SECOND SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 21083/23
László MAGYAR against Hungary
and 7 other applications
(see list appended)
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 1 July 2025 as a Committee composed of:
Jovan Ilievski, President,
Péter Paczolay,
Juha Lavapuro, judges,
and Dorothee von Arnim, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications against Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the applicants listed in the appended table (“the applicants”), on the various dates indicated therein;
the decision not to have the applicants’ names disclosed as specified in the appended table;
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
1. The applications concern the applicants’ whole or simple life sentences.
2. In Bancsók and László Magyar v. Hungary (no. 2) (nos. 52374/15 and 53364/15, 28 October 2021) the Court held that the applicants’ life sentences with possibility of release on parole after serving forty years could not be regarded as ‘reducible’ for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention, which resulted in a violation of that provision.
3. The first applicant in the present case, Mr Magyar, subsequently applied to the Kúria for a review of the final decision on the strength of the Court’s judgment.
4. On 21 November 2022 the Kúria rejected the petition, holding that the impugned sentence itself had been established in review proceedings (see for that review, following a first judgment of this Court in László Magyar v. Hungary (no. 73593/10, 20 May 2014), Bancsók and László Magyar, cited above, §§ 8-12), therefore its further review was excluded by law.
5. In Sándor Varga and Others v. Hungary (nos. 39734/15 and 2 others, 17 June 2021); T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary (nos. 37871/14 and 73986/14, 4 October 2016); and Blonski and Others v. Hungary ([Committee] nos. 12152/16 and 6 others, 13 October 2022), the Court held that the applicants’ whole life sentences together with mandatory pardon proceedings or their simple life sentences with the possibility of release on parole after serving a very long time could not be regarded as ‘reducible’ for the purposes of Article 3 of the Convention, which resulted in a violation of that provision.
6. The second to eighth applicants in the present case subsequently applied to the Kúria for a review of the final decisions on the strength of the Court’s judgments in their cases.
7. On different dates, the Kúria dismissed the petitions, holding in essence that the question of reducibility was one of execution of criminal judgments, rather than one of sentencing. In view of that ruling, the domestic court judgments themselves, which contained the impugned sentences, could not as such be considered contrary to the Convention.
8. The supervision of the execution of the Court’s above judgments is pending before the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe.
9. The applicants complain that, despite the Court’s judgments, their sentences remained de facto irreducible, a state of affairs not susceptible to any remedy. The Kúria’s approach to their cases was unfair, barred their access to a tribunal and represented reluctance to abide by the Court’s judgments. They relied on Articles 3, 6, 13 and 46 of the Convention.
THE COURT’S ASSESSMENT
10. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in a single decision.
11. The Court notes that the present applications constitute a follow-up to previous cases lodged by the same applicants. In its previous judgments, listed in the appended table, the Court found that the applicants’ life sentences were de facto irreducible and amounted to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
12. In the present applications, the applicants’ submissions consist of, in essence, complaining about the domestic courts’ refusal to address the problem of irreducibility of their life sentences, that is to say, to execute the previous Court judgments. It is appropriate to examine this complaint both as one concerning the alleged non-execution of the Court’s judgments and as one criticising the domestic courts’ procedure and decision in the review attempts (compare also Rózsa v. Hungary (dec.), no. 53815/11, § 12, 7 April 2015).
13. As to the first aspect, the circumstances of the case require the Court to have regard to Article 46 of the Convention concerning the distribution of powers between the Committee of Ministers and the Court as regards the execution of the Court’s judgments.
14. Article 46, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“1. The High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.
2. The final judgment of the Court shall be transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, which shall supervise its execution.”
15. Under Article 46 § 2, the Committee of Ministers is vested with the powers to supervise the execution of the Court’s judgments and evaluate the measures taken by respondent States. Thus, the question of compliance by the High Contracting Parties with the Court’s judgments falls outside its jurisdiction if it is not raised in the context of the “infringement proceedings” provided for in Article 46 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention. The general principles articulated in the Court’s case-law in this sphere are summarised in the case of Egmez v. Cyprus ((dec.), no. 1221/07, §§ 48-56, 18 September 2012; see Rózsa, cited above, § 14).
16. In the present case, the applicants submitted that the Kúria refused to remove the irreducible element of their life sentences, which would have been required in order to comply with the Court’s judgments. However, complaints of a failure either to execute the Court’s judgment or to redress a violation already found by the Court fall outside the Court’s competence ratione materiae (see Bochan v. Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251/08, § 35, 5 February 2015).
17. Accordingly, the applicants’ complaints, in so far as they concern the alleged failure to remedy the original violations of the Convention as found in the previous judgments, must be declared incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
18. Furthermore, to the extent that the applicants’ arguments may be understood to concern a further breach of the Convention, namely, that the domestic proceedings leading to the rejection of their requests for review were unfair or flawed, this being the second aspect of the applications, the Court reiterates that the Committee of Ministers’ role in the sphere of execution of the Court’s judgments does not prevent it from examining a fresh application concerning measures taken by a respondent State in execution of a judgment if that application contains relevant new information in relation to issues undecided by the initial judgment (see Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) [GC], no. 32772/02, §§ 61-63, ECHR 2009). In this context, reference should also be made to the criteria established in the case-law concerning Article 35 § 2 (b) of the Convention, by which an application is to be declared inadmissible if it “is substantially the same as a matter that has already been examined by the Court ... and contains no relevant new information” (see Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT), cited above, § 63).
19. In Bochan (no. 2) (cited above), the Grand Chamber considered the decision of the Ukrainian Supreme Court to dismiss the applicant’s extraordinary appeal following the Court’s finding of a breach of Article 10 to constitute relevant new information capable of giving rise to a fresh violation of Article 6. In coming to that conclusion, the Court reasoned that the case raised a new grievance concerning the manner in which the Supreme Court’s decision had been reached in the proceedings concerning the applicant’s exceptional appeal (rather than the outcome of those proceedings as such or the effectiveness of the national courts’ implementation of the Court’s judgment). It thus concerned a situation distinct from that examined in the Court’s previous judgment and contained relevant new information relating to issues undecided by that judgment.
20. The Court will therefore ascertain whether the present applications contain relevant new information possibly entailing a fresh violation of Article 6, for the examination of which the Court is competent ratione materiae.
21. The Court notes that in the present cases the Kúria dismissed the applicants’ requests for review respectively because of the reasons outlined in paragraphs 4 and 7 above. The applicants did not complain about any particular procedural unfairness in the review proceedings themselves.
22. Thus, the applicants’ complaints do not indicate any unfairness of the review proceedings as such; and their only grievance is the outcome of those proceedings. Therefore, the issue in question is entirely rooted in the original criminal judgments imposing the impugned irreducible life sentences on the applicants (see also Steck-Risch and Others v. Liechtenstein (dec.), no. 29061/08, 11 May 2010).
23. In these circumstances, the Court considers that the present case must be distinguished from Bochan (no. 2) (cited above), in that the Kúria’s decisions not to review the applicants’ sentences were not based on relevant new grounds capable of giving rise to a fresh violation of Article 6 § 1. It must equally be distinguished from Bancsók and László Magyar (cited above and concerning the first applicant), in which the Kúria, in a new judgment, reviewed and amended the trial court’s sentence regarding the first applicant by omitting from the final judgment a reference to the exclusion of release on parole and by setting the earliest date of eligibility for parole. That new domestic court judgment thus contained relevant new information possibly entailing a fresh violation of the Convention, unlike the Kúria’s decision in the present case (see paragraph 4).
24. It follows that this complaint is likewise incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Decides to join the applications;
Declares the applications inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 28 August 2025.
Dorothee von Arnim Jovan Ilievski
Deputy Registrar President
Appendix
List of cases:
No.
Application
no.
Case name
Introduction date
Applicant’s name
Year of birth
Nationality
Representative’s name
Location
Previous judgments
1.
21083/23
Magyar v. Hungary
12/05/2023
László MAGYAR
1966
Hungarian
Evelyn FRANK
Budapest
László Magyar v.Hungary (no. 73593/10, 20 May 2014)
Bancsók and László Magyar v. Hungary (no. 2) (nos. 52374/15 and 53364/15,
28 October 2021)
2.
21859/23
Rostás v. Hungary
23/05/2023
Henrik ROSTÁS
1987
Hungarian
Erzsébet KADLÓT
Budapest
Sándor Varga and Others v. Hungary (nos. 39734/15 and 2 others, 17 June 2021)
3.
22047/23
Varga v. Hungary
23/05/2023
Sándor VARGA
1981
Romanian
Erzsébet KADLÓT
Budapest
Sándor Varga and Others v. Hungary (nos. 39734/15 and 2 others, 17 June 2021)
4.
28170/23
Kiss v. Hungary
07/07/2023
István Zoltán KISS
1976
Hungarian
Edina Eszter JÓZSA
Budapest
Sándor Varga and Others v. Hungary (nos. 39734/15 and 2 others, 17 June 2021)
5.
10687/24
Benjamin v. Hungary
16/03/2024
Simon BENJAMIN
1972
Hungarian
István SZIKINGER
Budapest
Blonski and Others v. Hungary (nos. 12152/16 and 6 others, 13 October 2022)
6.
19014/24
Páva v. Hungary
28/06/2024
Sándor PÁVA
1972
Hungarian
Evelyn FRANK
Budapest
Blonski and Others v. Hungary (nos. 12152/16 and 6 others, 13 October 2022)
7.
20089/24
T.P. v. Hungary
11/07/2024
T.P.
1981
Hungarian
Arthur Kovács
Szeged
T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary (nos. 37871/14 and 73986/14, 4 October 2016)
8.
30596/24
A.T. v. Hungary
16/10/2024
A.T.
1985
Hungarian
Arthur Kovács
Szeged
T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary (nos. 37871/14 and 73986/14, 4 October 2016)