AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 27866/95
by Jaakko Johannes MARKKULA
against Finland
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 3 December 1997, the following members being present:
Mrs J. LIDDY, President
MM M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
E. BUSUTTIL
A. WEITZEL
L. LOUCAIDES
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
M. VILA AMIGÓ
Mrs M. HION
Mr R. NICOLINI
Mrs M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 15 May 1995 by
Jaakko Johannes Markkula against Finland and registered on 17 July 1995
under file No. 27866/95;
Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Procedure of the Commission;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Finnish citizen, born in 1926 and resident in
Kangasala, Finland. Before the Commission he is represented by
Mr Pekka Suojanen, a lawyer practising in Tampere.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be
summarised as follows.
The applicant and his brother owned jointly some real estates and
other property they had inherited from their parents. On
23 February 1990 the applicant and his wife on the one side and the
applicant's brother and his wife on the other side signed a contract
concerning the partition of the said property.
On 13 August 1992 the Pirkkala District Court (kihlakunnanoikeus,
häradsrätten) found the applicant incapable of caring for his economic
affairs and ordered his wife to act as his trustee as regards such
matters until further notice.
In 1992 the applicant and his wife instituted civil proceedings
before the Pirkkala District Court against the applicant's brother and
the latter's wife with a view to having the contract of
23 February 1990 declared void. They argued, inter alia, that at the
time of the transaction they had been incapable of evaluating the
contents and consequences of the contract and that they therefore had
been incapable of contracting. Accordingly, they contended that the
contract could not bind them. Furthermore, they referred to the alleged
unfairness of the partition.
In the course of the proceedings the plaintiffs submitted written
medical statements concerning the applicant's legal capacity. According
to the statements the applicant had a diminished legal capacity which
in particular appeared in situations involving division of property,
especially, if he was under any pressure. The court heard witnesses as
to the alleged incapacity from the medical and psychological points of
view and as to the circumstances relating to the contract at issue.
According to a witness, an expert in psychiatry, the incapacity from
which the applicant allegedly suffered was rare.
According to chapter 3 of the Legal Transactions Act (laki
varallisuusoikeudellisista oikeustoimista, lag om rättshandlingar på
förmögenhetsrättens område 228/1929) as in force at the relevant time,
a legal transaction may be declared void under certain conditions,
inter alia, on account of a person's lack of understanding.
On 1 February 1993 the District Court considered, on the basis
of the available evidence, that it could not be established that
pressure had been used during the negotiations for the contract or its
signing and that the applicant and his wife for this or any other
reason would have been incapable of judging clearly the contents and
consequences of the transaction at issue or that they would have lacked
the sense of judgment the contract at issue had required and that they,
accordingly, would have been incapable of contracting. The District
Court therefore rejected the claims.
Subsequently, the applicant and his wife appealed against the
judgment to the Turku Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten). They
submitted several written medical statements, some of them after the
time-limit for lodging an appeal, and requested an oral hearing to
examine several witnesses two of whom had been heard before the
District Court.
According to chapter 25, section 12 of the Code of Judicial
Procedure (Oikeudenkäymiskaari, Rättegångs Balk), as in force at the
relevant time, the time limit for lodging an appeal is 30 days from the
day the lower court renders its judgment or decision. According to
chapter 26, section 5 of the Code of Judicial Procedure the Court of
Appeal may, if a special reason appears, take into consideration
submissions and documents which arrive after the lime limit.
On 4 August 1994 the Court of Appeal decided to disregard the
evidence which had been submitted belatedly since no special reason for
taking it into account had been presented, deemed an oral hearing
unnecessary and, without holding one, upheld the judgment of the
District Court. In its reasoning the Court of Appeal noted, inter alia,
that a psychologist and a psychiatrist heard as witnesses had been of
the opinion that the applicant had been in a state in which he was
incapable of safeguarding his interests in the partition. However, two
witnesses, lawyers who had been present during the transaction, had
noticed nothing to the effect that the applicant's interests would not
have been attended to. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal considered that
the statements of the above-mentioned psychologist and psychiatrist did
not show that the applicant had been in such a state that he was unable
to understand the meaning of the transaction and to safeguard his
interests therein.
The applicant and his wife requested leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court (korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen). On 23 November 1994
the Supreme Court refused their request.
COMPLAINTS
1. The applicant complains that he was not afforded a fair trial.
He maintains that the courts decided the case contrary to the evidence
presented and thus refused him the protection the law provided. He also
contends that the Turku Court of Appeal refused to hold an oral hearing
to examine witnesses and disregarded part of the medical statements
submitted. He invokes Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.
2. Furthermore, the applicant complains that he was denied an
effective remedy taking into consideration that the courts decided the
case against the evidence given of his capacity to contract. He invokes
Article 13 of the Convention.
3. The applicant also complains that he was discriminated against
on the ground of his health. He maintains that he did not receive the
legal protection he was entitled to although his incapacity was proved
by the evidence. In this connection he invokes Article 14 of the
Convention.
4. Finally, the applicant complains that his right to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions was interfered with. He claims that by
rejecting his action the national courts failed to give him the
necessary protection. The applicant invokes Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
to the Convention.
THE LAW
1. The applicant complains that he was denied a fair hearing. He
claims that the courts decided the case contrary to the evidence. He
also maintains that the Court of Appeal refused to hold an oral hearing
and disregarded part of the evidence. He invokes Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as
follows:
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations
..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law. ..."
The Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19
(Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance
of the obligations undertaken by the Parties to the Convention. In
particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging
that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts,
except where it considers that such errors might have involved a
possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the
Convention or one of its Protocols (cf. Eur. Court HR, Schenk v.
Switzerland judgment of 12 July 1988, Series A no. 140, p. 29, para.
45).
The applicant claims that the courts decided the case contrary
to the evidence presented. The Commission notes, however, that the
District Court and the Court of Appeal rendered judgments in which they
assessed the evidence and, on the basis of this assessment, reached a
reasoned conclusion. The Commission has not found any appearance of a
violation of the Convention or its Protocols as regards this particular
aspect of the proceedings.
The Commission has examined next whether the refusal to hold an
oral hearing in the Court of Appeal discloses any appearance of a
violation of the applicant's right to a fair trial within the meaning
of Article 6 (Art. 6). It notes Finland's reservation to Article 6
(Art. 6) which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:
"For the time being, Finland cannot guarantee a right
to an oral hearing insofar as the current Finnish laws do
not provide such a right. This applies to:
1. proceedings before the Courts of Appeal, the Supreme
Court, ... in accordance with Chapter 26, Sections 7 and 8,
as well as Chapter 30, Section 20 of the Code of Judicial
Procedure..."
The Commission finds that the above-mentioned reservation covers
the applicant's complaint concerning the lack of an oral hearing before
the Court of Appeal. It follows that the Commission is barred ratione
materiae from examining this part of the applicant's complaints in
respect of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal.
As regards the evidence the Court of Appeal disregarded the
Commission recalls that the admissibility of evidence is primarily
governed by the rules of domestic law. The task of the Convention
organs is to ascertain whether the proceedings, considered as a whole,
were fair (cf. e.g. Eur. Court HR, Lüdi v. Switzerland judgment of
15 June 1992, Series A no. 238, p. 20, para. 43 and the reference
therein).
The Commission observes that the Court of Appeal decided to
disregard only the evidence which was submitted belatedly. The decision
was based on the Court's view that no special reason appeared for
taking this evidence into account. The applicant had 30 days to submit
documents to the Court of Appeal. Nevertheless, he submitted part of
the evidence after the time reserved for submissions had expired. The
applicant has not claimed that he could not have submitted the evidence
earlier, nor has he presented any special reason why the evidence ought
to have been taken into consideration. Having regard to this the
Commission finds that the Court of Appeal did not go beyond its
discretion as regards the evidence in question. In these circumstances
and considering the proceedings as a whole, the Commission cannot find
any indication that the proceedings were unfair.
It follows that this part of the application is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the
Convention.
2. The applicant complains that he was denied an effective remedy
since the courts allegedly decided the case contrary to the evidence.
He invokes Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, which provides as
follows:
"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this
Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy
before a national authority notwithstanding that the
violation has been committed by persons acting in an
official capacity."
The Commission notes that the applicant had available to him a
court remedy as required by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the
Convention in respect of the dispute concerning the partition of the
property. Furthermore, the Commission has recognised that the
procedural guarantees of Article 6 (Art. 6) take precedence over those
of Article 13 (Art. 13) where a "civil right" is at issue, because the
guarantees of this Article are more rigorous than those of Article 13
(Art. 13) (see e.g. No. 11949/86, Dec. 1.12.86, D.R. 51, p. 195).
Thus, the Commission considers that, having regard to its
decision relating to Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), it is unnecessary
to examine the application from the standpoint of Article 13 of the
Convention since the requirements of the latter provision are less
strict and are here absorbed by those of Article 6 para. 1
(Art. 6-1).
Accordingly, this part of the application must be rejected as
being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
3. The applicant complains that he was discriminated against on the
ground of his health. He invokes Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention
which provides as follows:
"The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin,
association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status."
The Commission notes that the proceedings the applicant complains
of involved the evaluation of his health. The District Court found that
it had not been established that this played any significant role at
the time of the transaction. The Court of Appeal upheld this judgment
and the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal.
Furthermore, the applicant has not shown that there would have been any
discrimination as regards the proceedings in general. In these
circumstances the Commission finds the applicant's allegation to be
unsubstantiated.
It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
4. The applicant finally complains under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
(P1-1) to the Convention that the national courts failed to give him
the necessary protection by not finding in his favour.
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention reads as
follows:
"Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject
to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it
deems necessary to control the use of property in
accordance with the general interest or to secure the
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."
The Commission must first consider whether there has been a
deprivation of or other interference with the applicant's possessions
within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).
The Commission recalls that the second sentence of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) dealing with deprivation of possessions is
generally intended to refer to acts whereby a State lays hands on, or
authorises a third person to lay hands on, a particular piece of
property for a purpose which is to serve the public interest. Property
transfers which take place in the context of the settlement of
relations between individuals do not normally amount to deprivation of
possessions within the meaning of Article 1 (Art. 1), notwithstanding
the fact that the State through its courts may have provided a forum
for such a settlement (see No. 8588/79 & 8589/79, Dec. 12.10.82, D.R.
29, p. 64 and No. 11949/86, Dec. 1.12.86, D.R. 51, p. 195). In the
Commission's view similar principles apply in the determination of
whether there has been an interference with possessions where this
interference is not covered by the second sentence.
In the present case the alleged violation of the property rights
took place in connection with civil proceedings between private parties
which the Commission has found above to have been in conformity with
Article 6 (Art. 6). It follows that there is no appearance of a
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).
This part of the application must therefore be rejected as being
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2
(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.
M.F. BUQUICCHIO J. LIDDY
Secretary President
to the First Chamber of the First Chamber
Full & Egal Universal Law Academy