Published on 30 October 2023
SECOND SECTION
Application no. 25336/22
Vytautas MANKUS
against Lithuania
lodged on 12 May 2022
communicated on 12 October 2023
SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
The application concerns the applicant’s complaint that he is barred from working in Statutory organisations (Statutinė įstaiga) on account of his conviction which expired a long time ago. The applicant also complains of the fact that he had not been compensated for legal costs incurred in connection with a successful individual constitutional complaint.
On 11 October 2011 the applicant was convicted of perjury, which is an intentional crime (Article 235 of the Criminal Code). He was imposed a fine which he paid.
In January 2012 the applicant was admitted to the Public Security Service at the Ministry of the Interior. In May 2013 he was transferred to serve in the police force, but a week later he was dismissed on the grounds that the applicant’s conviction had not been known at the time he was admitted to the Public Security Service.
On 30 October 2013 the court granted the prosecutor’s request and held that the applicant’s conviction had expired.
In July 2014 the State authorities provided the Public Security Service information about the applicant’s conviction and about the court decision to hold that conviction to have expired. Afterwards, in September 2014 the applicant was re-admitted to the Public Security Service, and his professional rank restored.
Five years later, on 27 March 2019, the Public Security Service dismissed the applicant from service on the basis of Article 72 § 1 (10) of the Statute of Internal Service (Vidaus tarnybos statutas), which referred to Article 16 thereof. The latter article provided at that time that a serviceman must be dismissed when it comes to light that he does not meet the requirement of irreproachable reputation. Article 9 § 2 (1) of the Statute provided at that time that a person is not considered to have an irreproachable reputation if he or she has been convicted of an intentional crime, irrespective of the fact that the conviction had expired.
The applicant started administrative court proceedings for his reinstatement, arguing that his conviction had not been a new circumstance – it had been known to the Ministry of the Interior authorities before his re-admittance in September 2014. The applicant also asked the administrative court to refer to the Constitutional Court the question whether Article 9 § 2 (1) of the Statute of Internal Service was constitutional, insofar as it barred for a lifetime a person who had been convicted of an intentional crime from entering public service in any Statutory organisation.
By a decision of 28 November 2019 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s action. The court held that eight years had passed from the time the crime had been committed to the moment the applicant had lodged an action; this was not a sufficiently long time to hold that the legal requirement for an individual not to be convicted of an intentional crime was disproportionate. An intentional crime was more dangerous than a non-intentional crime, and it also mattered that the applicant had been convicted of perjury, which fell into the category of crimes against justice. As a result, the administrative court also had no doubts that the Statute was in compliance with the Constitution, and no referral to the Constitutional Court was needed.
On 4 March 2020 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s appeal, including his request to refer the question of the constitutionality of the Statute to the Constitutional Court. The Supreme Administrative Court referred to the Court’s judgment in the case of Lekavičienė v. Lithuania (no. 48427/09, 27 June 2017), and concluded that the expiry of a conviction, in and of itself, did not mean that a person regained an irreproachable reputation.
On 27 April 2020 the applicant lodged an individual constitutional complaint, which the Constitutional Court accepted for examination.
By a ruling of 14 April 2021 the Constitutional Court held that Article 9 § 2 (1) of the Statute of Internal Service, insofar as it held that “a person who had been found guilty of an intentional crime, irrespective of whether the conviction had expired” had been in breach of Article 33 § 1 of the Constitution, which grants all citizens the right to enter on equal terms the State Service of the Republic of Lithuania, and of Article 48 § 1 of the Constitution, which holds that everyone may freely choose a job.
Afterwards, on the applicant’s request, the Supreme Administrative Court re-opened the administrative court proceedings regarding the applicant’s dismissal.
Despite this, by a final ruling of 24 November 2021 the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal, and left the decision of 4 March 2020 unchanged. The Supreme Administrative Court noted, among others, that part of Article 9 § 2 (1) of the Statute of Internal Service, which provided that a person who had been convicted of a non-intentional crime, and when less than five years from the conviction had passed, remained valid. Besides, in the applicant’s case it was relevant that particularly high requirements applied to the statutory officers’ reputation, given the specifics of those officers’ status. It followed that the applicant’s request for re-instatement could not be granted. Lastly, given that the decision was not in the applicant’s favour, the Supreme Administrative Court also dismissed the applicant’s request for legal costs.
The applicant complains under Article 8 of the Convention that the prohibition for him to enter statutory service was not prescribed by law, and that it was disproportionate.
The applicant further complains under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he had not been compensated for the legal costs incurred in connection with the individual constitutional complaint.
QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES
1. Has there been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention? In particular, has there been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for his private life, within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention, on account of the courts’ finding that he is prohibited from working in statutory organisations due to his previous conviction (see Denisov v. Ukraine [GC], no. 76639/11, §§ 92-117, 25 September 2018, and Jankauskas v. Lithuania (no. 2), no. 50446/09, §§ 56-58, 27 June 2017; see also, mutatis mutandis, Gražulevičiūtė v. Lithuania, no. 53176/17, §§ 95-111, 14 December 2021)?
If so, was that interference in accordance with the law?
Was it necessary in terms of Article 8 § 2 (see, mutatis mutandis, Lekavičienė v. Lithuania, no. 48427/09, §§ 51-57, 27 June 2017, and Jankauskas, cited above, §§ 74-82)?
2. Has there been a breach of the applicant’s right of access to court, as provided for in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, on account of the fact that the courts refused to award compensation for the legal expenses incurred by the applicant in the Constitutional Court proceedings when contesting the constitutionality of the Statute of Internal Service (see, mutatis mutandis, Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania, nos. 73579/17 and 14620/18, §§ 65-74, 18 February 2020)?
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