidence and erred in establishing the facts of the case.
However, the Court reiterates that, according to Article 19 of the Convention, its duty is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the Contracting Parties to the Convention. In particular, it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly committed by a national court unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention. Moreover, while Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way it should be assessed, which are therefore primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999-I, with further references).
In the present case the Court notes that the applicant did not allege any particular failure to respect his right to a fair hearing on the part of the relevant courts. Indeed, his complaints are limited to a challenge to the result of the proceedings. Assessing the circumstances of the case as a whole, the Court finds no indication that the impugned proceedings were conducted unfairly.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court unanimously
Takes note of the terms of the respondent Government’s declaration in respect of the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and of the modalities for ensuring compliance with the undertakings referred to therein;
Decides to strike the application out of its list of cases in so far as it relates to the above complaint in accordance with Article 37 § 1 (c) of the Convention.
Fatoş AracıPäivi Hirvelä
Deputy RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy