THIRD SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 53257/12
Aleksandr Petrovich LVOV
against Russia
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting on 18 December 2018 as a Committee composed of:
Alena Poláčková, President,
Dmitry Dedov,
Jolien Schukking, judges,
and Stephen Phillips, Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 21 July 2012,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Mr Aleksandr Petrovich Lvov, is a Russian national, who was born in 1976 and lives in Cheboksary.
2. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights and then by his successor in that office, Mr M. Galperin.
A. The circumstances of the case
3. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
4. The applicant took part in various military operations in the North Caucasus Region between 1995 and 1998.
5. On an unspecified date the applicant, within the group of other military servicemen, applied to the Vladikavkaz Garrison Military Court against the director of the North Caucasus Military Institute seeking to recover additional social payments, food allowances and remuneration for participation in the aforementioned operations.
6. On 30 April 2003 the district court granted the applicant’s claim and ordered the director of the North Caucasus Military Institute to recalculate military allowances, social payments and remuneration of the applicant. The court did not specify any sum payable to the applicant. The judgment was not appealed against and became final.
7. On 26 October 2005 the district court issued a writ of execution. The applicant submitted the writ of execution to the bailiffs’ service.
8. On 6 March 2006 the bailiffs’ service returned the writ of execution with a mention that since the debtor was a budgetary institution of a constituent entity of the Russian Federation, the writ of execution should be submitted to the relevant Federal Treasury Department.
9. It appears that the applicant submitted the writ of execution to the relevant Federal Treasury Department twice. However he failed to submit his bank account details and copy of the judgment.
10. On 16 May 2006 and on 26 December 2007 the Federal Treasury Department returned the writ of execution and asked for bank account details to be submitted. It further noted that the court judgment did not specify sums payable to the applicant.
11. On 14 June 2011 the applicant applied for the restoration of the time limits for enforcement.
12. On 22 September 2011 the Vladikavkaz Garrison Military Court dismissed his request on the grounds that there was no legitimate reason to restore the time limits. This decision was upheld on 14 December 2011 by the cassation instance.
13. The applicant applied for compensation for non-enforcement.
14. On 16 December 2011 the single judge of the North Caucasus Circuit Military Court returned the application owing to the failure to submit the writs of execution for enforcement after it was returned on 26 December 2007. This decision was upheld on 18 June 2012 by the cassation instance.
B. Relevant domestic law
15. Article 239 §§ 2 and 3 of the Budget Code of the Russian Federation, as in force at the material time, provided that the bailiffs’ service were not entitled to execute judicial decisions recovering funds from the budgetary system of the Russian Federation. Execution of such decisions was regulated by Chapter 24.1 of the Budget Code (Articles 242.1-242.5).
16. Article 242.1 § 1 of the Budget Code provided that enforcement of judicial decisions recovering funds from the budgetary system of the Russian Federation was held on the basis of the enforcement documents (writ of execution, court order).
17. Article 242.3 § 1 of the Budget Code provided that the creditor or the court acting on his or her behalf should send the necessary enforcement documents to the relevant branch of the Federal Treasury that holds the debtor’s accounts.
18. Article 14 § 1 (1) of the Federal Law on Enforcement Proceedings of 21 July 1997 provides that the writ of execution should be submitted to enforcement authorities within three years after the judgment became final.
COMPLAINT
19. The applicant complained under Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the non‑enforcement of the domestic judgment in his favour and lack of access to court because his claim for compensation under the Compensation Act was left unexamined.
THE LAW
20. The Government argued that the applicant did not comply with the domestic law requirements. In particular, he did not submit the writ of execution to the relevant authorities within the three-year time limit. Thus the applicant could not have expected to claim compensation under the domestic law for non-enforcement of the judgment in his favour.
21. The applicant disagreed and maintained his claims.
22. The Court notes at the outset that a person who has obtained a judgment against the State may not be expected to bring separate enforcement proceedings (see Metaxas v. Greece, no. 8415/02, § 19, 27 May 2004). The burden to ensure compliance with a judgment against the State lies primarily with the State authorities starting from the date on which the judgment becomes binding and enforceable (see Burdov v. Russia (no. 2), no. 33509/04, § 69, ECHR 2009).
23. At the same time, the Court has accepted that a successful litigant may be required to undertake certain procedural steps in order to recover the judgment debt (see Shvedov v. Russia, no. 69306/01, § 32, 20 October 2005). The creditor’s uncooperative behaviour may be an obstacle to timely enforcement of a judgment, thus alleviating the authorities’ responsibility for delays (see Belayev v. Russia (dec.), no. 36020/02, 22 March 2011). In several Russian cases, the Court has found that where the Budget Code, in force at the material time, provided for a successful litigant to be able to request the trial court to forward the writ of execution directly to the competent State authority, and where the applicant for any reason obtained himself the writ of execution from the trial court, it was logical to require that he submitted it to the competent authority with a view to enforcement of the judgment (see Li v. Russia, no. 38388/07, § 17, 24 April 2014; Gadzhikhanov and Saukov v. Russia, nos. 10511/08 and 5866/09, § 26, 31 January 2012; and the most recent Tryapitsyna v. Russa (dec.), § 23, no. 7786/09).
24. Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant obtained the writ of execution and submitted it to the bailiffs’ service and subsequently to the relevant Federal Treasury Department. However, on 16 May 2006 and on 26 December 2007 the Federal Treasury Department returned the writ of execution to the applicant instructing him in clear and unambiguous terms, to submit necessary information and documents. It took the applicant more than three years and a half to apply to the court for restoration of the missed three-year time limit for enforcement. The applicant failed to provide any explanation in order to justify why he had remained passive for such a long period of time without taking any reasonable steps to obtain the execution of a judgment in his favour.
25. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that the applicant’s failure to comply with the authorities instructions and to take reasonable procedural steps was an obstacle to the enforcement of the judgments in his favour. Consequently, the authorities cannot be held responsible under the Convention for non-enforcement of the judgment of 30 April 2003.
26. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
27. Turning to the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 of the Convention about the lack of access to a court because his claim for compensation was left unexamined, the Court notes that in the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. The domestic courts rejected to examine the applicant’s complaint since he had not complied with the domestic law requirements on enforcement proceedings and thus could not have claimed to obtain compensation for non-enforcement.
28. It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill‑founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 24 January 2019.
Stephen PhillipsAlena Poláčková
RegistrarPresident
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy