SECOND SECTION
DECISION
Application no. 31838/19
Margarita MAKARČEVA
against Lithuania
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 28 September 2021 as a Chamber composed of:
Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, President,
Carlo Ranzoni,
Aleš Pejchal,
Egidijus Kūris,
Pauliine Koskelo,
Marko Bošnjak,
Saadet Yüksel, judges,
and Hasan Bakırcı, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having regard to the above application lodged on 5 June 2019,
Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant,
Having deliberated, decides as follows:
THE FACTS
1. The applicant, Ms Margarita Makarčeva, is a Lithuanian national who was born in 1952 and lives in Klaipėda. She was represented before the Court by Mr R. Kairys, a lawyer practising in Šilutė.
2. The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms K. Bubnytė-Širmenė.
The circumstances of the case3. In July 1993 the applicant started a relationship with J.B. They never married but lived together as a couple until J.B. died in May 2013.
4. At the time of his death, J.B. owned two flats in Klaipėda: one which he had bought in March 1992 (hereinafter “the first flat”) and another which he had inherited from his aunt in August 2000 (hereinafter “the second flat”). Both flats were officially registered as J.B.’s property. He also owned some shares in the company in which he had previously worked; he had bought them in 2002 and 2004.
5. During their entire relationship, the applicant and J.B. lived together in the first flat. It appears that the second flat was rented out.
6. J.B. did not leave a will and he did not have any legal heirs (see paragraph 32 below). Therefore, in accordance with the Civil Code, after his death his property was inherited by the State (see paragraph 35 below). In September 2014 a notary issued an inheritance certificate in favour of the State, represented by the State Tax Inspectorate, in respect of the two flats and the shares (see paragraph 4 above).
Proceedings for recognition of property rights7. In July 2013 the applicant lodged a claim seeking official legal recognition that the two flats and the shares (see paragraph 4 above) had been the joint property of her and her deceased partner. She submitted that for twenty years she and J.B. had lived together as a family and had shared a common household. J.B. had been disabled and the applicant had taken care of him. They had had plans to get married but kept postponing them because the applicant had felt self-conscious about the fact that she walked with a limp. She submitted that, over the time of their relationship, she had worked and had received an income, and she had contributed financially to the maintenance and renovation of the two flats. Moreover, the applicant submitted that at present her financial situation was difficult – she had no savings and her only income was a disability pension. Since J.B. had not had any other heirs, she argued that it would be in line with the principles of justice and reasonableness that she should keep the property.
8. The State Tax Inspectorate contested the applicant’s claim. It submitted, inter alia, that she had concealed certain important facts from the court, such as the fact that she owned a flat together with her sister and that her official address had been registered there since 1997.
9. On 30 September 2015 the Klaipėda District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. It held that the fact that she had lived in J.B.’s flat and had used his other property did not suffice to make it their joint property – it had to be demonstrated that they had acquired that property jointly (see paragraph 43 below). The court observed that J.B. had bought the first flat prior to the start of their relationship and he had inherited the second flat from his aunt (see paragraph 4 above). Therefore, it was evident that the applicant had not contributed financially to their acquisition. Moreover, she had not proved that she had given J.B. money to buy the shares.
10. On 22 June 2016, following an appeal lodged by the applicant, the Klaipėda Regional Court upheld the first-instance court’s decision. It stated that, according to the case-law of the Supreme Court, it could not be assumed that all property that had been acquired during a period of marriage or cohabitation constituted the spouses’ or the partners’ joint property (see paragraph 43 below). In order to recognise that J.B.’s personal property had become his and the applicant’s joint property, the applicant had to prove that she had made a significant contribution to the improvement of that property (see paragraph 44 below). However, she had provided only inconsistent information about the renovation works that had been carried out in the flats and had not submitted any credible evidence regarding her financial contribution to those works. Moreover, referring to the information obtained from the relevant authorities, the court found that, for the duration of the applicant’s and J.B.’s relationship, J.B.’s income had been several times higher than the applicant’s, which also gave grounds for questioning her ability to significantly contribute to the improvement of J.B.’s property. Lastly, the court observed that, during the twenty years of their relationship, J.B. had not taken any action to change the legal status of his property, which indicated that he had been satisfied for it to remain his personal property.
11. The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, but on 29 September 2016 the Supreme Court declined to accept it for examination on the grounds that it did not raise any important legal issues.
Proceedings for the recognition of de facto family life12. In March 2017 the applicant instituted new court proceedings, asking the court to recognise a fact of legal significance (nustatyti juridinį faktą) – namely, that she and J.B. had led a de facto family life. In the applicant’s view, the recognition of such a fact would entitle her to inherit J.B.’s property. She submitted that, according to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, family life could be created and exist even if the partners in question were not legally married. She and J.B. had planned to get married, and they had also had plans to sell the two flats and buy a new flat together, but various circumstances had got in their way – the applicant had had a stroke, then her mother had died, and later J.B. had fallen ill. She pointed out that Lithuanian law did not provide for the possibility to register a civil partnership (see paragraphs 36 and 37 below), and argued that it would be contrary to the principles of justice and fairness if the property rights of unmarried partners were left unprotected. She stated that she and J.B. would have registered a civil partnership while he had still been alive, if that had been possible.
13. In the same claim the applicant also asked the court to annul the inheritance certificate that had been issued in favour of the State (see paragraph 6 above).
14. On 28 March 2017 the Klaipėda District Court refused to accept for examination the applicant’s claim, on the grounds that recognition of de facto family life between her and J.B. would not have any legal effect. The court observed that, under the law, unmarried de facto partners were not automatically entitled to inherit each other’s property (see paragraphs 32 and 33 below). The court also found that the applicant did not have legal standing to request the annulment of the inheritance certificate.
15. On 8 June 2017 the Klaipėda Regional Court upheld the first-instance court’s decision in part. It found that the lower court had correctly determined that recognition of de facto family life would not give rise to any legal consequences for the applicant. There was no dispute that the applicant and J.B. had not been married, and they thus could not be recognised by a court as having been spouses. Moreover, given the absence of the possibility to register a civil partnership under the domestic law, recognition of a de facto partnership would not have had any legal effect either. However, the Klaipėda Regional Court quashed the part of the lower court’s decision concerning the applicant’s request for the inheritance certificate to be annulled and remitted that part for fresh examination.
16. On an unspecified date the applicant asked the Klaipėda District Court to adjourn the examination of the case until a law on civil partnership was passed.
17. On 9 March 2018 the Klaipėda District Court dismissed the applicant’s claim. It firstly stated that there were no grounds to adjourn the case, because even if a law on civil partnership were to be enacted, it could not be applied retroactively in respect of the applicant’s and J.B.’s relationship; the applicant had not provided any information to indicate that any draft law on civil partnership providing for its own retroactive application was under consideration in the Seimas. The court also refused the applicant’s request for the inheritance certificate to be annulled, finding that the applicant had not acquired the right to inherit J.B.’s property – either under the law or pursuant to a will – and that she therefore had not had legal standing to lodge such a request.
18. On 15 November 2018 the Klaipėda Regional Court upheld the first-instance court’s decision in its entirety.
19. On 11 December 2018 the Supreme Court refused to accept for examination an appeal on points of law lodged by the applicant, on the grounds that it did not raise any important legal issues.
Proceedings concerning the applicant’s eviction20. In March 2017 the State Tax Inspectorate lodged a claim against the applicant, asking that she be evicted from the property belonging to the State.
21. The applicant lodged a counterclaim, seeking that the State compensate her for the approximately 24,000 euros (EUR) that she submitted that she had spent on maintaining and renovating the two flats.
22. On 25 June 2019 the Klaipėda District Court allowed the claim lodged by the State Tax Inspectorate and ordered the applicant to transfer the two flats to the ownership of the State within fifteen days. It dismissed her counterclaim as unproven. The court observed, inter alia, that the amount which the applicant had submitted that she had invested in the maintenance and renovation of the flats had been higher than the entire official income which she had received over the period of 1993-2013.
23. On 3 April 2020, following an appeal by the applicant, the Klaipėda Regional Court quashed the first-instance court’s decision and remitted the case for fresh examination on the grounds that the applicant had not been properly notified of some of the claims made by the State Tax Inspectorate.
24. On 8 September 2020 the Klaipėda District Court adjourned the case pending the resolution of the proceedings instituted by the applicant in respect of life-long maintenance (išlaikymas iki gyvos galvos) (see paragraphs 29 and 30 below).
25. At the time of the lodging of the parties’ latest observations with the Court (on 27 May 2021), those proceedings were still pending.
Proceedings for damages26. In June 2018 the applicant lodged a civil claim against the State. She argued that she had been unable to inherit J.B.’s property because of the failure of the Seimas and the Government to enact a law on civil partnership. In respect of pecuniary damage she claimed approximately EUR 75,000 in compensation, a sum that allegedly corresponded to the value of the flats and the shares owned by J.B.
27. On 15 April 2019 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s claim as time-barred. It considered that the applicant had known by July 2013 at the latest (see paragraph 7 above) that she was not entitled to inherit J.B.’s property. Therefore, she had missed the three-year time-limit to lodge the claim.
28. On 20 January 2021 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the first-instance court’s decision, albeit on different grounds. It observed that there was no objective data showing that the applicant and J.B. had sought to register a civil partnership, and the sole fact that they had lived together as a couple was insufficient to demonstrate the existence of such an intention. Moreover, the relevant provisions of the Civil Code, which would enter into force when a law on civil partnership was enacted, did not provide that partners had an automatic right to inherit from each other (see paragraph 36 below). Accordingly, even if a law on civil partnership had been enacted, that would not in itself have entitled the applicant to inherit J.B.’s property. The court concluded that the applicant had not demonstrated that her rights had been violated by the State’s failure to enact such a law.
Proceedings concerning life-long maintenance29. In August 2020 the applicant lodged a new claim. She asked the court to recognise that she and J.B. had made an oral agreement on life-long maintenance – specifically, that they had agreed that the applicant would provide maintenance to J.B. until his death and in exchange he would leave his property to her (see paragraph 40 below).
30. On 23 November 2020 the Vilnius Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s claim, finding that she had not proved the existence of such an agreement. The applicant lodged an appeal against that decision. At the time of the lodging of the parties’ latest observations with the Court (on 27 May 2021), those proceedings were still pending.
Relevant domestic law and practiceStatutory provisions(a) Inheritance
31. Article 5.2 § 1 of the Civil Code provides that the right to inherit can be based on the law (see paragraphs 32 and 33 below) or on the provisions of a will (see paragraph 34 below).
32. Article 5.11 § 1 lists the categories of persons who are entitled by law to inherit a deceased person’s estate. In order of priority, those categories are: the deceased’s (1) biological or adopted children; (2) biological or adoptive parents, and grandchildren; (3) grandparents and great-grandchildren; (4) siblings and great-grandparents; (5) nieces, nephews, aunts and uncles; and (6) cousins.
33. Under Article 5.13, a deceased’s surviving spouse is considered to be an heir falling into either the first or the second category (see paragraph 32 above). If there are no other heirs falling into either of those two categories, the spouse inherits the entire estate.
34. Article 5.19 § 1 provides, inter alia, that every person has the right to leave, in a will, all or part of his or her property to one or several persons who may or may not be heirs under the law. A will may be official – that is to say drafted in two copies and certified by a notary (Article 5.28 § 1), or personal – written and signed by the testator by hand (Article 5.30 § 1).
35. Under Article 5.2 § 3, when there are no heirs either under the law or pursuant to a will, the deceased person’s estate shall be inherited by the State.
(b) Civil partnership
36. Chapter XV of Book 3 of the Civil Code of 2000 lays down the rules concerning the property rights of unmarried opposite-sex couples who live together as a family for at least one year after registering a civil partnership. It does not contain any provisions regarding registered partners’ right to inherit each other’s property after the death of one or other partner.
37. Under Article 28 of the Law on the Approval, Entry into Force and Implementation of the Civil Code, the provisions of Chapter XV of Book 3 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 36 above) will enter into force when a law on civil partnership is enacted. Article 50 of that Law recommended to the Government that they prepare a draft law on civil partnership by 1 January 2002. To date no such law has been enacted.
38. According to the information provided by the Government, in 2004, 2007 and 2009 three proposals for a draft law on civil partnership or for amendments to the relevant parts of the Civil Code were registered in the Seimas. None of them would have established the right of registered partners to inherit each other’s property. In 2016 there was a new proposal to amend the Civil Code so that registered partners would have the right to inherit each other’s property. It appears that none of those proposals was submitted to the Seimas for a vote.
39. The most recent proposal for a draft law on civil partnership was presented to the Seimas in May 2021; the draft law would have granted registered partners the right to inherit each other’s property. However, the draft failed to secure the number of votes needed for it to progress to the next legislative stage.
(c) Life-long maintenance
40. Article 6.460 § 1 of the Civil Code of 2000 provides that, under an agreement on life-long maintenance, one person transfers the property rights to his or her real estate (for example, a house, a flat, or a plot of land) to another person, who in return undertakes to provide maintenance to the first person (or to someone else indicated by that person) until their death.
Courts’ practice(a) Constitutional Court
41. In its rulings of 28 September 2011 and 11 January 2019, the Constitutional Court held that the constitutional concept of family was not based solely on the institution of marriage. Although marriage was one of the grounds for the creation of family relations, the Constitution also protected and defended families other than those founded on the basis of marriage – including men and women living together without concluding a marriage.
(b) Supreme Court
42. The Supreme Court acknowledged on several occasions that a relationship between a man and a woman who lived together as a couple without being married could be classified as “joint activity”. It would be unreasonable to require such persons to conclude written agreements when acquiring property together; therefore, the creation of joint property could be manifested by various circumstances, such as the fact that a couple lived together in a long-lasting and stable relationship, that they jointly took care of their shared household, or that they invested their money or work in the creation of joint property (see, inter alia, a decision of 28 March 2011 in civil case no. 3K-3-134/2011 and a decision of 24 October 2011 in civil case no. 3K-3-410/2011).
43. In a decision of 28 March 2011 in civil case no. 3K-3-134/2011 the Supreme Court held that persons who were married, as well as those who lived with a partner without being married, could still acquire and own personal property. It could not be assumed that all property acquired during the period of a couple’s cohabitation was their joint property, because that would unreasonably restrict each partner’s property rights and freedom to conclude contracts. Therefore, when determining that a certain piece of property was the joint property of both partners, rather than the personal property of only one partner, it had to be demonstrated that the partners had agreed to acquire that object as their joint property.
44. In a decision of 15 February 2006 in civil case no. 3K-3-126/2006 and a decision of 14 March 2013 in civil case no. 3K-3-140/2013, the Supreme Court, when examining the division of property between spouses during a divorce, held that personal property of one of the spouses could be considered as their joint property if it had been significantly improved during the period of marriage through the use of the spouses’ joint funds or by using the funds or labour of the other spouse.
COMPLAINT
45. The applicant complained that she had been unable to inherit J.B.’s property.
THE LAW
46. The applicant complained that she had been unable to inherit J.B.’s property because of the failure of the State authorities to enact a law on civil partnership. In her initial application she relied on Article 8 of the Convention.
47. When giving notice of the application to the respondent Government, the Court asked the parties questions under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
48. After the Government had been given notice of the application, the applicant lodged a new application form, in which she raised the same complaints and cited Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. It was included in the present case.
49. The Court reiterates that it is the master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case (see Radomilja and Others v. Croatia [GC], nos. 37685/10 and 22768/12, §§ 123-26, 20 March 2018, and the cases cited therein). It observes that the present case concerns the applicant’s right to inherit the property of her late partner – but not the protection of her already existing property rights, which would fall under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above; contrast Molla Sali v. Greece [GC], no. 20452/14, §§ 129-31, 19 December 2018). Accordingly, her complaints fall to be examined under Article 8 of the Convention taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14. Those provisions read as follows:
Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life)
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination)
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.”
The parties’ submissionsThe Government50. The Government firstly submitted that the application was premature because some of the domestic proceedings were still ongoing (see paragraphs 25 and 30 above).
51. Be that as it may, they contended that the domestic law provided several ways for the applicant to obtain J.B.’s property. One way would have been for J.B. to make a will – a simple procedure (see paragraph 34 above), which the applicant had not argued would have been overly burdensome. Nonetheless, during the nearly twenty years of their relationship, J.B. had not done so.
52. In addition, the Government submitted that the applicant and J.B. had had the possibility to get married and, according to the applicant, they had intended to do so (see paragraphs 7 and 12 above). The Government stated that the applicant had not presented any reasons why she and J.B. would have preferred to register a civil partnership, an option which they had known had not been available.
The applicant53. The applicant submitted that the State had an obligation to protect all families, not only those that had been created by way of marriage. However, Lithuanian law did not adequately protect unmarried partners’ property rights, and as a result, the applicant had been unable to inherit her partner’s property. That property had been her home for nearly twenty years, but it had eventually been appropriated by the State.
54. The applicant considered that her right to respect for her private and family life had been violated by the absence of any possibility under Lithuanian law to register a civil partnership. She submitted that the authorities had failed to enact the necessary law for almost two decades, thereby creating a legal vacuum (see paragraphs 36 and 37 above). As a result, existing non-marital family or partnership relationships had been left without legal protection.
The Court’s assessmentWhether the present application is premature55. The Court observes that two sets of domestic proceedings are still pending. One of them concerns the applicant’s eviction from J.B.’s flat and her claim for compensation for the expenses that she claimed to have had when maintaining J.B.’s property (see paragraphs 20-25 above). The other set of pending proceedings concerns the applicant’s claim that she and J.B. had concluded an oral agreement on life-long maintenance (see paragraphs 29 and 30 above). In the Court’s view, although these two sets of proceedings stem from the same facts as the case before it, the legal issues raised therein are not so closely related to the present application as to render it premature. By contrast, the proceedings in which the applicant raised the claims that she subsequently made before the Court have been concluded by final decisions (see paragraphs 19 and 28 above). Therefore, the Court rejects the Government’s request for it to dismiss the case as premature.
Scope of the case56. It was not disputed that the applicant had lived in the first flat for nearly twenty years and that it was her home (see paragraph 5 above). However, she did not rely on the right to respect for her home in any of the five sets of domestic proceedings (see paragraphs 7, 12, 21, 26 and 29 above). Nor did she ever allege that, in the event of eviction, she would be unable to secure alternative accommodation (compare and contrast Šidlauskas v. Lithuania, no. 51755/10, § 47, 11 July 2017; see also the domestic authorities’ submissions concerning another property, partly owned by the applicant, in paragraph 8 above). Accordingly, the Court does not consider that the present case calls for an examination of the applicant’s right to respect for her home.
Article 8 of the Convention57. It cannot be disputed that the relationship between the applicant and J.B. constituted “family life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention, regardless of the fact that they were not married (see Van der Heijden v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 42857/05, § 50, 3 April 2012, and the cases cited therein).
58. The Court acknowledged in Şerife Yiğit v. Turkey ([GC], no. 3976/05, § 95, 2 November 2010, and the cases cited therein) that questions of inheritance and voluntary dispositions between near relatives appear to be intimately connected with family life. It held that family life does not include only social, moral or cultural relations, but also interests of a material kind, and that inheritance rights and the distribution of the estate represent a feature of family life that cannot be disregarded.
59. While the essential object of Article 8 of the Convention is to protect individuals against arbitrary interference by public authorities, it may also impose on a State certain positive obligations to ensure effective respect for the rights protected by Article 8 (see Hämäläinen v. Finland [GC], no. 37359/09, § 62, ECHR 2014, and the cases cited therein). In the present case, the applicant and J.B. lived together as a couple for many years, without any interference by the State in their family life. Accordingly, the Court considers that it is more appropriate to examine the case from the perspective of the State’s positive obligations (see Şerife Yiğit, cited above, §§ 100-101).
60. Under Lithuanian law, spouses are automatically entitled to inherit one another’s property after death (see paragraph 33 above). The law does not provide the same inheritance rights to unmarried couples (see paragraph 32 above). However, an unmarried partner may inherit his or her partner’s property pursuant to a will made by the latter (see paragraph 34 above). In the Court’s view, the procedure for concluding a will cannot be considered as overly burdensome or excessively formalistic (see paragraph 34 above).
61. The Court has never held that Article 8 of the Convention imposes an obligation on the Contracting States to establish any specific type of legal regime for ensuring inheritance rights. Article 8 in principle leaves to the Contracting States the choice of the means in this sphere (see Merger and Cros v. France, no. 68864/01, § 47, 22 December 2004).
62. Given the circumstances of the present case, the Court considers that the applicant and her late partner had sufficient opportunities to secure their inheritance rights. It observes that the applicant did not provide any explanation as to why, during the nearly twenty years of their relationship, J.B. had not drafted a will (see paragraph 10 above and, mutatis mutandis, in the context of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, Şerife Yiğit, cited above, § 86). Moreover, it was never suggested that they had been prevented for some reason from contracting marriage (see Van der Heijden, cited above, § 72; contrast Muñoz Díaz v. Spain, no. 49151/07, §§ 57-59, ECHR 2009). On the contrary, the applicant herself claimed that they had intended to get married but had postponed those plans for various reasons (see paragraphs 7 and 12 above), which reasons can in no way be attributed to the authorities (see, mutatis mutandis, Korosidou v. Greece, no. 9957/08, § 71, 10 February 2011).
63. In most of the proceedings before the domestic courts, as well as in her submissions before this Court, the applicant placed great emphasis on the fact that Lithuanian law did not provide for the possibility for couples to register a civil partnership (see paragraphs 12, 16, 26 and 54 above).
64. In this connection, the Court reiterates that all couples in stable, committed relationships are in need of legal recognition and protection of their relationship (see Oliari and Others v. Italy, nos. 18766/11 and 36030/11, § 165, 21 July 2015, and the cases cited therein).
65. However, the Court’s task is not to assess the domestic law in abstracto, but to determine whether the manner in which it was applied to, or affected, the applicant gave rise to a violation of the Convention (see Roman Zakharov v. Russia [GC], no. 47143/06, § 164, ECHR 2015, and the cases cited therein).
66. The Court has already found that the applicant and J.B. had the possibility to obtain legal recognition and protection of their relationship by contracting a marriage (see paragraph 62 above). There is no indication in any of the documents in the Court’s possession that during the entire duration of their relationship the applicant and J.B. ever discussed their wish to enter into a civil partnership, that they expressed their preference for a civil partnership over marriage, or that they had any objections to getting married (see paragraph 28 above). Nor did the applicant present any arguments to that effect to either the domestic courts or this Court.
67. The Court also observes that on the domestic level there have been several unsuccessful attempts to enact a law on civil partnership (see paragraph 38 above). It notes that enacting such a law would provide an avenue to persons who, for any reason, do not wish or are unable to marry but who nonetheless seek legal recognition and protection of their relationship. Be that as it may, it does not appear that, during the time of the applicant and J.B.’s relationship, any of the legislative attempts progressed sufficiently to create an expectation for the applicant that she and J.B. would be able to register a civil partnership. Therefore, it ought to have been clear to the applicant and J.B. that they did not have the option of registering a civil partnership and ensuring the applicant’s inheritance rights in that way. There is no indication that the applicant was misled by the authorities in this respect.
68. In the light of the foregoing, the Court is satisfied that the domestic law provided the applicant with adequate opportunities to inherit her late partner’s property. It has not been suggested that she was unaware of the fact that she would be unable to inherit J.B.’s property in the absence of a will or marriage (see, mutatis mutandis, Van der Heijden, cited above, § 70). Given those circumstances, the Court concludes that the situation in which she eventually found herself was created by the choices made by her and J.B., and not by any failure on the part of the authorities.
69. It follows that the applicant’s complaint under Article 8 of the Convention is manifestly ill-founded and must be declared inadmissible, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 870. The applicant also invoked Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8. However, she did not substantiate that complaint, or raise it, at least in substance, before the domestic courts.
71. Having regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as this complaint falls within its competence, the Court finds that there is no appearance of a violation of the provisions invoked. It follows that this part of the application must likewise be rejected as manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Court, unanimously,
Declares the application inadmissible.
Done in English and notified in writing on 28 October 2021.
Hasan Bakırcı Jon Fridrik Kjølbro
Deputy Registrar President