LUNGU v. THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

Published on 6 October 2025

FIFTH SECTION

Application no. 56161/18
Nicolae LUNGU
against the Republic of Moldova
lodged on 22 November 2018
communicated on 16 September 2025

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The application concerns the applicant’s administrative conviction for leaving the scene of a traffic accident before his guilt in respect of the accident itself was established in separate proceedings.

On 27 December 2017 the applicant was involved in a traffic accident, colliding with a billboard owned by a private company. After the accident the applicant left the scene.

On 9 January 2018 the police drew up two administrative offence reports – one for leaving the scene of a traffic accident and the second one for violating traffic regulations resulting in significant damage to goods. The two offence reports were examined in two separate sets of administrative offence proceedings.

In the first set of administrative offence proceedings, on 10 May 2018 the applicant was found guilty by a first-instance court of having left the scene of the traffic accident. In particular, Article 243 of the Code of Administrative Offences then in force, penalised leaving the scene of a traffic accident by a perpetrator (de către vinovat).

The applicant’s driving licence was withdrawn for a period of two years.

He challenged the decision of the first-instance court, alleging that the administrative offence report had been drawn up with multiple procedural violations and that the court breached the principle of presumption of innocence by implying that the applicant was responsible for the traffic accident, although the second set of administrative offence proceedings were still pending, and his guilt was not established by any court.

He also requested the first-instance court to refer his case to the Constitutional Court alleging that Article 243 of the Code of Administrative Offences was unconstitutional.

On 19 July 2018 an appellate court upheld the decision of the first-instance court and also dismissed the applicant’s request to refer his case to the Constitutional Court as manifestly ill-founded.

In the second set of administrative offence proceedings, concerning the violation of traffic regulations resulting in significant damage to goods, on 14 September 2018 the first-instance court fined the applicant.

On 4 December 2018 that decision was upheld by the appellate court’s final decision.

The applicant complains, relying on Article 6 §§ 1 and 2 of the Convention, that the courts did not sufficiently reason their decisions and that his administrative conviction for leaving the scene of a traffic accident, issued before a final decision regarding the accident itself, violated the principle of presumption of innocence.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1.  Did the applicant have a fair hearing in the determination of the criminal charges against him, in accordance with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 169, ECHR 2010)? In particular, did the domestic courts involved in the first set of administrative offence proceedings give sufficient reasons for their decisions to convict the applicant, in accordance with the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention, taking into consideration that the second set of administrative offence proceedings were still pending (see Fomin v. Moldova, no. 36755/06, §§ 24-34, 11 October 2011)?

2.  Was the presumption of innocence, guaranteed by Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, respected by the court’s decision of 19 July 2018 given that Article 243 of the Code of Administration Offences, as in force at the time, penalised leaving the scene of a traffic accident by the perpetrator?