Information Note on the Court’s case-law No. 176
July 2014
Lynch and Whelan v. Ireland (dec.) - 70495/10 and 74565/10
Decision 8.7.2014 [Section V]
Article 5
Article 5-1
Lawful arrest or detention
Continued imprisonment without review under “wholly punitive” life sentence: inadmissible
Facts – The applicants were serving life sentences for murder. Mr Lynch was convicted of murder in 1997 and given the sentence of life imprisonment that is mandatory in Irish law. His detention was reviewed on a number of occasions by the Parole Board and in September 2012 it recommended his placement on a temporary release programme, which has since commenced. Mr Whelan was convicted of murder and attempted murder in 2002 and given consecutive 15‑year and life sentences.
In their applications to the European Court both applicants complained that their continuing imprisonment violated Article 5 § 1 of the Convention as no there was no form of review available to them to test whether it was still justified by their original convictions. They further argued under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that the power of the Minister to grant temporary release meant that the executive was effectively determining the duration of their sentence, contrary to their right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal.
Mr Whelan’s application was declared inadmissible as being out of time.
Law
Article 5 § 1: The Court noted that Mr Lynch’s trial and detention had been in full conformity with Irish law.
The Court next considered his argument that his sentence was not wholly punitive as in most cases such prisoners were in practice granted temporary release. In its view, this did not belie what the Supreme Court also termed the “exclusively punitive” nature of the applicant’s sentence. In Ireland a mandatory life sentence for the crime of murder had as its sole purpose the punishment of the offender. There was no ‘tariff period’ which a prisoner must serve. Temporary release did not as a matter of domestic law terminate the sentence imposed upon the prisoner following conviction.
Mr Lynch’s situation was clearly distinguishable from that in Stafford v. the United Kingdom in which a life prisoner who had been released on licence complained to the Court that 30 years after his conviction, and because of more recent, lesser offences, he had been recalled and remained in prison by decision of the executive to maintain the revocation of his licence. In Mr Lynch’s case, there had been no interruption in incarceration that could be viewed as rupturing the link between the original conviction and present detention and his detention was not based on any administrative withdrawal of the privilege of temporary release.
The discretionary power of the executive to grant temporary release to a life prisoner was not inconsistent with the solely punitive character of a mandatory life sentence, as expounded by the Irish courts. Nor could it be said to give rise to any uncertainty as regards Mr Lynch’s legal status such as would raise an issue of quality of law or respect for the rule of law.
Accordingly, the causal connection between Mr Lynch’s conviction of murder in 1997 and his imprisonment from that point on was both clear and sufficient. His detention remained in conformity with the original life sentence imposed on him. Finding no sign of any arbitrariness, the Court was satisfied that the applicant’s detention was justified under Article 5 § 1.
Conclusion: inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
Article 5 § 4: Preventative considerations were not part of Irish criminal law generally, a fortiori when it came to the imposition of a mandatory life sentence. The existence of an executive power of temporary release, which took account of factors of security and risk and which was routinely exercised, did not entitle Mr Lynch to a judicial procedure to test the ongoing legality of his current imprisonment. In any event, the power of the Minister was subject to legal safeguards. The Convention did not require any further review of the lawfulness of the detention.
Conclusion: inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
Article 6 § 1: Mr Lynch also complained that, in view of the executive power of temporary release, the criminal proceedings against him had not been conducted in accordance with his right to be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal. The Court rejected Mr Lynch’s argument that it was the Minister who determined the duration of his imprisonment. It found that the criminal charges against him were determined on the day his appeal against conviction was dismissed in 1998. The involvement of the Minister did not come until many years after the trial and it was artificial to suggest that the mandatory life sentence given to the first applicant for the crime of murder remained “unfixed” until he was eventually released by ministerial decision.
Conclusion: inadmissible (manifestly ill-founded).
(See Stafford v. the United Kingdom [GC], 46295/99, 28 May 2002)
© Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights
This summary by the Registry does not bind the Court.
Click here for the Case-Law Information Notes
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy